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I. ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Appellees request oral argument because of important and novel state 
constitutional issues this appeal implicates. 
II. LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW 
John Thomas Snyder, Plaintiff and Appellant, represented by Brian M. Barnard 
and James L. Harris, Jr. of the Utah Legal Clinic. 
Murray City Corporation, a municipal corporation, and H. Craig Hall, former City 
Attorney for the City (collectively referred to as the "City"), represented by Richard A. 
Van Wagoner and Allan L. Larson of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
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V. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2001), and 
Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
VI. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court properly dismiss Mr. Snyder's Article I, Section 15 
Speech Clause claim as time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations? Did Mr. 
Snyder waive an "ongoing violation" defense to the motion to dismiss the Speech Clause 
claim as time-barred? The issue was raised and preserved at R. 492 at 10,20. 
B. Is Mr. Snyder barred from relitigating claims and issues finally resolved in 
the federal case as to which the facts and legal standards are the same under the Utah 
Constitution? This issue was preserved at R. 251-58. 
C. After Mr. Snyder announced his intent to give a "prayer" that was meant to 
offend, embarrass, disparage, and proselytize in a manner strictly incompatible with the 
purpose for having an Opening Ceremony at Council Meetings, did the City's decision 
not to invite Mr. Snyder to give the "prayer" during the Opening Ceremony, but 
suggestion that he give his "prayer" as an agenda item or during the Public Comment 
portion of the Meeting, violate any of the following provisions of the Utah Constitution: 
1. Article I, Section 4 (Free Exercise Clause); 
2. Article I, Section 15 (Free Speech Clause); 
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3. Article I, Section 4 (Establishment Clause); 
4. Article I, Section 7 (Due Process Clause)? 
These issues were raised and preserved at R. 9-14,107-18. 
VII. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
See Addendum at Tab 5. 
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City has a longstanding custom to include an inspirational thought or message, 
which may include a prayer, as part of the Opening Ceremony in Council Meetings. The 
purposes of such messages is, among others, to promote civility, lofty thoughts and 
attention to the agenda items. Appellant Mr. Snyder requested he be allowed to present a 
"prayer95 at an upcoming Council Meeting. Mr. Snyder included a copy of the statement 
he intended to present. 
Because Mr. Snyder's proposed "prayer" did not conform to the purpose for 
having the Opening Ceremony, H. Craig Hall, then City Attorney, informed Mr. Snyder 
his proposed "prayer" was unacceptable for the Opening Ceremony but invited Mr. 
Snyder to present his statement in the Public Comment portion of the Meeting or as an 
agenda item. Mr. Snyder rejected this offer and filed a federal lawsuit in mid-1994. The 
district court granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Snyder v. Murray City 
Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Utah 1995) (Snyder /, Addendum Tab 1), reh 'g denied, 902 
2 
F. Supp. 1455 (D. Utah 1995) (Snyder II, Addendum Tab 2). Mr. Snyder appealed the 
matter to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, Snyder v. 
Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349 (10th Cir. 1997) (Snyder III, Addendum Tab 3). Mr. 
Snyder's federal law claims were dismissed with prejudice, but his state law claims were 
reinstated and dismissed without prejudice on September 10,1997. The appeal was later 
heard en banc, Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 526 
U.S. 103 (1998) (Snyder IV, Addendum Tab 4), and the Tenth Circuit, again, affirmed. 
The Tenth Circuit Order to dismiss the state law claims with prejudice was remanded to 
the district court on October 27,1998. In that case Mr. Snyder had not brought a Speech 
Clause claim under the United States or Utah Constitutions. 
Mr. Snyder then filed this lawsuit on August 3,1999, more than five years 
after the City had declined to invite Mr. Snyder to give his "prayer," in which he asserted 
the original state law claims and added a state Speech Clause claim. The parties moved 
the trial court for summary judgment. The City orally moved to dismiss Mr. Snyder's 
Speech Clause claim as time-barred. Following the hearing on the cross motions, the trial 
court granted the City's motion, and denied Mr. Snyder's motion. The trial court also 
dismissed the Speech Clause claim as time-barred. (Addendum Tab 6.) This timely 
appeal followed. 
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IX. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Federal District Court for the District of Utah and the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals each addressed this case twice. Both courts set forth a statement of undisputed 
facts. Appellees believe Mr. Snyder is not entitled to re-visit the factual underpinnings of 
his claims and is bound by the federal courts' conclusions. The original panel opinion 
succinctly provided: 
Since 1982, Murray City has opened its city council meetings with a reverence 
period, during which an invocation or devotion is presented. The reverence 
portion of the meetings is designed to encourage lofty thoughts, promote civility, 
and cause the participants to set aside other matters in order to focus on the topics 
to be addressed at the meeting. The city council extends invitations to speak 
during the reverence period to individuals representing a broad cross-section of 
religious faiths, and invocations or devotionals have been presented at the Murray 
City Council meetings by Christians, Navajos, Quakers and Zen Buddhists. One 
speaker simply requested a moment of silence. Mr. Snyder, who does not reside in 
Murray City, wrote to the City, advising of his interest in presenting a prayer at a 
council meeting. Mr. Snyder attached his two-page proposed "Opening Prayer" to 
the letter. Mr. Snyder's request was part of his personal campaign to stop prayers 
at public meetings, waged in response to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of 
Utah which upheld Salt Lake City's practice of opening public meetings with a 
prayer. 
Although Mr. Snyder was reared as a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, he is no longer a practicing member of that faith, or any other 
organized religion. He testified that he considers himself deeply religious, but is 
not yet sure what his beliefs are, and leans towards agnosticism. Mr. Snyder cites 
the Book of Mormon and the Gospel of St. Matthew as the religious bases for his 
prayer. He believes that prayer should be a private matter between an individual 
and his or her God, and that Jesus Christ opposed public prayers, including those 
before government meetings. Although Mr. Snyder testified at his deposition that 
he believes in God, he also testified that he questions God's existence. 
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On behalf of Murray City, Mr. Hall responded to Mr. Snyder's request and 
informed him that his proposed prayer was unacceptable because it did not follow 
the guidelines for prayers which the City had previously provided to Mr. Snyder. 
Although the council had no formal, written policy, Mr. Snyder had been informed 
by letter prior to the submission of his proposed prayer that "the purpose of the 
'prayer' is to allow individuals [the] opportunity to express thoughts, leave 
blessings, etc. It is not a time to express political views, attack city policies or 
practices or mock city practices or policies." Mr. Snyder had also been advised 
that comments on City practices and policies could be made during city council 
meetings either by requesting a place on the meeting agenda or by speaking during 
the citizen comment portion of the meeting. The citizen comment portion of the 
meeting immediately follows the reverence portion. 
Snyder III, 124 F.3d at 1351-52 (Addendum Tab 3). 
Out of caution, Appellees set forth their Statement of Facts. 
INSPIRATIONAL THOUGHTS AT THE 
BEGINNING OF COUNCIL MEETINGS 
The City has a longstanding custom to include an inspirational thought or message, 
which may include a prayer, as part of the Opening Ceremony in Council Meetings. The 
City established this practice in 1982 when the Council form of government became 
effective, and has remained uninterrupted, with one exception.1 (R. 341.) The City has 
not favored any particular religion or religion in general in scheduling participants.2 (R. 
340-41, 345-46,349-50, 354, 356.) Rather, the City's policy has been to expect and 
*The City suspended its practice during the pendency of the appeal in Society of 
Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993), decided in December 1993. 
Murray City reinstituted the practice in January or February 1994. (R. 349.) 
2The City's practice was the same as that in Salt Lake City, as characterized in Society 
of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 918-19 & n.2 (Utah 1993). 
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encourage those persons giving commencement thoughts or prayers to promote civility, 
lofty thoughts and attention to agenda items. (R. 340-41,345-46,349-50,354,356.) The 
City sought to assure a broad cross-section of the community was represented. It made a 
list of diverse congregations, groups and associations within the community and invited 
people from such groups to give a thought, expression or prayer at the commencement of 
Council Meetings. Participants have included Native Americans and representatives from 
Zen Buddhists, a cross section of Judeo-Christian congregations, Quakers, and others. 
(R. 340, 350-51.) Any public expenditures were not for the religious exercise itself, but 
for the meeting and that portion of the agenda that consists of opening thoughts, some of 
which have included prayers. (R. 340-41, 345-46, 349-50, 354.) 
The City allows, as the first agenda item following the Opening Ceremony, three 
minutes each for citizens to express whatever political or other comments they have 
without restriction (Public Comment agenda item). Citizens may also contact the Council 
before-hand and be formally placed on the agenda in order to express personal or political 
views or grievances. (R. 343, 344, 357.) 
MR. SNYDERfS REQUEST TO GIVE AN OPENING PRAYER 
On December 10, 1993, this Court decided Society ofSeparationists v. Whitehead, 
870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993) (hereinafter "Whitehead"), holding that Salt Lake City 
Council's policy of permitting prayer during the portion of Council Meetings set aside for 
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opening remarks did not violate the Utah Constitution's prohibitions against union of 
church and state or domination of government by any church. 
On March 23,1994, Mr. Snyder sent a letter to the City, expressing interest in 
presenting a "prayer" at the beginning of a Council Meeting. (R. 124.) Mr. Snyder was 
the first person ever to ask to offer a prayer before the City Council. Invitees gave all 
other inspirational messages or prayers. (R. 143,151.) Mr. Snyder sent a second letter 
dated May 9,1994. (R. 126.) 
By letter dated June 1,1994, Mr. Hall responded to Mr. Snyder's letters as follows: 
The Municipal Council has not established formal policies regarding the 
nature and/or content of this reverence portion of their agenda3 
The purpose of the "prayer" is to allow individuals that opportunity to 
express thoughts, leave blessings, etc. It is not a time to express political 
views, attack city policies or practices or mock city practices or policies. 
Comments on present city practices or policies may be made at city council 
meetings by one of two methods; either by requesting to be placed on the 
agenda; or, taking up to three minutes during the "citizen comment" portion 
of the meeting. The later method requires no prior arrangements to be 
made. 
(R.at21.) 
In a June 9,1994 letter, Mr. Snyder requested he be allowed to give a "prayer" at 
the next available Council Meeting, and enclosed a copy of his proposal, as follows: 
3At the time Whitehead was initiated, Salt Lake City's policy had not been reduced to 
writing. 870 P.2d at 918-19 n.2. 
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OUR MOTHER, WHO ART IN HEAVEN (IF, INDEED THERE IS A 
HEAVEN AND IF THERE IS A GOD THAT TAKES A WOMAN'S 
FORM) HALLOWED BE THEY NAME, WE ASK FOR THY BLESSING 
FOR AND GUIDANCE OF THOSE THAT WILL PARTICIPATE IN 
THIS MEETING AND FOR THOSE MORTALS THAT GOVERN THE 
STATE OF UTAH; 
WE FERVENTLY ASK THAT YOU GUIDE THE LEADERS OF THIS 
CITY, SALT LAKE COUNTY AND THE STATE OF UTAH SO THAT 
THEY MAY SEE THE WISDOM OF SEPARATING CHURCH AND 
STATE AND SO THAT THEY WILL NEVER AGAIN PERFORM 
DEMEANING RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES AS PART OF OFFICIAL 
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS; 
WE PRAY THAT YOU PREVENT SELF-RIGHTEOUS POLITICIANS 
FROM MIS-USING THE NAME OF GOD IN CONDUCTING 
GOVERNMENT MEETINGS; AND, THAT YOU LEAD THEM AWAY 
FROM THE HYPOCRITICAL AND BLASPHEMOUS DECEPTION OF 
THE PUBLIC, ATTEMPTING TO MAKE THE PEOPLE BELIEVE 
THAT BUREAUCRATS* DECISIONS AND ACTIONS HAVE THY 
STAMP OF APPROVAL IF PRAYERS ARE OFFERED AT THE 
BEGINNING OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS; 
WE ASK THAT YOU GRANT UTAH'S LEADERS AND POLITICIANS 
ENOUGH COURAGE AND DISCERNMENT TO UNDERSTAND 
THAT RELIGION IS A PRIVATE MATTER BETWEEN EVERY 
INDIVIDUAL AND HIS OR HER DEITY; WE BESEECH THEE TO 
EDUCATE GOVERNMENT LEADERS THAT RELIGIOUS BELIEFS 
SHOULD NOT BE BROADCAST AND REVEALED FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF IMPRESSING OTHERS; WE PRAY THAT YOU STRIKE 
DOWN THOSE THAT MIS-USE YOUR NAME AND THOSE THAT 
CHEAPEN THE INSTITUTION OF PRAYER BY USING IT FOR 
THEIR OWN SELFISH POLITICAL GAINS; 
WE ASK THAT THE PEOPLE OF UTAH WILL SOME DAY LEARN 
THE WISDOM OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE; WE 
ASK THAT YOU WILL TEACH THE PEOPLE OF UTAH THAT 
GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN RELIGION; WE 
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PRAY THAT YOU SMITE THOSE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT 
WOULD ATTEMPT TO CENSOR OR CONTROL PRAYERS MADE BY 
ANYONE TO YOU OR TO ANY OTHER OF OUR GODS; 
WE ASK THAT YOU DELIVER US FROM THE EVIL OF FORCED 
RELIGIOUS WORSHIP NOW SOUGHT TO BE IMPOSED UPON THE 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH BY THE ACTIONS OF MIS-
GUIDED, WEAK AND STUPID POLITICIANS, WHO ABUSE POWER 
IN THEIR OWN SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS; 
ALL OF THIS WE ASK IN THY NAME AND IN THE NAME OF THY 
SON (IF IN FACT YOU HAD A SON THAT VISITED EARTH) FOR 
THE ETERNAL BETTERMENT OF ALL OF US WHO POPULATE 
THE GREAT STATE OF UTAH. 
AMEN. 
(R. 130,131.) 
Prior to Mr. Snyder's proposal, no one had ever used the opening portion of the 
Meeting to attack City policies or practices or express political views. (R. 340,342,344, 
355.) In a June 30,1994 letter, Mr. Hall, on behalf of the City, stated: 
The text of the proposed prayer is unacceptable. It does not follow the 
guidelines set forth in my letter dated June 1,1994. Until your proposed 
prayer satisfies these guidelines, an invitation to participate in our opening 
ceremonies will not be forthcoming.... 
If you have any questions please contact me directly. I would appreciate a 
phone number that I may discuss this matter with you during the day. 
(R. 134.) 
Whether the "prayer" reflected Mr. Snyder's deeply held or sincere religious 
beliefs had nothing to do with the City's decision. Rather, the decision was based on the 
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City's right to conduct its business in accordance with procedures it adopts, by practice 
and by rule. (R. 345.) Mr. Hall determined the text of the "prayer" did not encourage 
people to have lofty thoughts, did not encourage people to be civil, did not encourage 
people to "clear out the clutter of the day" or to focus on the agenda. Mr. Hall also 
believed it was insincere and hypocritical. (R. 345-46,348,353,354,356.) 
According to the City's custom and practice, any person or group could give the 
inspirational thought or invocation, be they agnostics, Catholics, Buddhists, Baptists, 
Seventh Day Adventists or others, so long as the offering was consistent with the purpose 
for having the Opening Ceremony. (R. 349-50, 352,258.) 
Mr. Snyder did not accept Mr. Hall's invitation to give his statement as an agenda 
item or during the Public Comment portion of the Meeting. Nor did he accept Mr. Hall's 
invitation to discuss the matter or to provide Mr. Hall a telephone number where he could 
be reached. (R. 347-48, 357,386-389.) 
MR. SNYDERfS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS 
Mr. Snyder was baptized LDS, and has "the dubious distinction of having served 
in the same Deacon's Quorum with now-Apostle Dallin Harris Oaks" in Vernal. He 
resigned from the LDS Church because of its stand on the Equal Rights Amendment. He 
is not a member of any other church, and has not been in any church for several years. 
(R. 363-64.) He has been trying for years to "separate the dogmatisms that [his] hard-
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core little Mormon mother painted on [him] by the time [he] was thirteen or fourteen 
years old." He thinks he is deeply religious, but he is not sure what his beliefs are. He 
believes in doing unto others as he would have them do unto him, but he "can't separate 
[his] political and philosophical and religious beliefs. They are pretty tangled up." 
Snyder Depo., p. 15 (R. 365). 
He supposes he believes in God. At the time of his deposition in September 1994, 
his odds were 60/40 against God's existence. Some days he is more or less pessimistic. 
(R.366,400-01.) To the extent he believes God exists, he does not know whether God 
looks like a man or a woman, nor what manifestation, if any, God takes. However, he has 
some beliefs learned from his mother which sometimes "rare up," but he does not know 
what those beliefs are, although he does recall that his mother taught him God was male. 
(R. 366-67.) He does not know what he believes about God's powers, or whether God 
can grant requests. (R. 367-68.) 
When asked whether he had ever had a vision or "spiritual experience," his only 
response was to describe an incident about ten years before in Vernal when his friend, 
who was a "bad drunk," told him about a visit from the Lord. It went something like this: 
Drunk: I had a visit from the Lord, and boy, was I surprised! 
Snyder: Well, what surprised you? 
Drunk: She's black! (spilling a drink on Mr. Snyder). 
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Mr. Snyder "went crazy." "[He] thought that was so fiinny." (R. 368-69.) 
THE ORIGIN AND MOTIVATION OF MR. SNYDERfS "PRAYER" 
Mr. Snyder's son-in-law is acquainted with Chris Allen and Rich Andrews, who 
Mr. Snyder thinks co-chaired the Society of Separationists. (R. 373-74.)4 Mr. Snyder 
read newspaper accounts of Whitehead in December 1993. After the first of the year Mr. 
Snyder wrote a letter to Mr. Andrews saying he was sorry the Court had ruled against 
them. In the letter, he incorporated a draft of his "prayer." Mr. Snyder described the 
genesis of, and the motivation for, the "prayer": 
I get rid of my frustrations with a pencil and a piece of paper. The letter 
I wrote him was tongue-in-cheek. The first part of it was . . . As I was 
venting my frustrations in that letter... I told Rich I had watched so much 
football over the holidays that I had a trick knee and I was laying on the 
couch convalescing, licking my nuts and listening to the Mormon 
Tabernacle Choir sing "When the Saints Come Marching In." As I 
remember, that's the way it all started. And then I said, if you need, or if 
they are going to force us to listen to their prayers, let's give them a prayer 
that they don't want to listen to. I think that is basically what I said. 
(R. 375-77 (emphasis supplied).) 
The prayer was intended to "jolt Murray or Salt Lake City, make them think that 
they really didn't want to open up that can of worms again." (R. 377-78.) 
Mr. Snyder does not live in the City, had never been to a Council Meeting in his 
life, and could not conceive of any business he would have had before the City Council 
4Richard Andrews is a named plaintiff in Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). 
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during 1994. (R. 371,372-73.) His motivation was to accomplish the same thing he had 
accomplished with Salt Lake City.5 Chris Allen of the Separationists suggested with that 
"victory" under their belts, Mr. Snyder do the same thing with other cities. (R. 378,379-
82,383-84.) 
Q. As I get it, what you wanted to have happen here was to have 
Murray City do the same thing that Salt Lake City did, right? Just 
decide not have prayers? 
A. I would have been pleased with that, yes sir. 
(R. 395-96.) 
Q. And the primary purpose of the prayer, as I get it, was to call 
attention, to the City Council, to your aversion to prayer and to get 
them thinking about the whole issue; is that right? 
A. To make them see the fallacy of what they are getting into by prayer. 
(R. 399.) 
He did not want to give the "prayer" during the Public Comment portion of the 
Meeting solely because he assumed he would be interrupted; admittedly, however, he had 
never been to a Council Meeting, and did not know what the practice was concerning 
interrupting people. (R. 385-86.) He wanted the Council to be his captive audience for 
three minutes so he could leave the thought and make them reconsider the practice. (R. 
5When he requested permission to give his "prayer" at a Salt Lake City Council 
Meeting in January 1994, the Council decided, rather than be subjected to such "a can of 
worms," it would forego the practice of prayer altogether. 
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385-86.) He "expected somewhat of a stunned silence where they could meditate, gather 
their thoughts, and start the ball rolling. Let's debate [the issue of prayer]." (R. 393.) 
If the City had invited him to give his "prayer," but had not modified its practices 
to Mr. Snyder's approval, he would have written another "prayer," perhaps more 
offensive, in order to get the Council's attention: 
Q. So your purpose was to do whatever it takes to get their attention; 
correct? 
A. As I have said, you've got to have their attention before their thought 
process looks at themselves. 
Q. And your goal is to get their attention, have them see the light, have 
them cease allowing prayer at the commencement of council 
meetings. That's your goal. Correct? 
A. As I have said, I have -1 don't like public prayer. I don't think it is 
proper. I disagree with the Utah Supreme Court. But I have the 
right to express my thoughts and opinions, and I'm going to fight to 
protect those rights. 
Q. You consider that you have a right to give your prayer at the prayer 
portion of the City Council meeting, no matter what the content, or 
the intent, of your prayer? That's your position in this matter? 
A. Yes. I have a right to deliver it. 
(R. 396-98.) 
Apparently acknowledging the intemperate nature of his requests in his "prayer," 
he attempted to define some terms: 
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But let me define "strike down" and "smite." When I use the term "strike down," I 
would - my prayer to her would be to knock them off of their little self-styled 
pedestals and put them on a level playing field to -1 think I'd know the true 
definition of "smite" because after being married to that old gal, living with her for 
over forty years, have her sneak off like she did, I God damn sure know what 
smitten is. And it took me a while to realize, after a few bottles of scotch and 
beating my head against the wall, I realized I was hurt. She hurt me. She smited 
me terribly. And that was the intent of "strike down" and "smite."6 
(R. 394-95.) 
He refused Mr. Hall's offer to discuss the issue as set forth in Mr. Hall's letter of 
June 30, 1994, and immediately filed suit in the related federal case. (R. 134.) 
X. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Snyder filed suit in federal court, asserting violations of both the United States 
and the Utah Constitutions under identical facts. The federal courts' decisions bear 
directly on this case and, in instances where the legal standards under the respective 
constitutions are the same, the decisions are dispositive.7 
In sum, (l)(a) the City had no affirmative duty under Article I, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution to provide Mr. Snyder a forum in which to exercise his religion because the 
language vis-a-vis the government is prescriptive not prescriptive; (b) Mr. Snyder did not 
6There is, of course, no evidence anyone associated with the City knew of 
Mr. Snyder's marital history, drinking habits, or his personal definition of "strike down" 
or "smite." 
7The language in the respective Constitutions is essentially identical with respect to 
Mr. Snyder's Free Exercise claim, his Speech claim and his Due Process claim. 
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have a deeply held or sincere religious belief in the practice he sought to exercise, so the 
City did not interfere with a religious exercise; (2)(a) his Speech Clause claim was 
properly dismissed as time-barred; (b) Mr. Snyder's claim of an "ongoing violation" as a 
defense to the statute of limitations motion is procedurally improper because it is raised 
for the first time on appeal; (c) the forum to which he sought access-Opening Ceremony-
-was non-public, reserved for specific government purposes, and, because his "prayer" 
was strictly incompatible with the purpose for having legislative prayer, the City properly 
chose not to invite Mr. Snyder to give the "prayer"; (d) had the City invited Mr. Snyder to 
give his "prayer" during the Opening Ceremony, the City would have risked (i) violating 
the Establishment provisions of Article I, Section 15 because of the "prayer's" overt 
proselytization ("compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently 
compelling to justify content-based restrictions on speech"), (ii) violating the federal 
Establishment Clause, or (iii) changing the nature of the forum, which it was not required 
to do; (e) Mr. Snyder had reasonable alternatives to convey his message to the Council; 
(3) the City did not violate the Establishment provisions of Article I, § 4 by declining to 
invite Mr. Snyder to give his "prayer" because his proposal was strictly incompatible with 
the purpose for having legislative prayer, yet he or anyone else who would give a 
message that was consistent with the purpose for having the Opening Ceremony was and 
is welcome; (4) the City did not deny Mr. Snyder due process within the meaning of 
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Article I, § 7 because (a) he was not deprived of life, liberty or property, (b) he was 
afforded reasonable, meaningful process which he declined. 
The narrow question is whether the City's decision not to invite Mr. Snyder to give 
his "prayer" during the Opening Ceremony of the Meeting (a forum specifically reserved 
for government purposes) after he announced his intent to proselytize, embarrass, and 
disparage the beliefs of others, but offer of time during another part of the Meeting to 
express his views, is constitutionally permitted. The broader issue, however, is whether, 
by having legislative prayer during the Opening Ceremony, the City must provide a pulpit 
during the Opening Ceremony to anyone who claims a sincerely held religious belief in 
something, regardless of message's strict incompatibility with the City's purpose for 
having legislative prayer. Mr. Snyder argues Murray City opened Pandora's Box by 
having the ceremony, and now must allow every "exercise" even the most imaginative 
mind could conceivably call "religious," regardless of its inconsistency with the City's 
lawful purpose in reserving the forum. The City believes Mr. Snyder's assertion is not a 
valid extension or application of Whitehead. 
The City did not open Pandora's Box. The Utah Constitution permits and requires 
courts to draw reasonable lines, to distinguish legitimate legislative prayer from 
gratuitous insult in a non-public forum. The City did not have to tolerate Mr. Snyder's 
offering as the event itself; its accommodation to hear his protest as a separate agenda 
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item or during the Public Comment portion of the Meeting was fair, reasonable and 
constitutional. Forcing the City to allow Mr. Snyder to inflict whatever "prayer" he wants 
as the "putative government-sanctioned speaker" in the non-public forum would create a 
serious imbalance of individual over majority rights and interests. 
XI. ARGUMENT 
A. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
Certain claims and issues herein were litigated in federal court. To the extent 
those claims and issues and the legal standards are the same, the parties are bound by the 
courts' rulings. 
1. LEGAL STANDARD. 
Under Utah law, the doctrine of res judicata has two distinct branches. Both 
branches are designed to protect litigants from the burden of relitigating decided issues, 
and promote judicial economy by preventing needless litigation. Macris & Associates, 
Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P. 3d 1214,1219 (Utah 2000). One branch, claim preclusion, 
bars relitigation of claims previously litigated between the same parties. Id. The other 
branch, issue preclusion (interchangeably referred to as collateral estoppel), prevents 
relitigation of previously litigated issues. Id. 
A "claim" is a set of operative facts giving rise to a judicially enforceable right. 
Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, 766 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1988) (citing Original 
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Ballet Russe v. Ballet Theatre, 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943)). This Court has held that in 
order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of action, the plaintiff must satisfy 
three requirements: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit 
or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. 
Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Maoris & Associates, Inc. v. Newqys, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Utah 2000) (quoting 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,247 (Utah 1988)). All three elements must be present 
for claim preclusion to apply. Id. 
An "issue" is a material point asserted by one party and denied by the other. Id. 
(citing Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Ca, 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943)). As noted in 
Hillv. Seattle First National Bank, 827 P.2d241, 245 (Utah 1992), this Court has adopted 
a four-prong test governing the application of issue preclusion: 
First, the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must 
be final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, 
fairly, and competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is 
precluded from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action 
or a privy of a party. 
827 P.2d 241,245 (Utah 1992).8 
8Utah cases inconsistently apply an additional requirement that the issue actually 
litigated in the earlier matter "must have been essential to the resolution of that suit." 
Compare Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (citing Robertson v. Campbell, 61A P.2d 1226,1230 n.l 
(Utah 1983), for additional requirement) with Swainston, 766 P.2d 1059 (making no 
mention of requirement that issue be essential in previous matter) and Burnett, 797 P.2d 
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The City has been unable to find a Utah case expressly addressing the question 
whether claim or issue preclusion serves to prevent relitigation in Utah state courts of 
civil claims or issues previously decided in federal courts or other state's courts.9 
However, this Court, at least twice, affirmed lower court decisions invoking the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel to bar litigation of issues in state court that were previously decided 
in federal court. See Hill v. Seattle First National Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992); 
Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co., 797 P.2d 1096. This Court also considered a case 
relying on collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of issues previously decided in 
bankruptcy court, and applied the same four-prong test used in other cases. See Bruno, 
735 P.2d 387. Finally, in Glickv. Holden, 889 P.2d 1389 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995), the Court 
of Appeals was confronted with whether a federal judge's adoption of a Magistrate 
Judge's Report and Recommendation dismissing certain claims as legally frivolous under 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), precluded relitigation of those claims in state court. The Court 
decided the case on an alternative basis, and therefore did not reach that issue. But for the 
1096 (Utah 1990) (similarly quiet as to requirement that issue be essential). This 
additional requirement is arguably consumed, at least in part, under the third prong of the 
original test which mandates a full and competent consideration of any issue precluded 
from relitigation. 
9Utah courts have noted the doctrine of "dual sovereignty" prevents invocation of 
collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of issues by separate sovereigns in criminal 
cases. See, e.g., Utah v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981 (Utah App. 1995) (relying on several 
federal decisions). 
20 
alternative ground for dismissal, the Court appeared ready to apply claim preclusion 
analysis to the issue. Id. at 1391-92. Consequently, even though no Utah court has 
expressly held such, the doctrine of res judicata is applied to claims and issues decided in 
federal courts. This approach addresses the efficiency rationale underlying the rule, 
which should apply with equal force to issues or claims fully considered and decided by 
any competent state or federal court. 
2. PRIOR LITIGATION OF CLAIMS AND ISSUES. 
Mr. Snyder is barred from relitigating several claims and issues that respectively 
meet the three criteria for claim preclusion and the four criteria for issue preclusion. In 
Snyder I, 902 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Utah 1995) (Addendum at Tabs 1 and 2), under identical 
facts, plaintiff made the same claims and raised the same issues under the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution (with the exception of the Speech Clause claim).10 
In Snyder III, 124 F.3d 1349 (10th Cir. 1997) (Addendum at Tab 3), the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Snyder's federal claims. Concerning Mr. Snyder's Free 
Exercise claim, the Tenth Circuit explained: 
Even assuming that Mr. Snyder is possessed of sincerely held religious beliefs, as 
articulated in his proposed prayer, we find that Mr. Snyder's claim is not 
10Moreover, in Vagi Convalescent & Care Inst. v. Industrial Comm % 649 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1982), this Court concluded that decisions relating to the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution are highly persuasive when interpreting 
the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution. 
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cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause. In fact, Mr. Snyder's arguments 
evince a fundamental misconception about the rights bestowed by the clause.11 
The Free Exercise Clause is one of the Bill of Right's "thou shall not" prohibitions 
against certain government actions. The Clause is written in terms of what the 
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can 
exact from the government To protect "the right to believe and profess 
whatever religious doctrine one desires," . . . the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the 
government from impermissibly burdening an individual's free exercise of 
religion. However, "[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to 
require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport 
with the religious beliefs of particular citizens." 
The Free Exercise Clause does not guarantee any person the right to pray 
whenever and wherever he chooses. Nor does the Clause guarantee a person the 
right to speak during portions of public meetings set aside for devotional or 
invocational purposes. Suggestion to the contrary is inconsistent with both 
common sense and constitutional doctrine We find no violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
Id. at 1353 (citations omitted (Addendum at Tab 3)). 
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the district court's dismissal of Mr. Snyder's due 
process claims. Id. at 1353-54 (Addendum at Tab 3). The court explained: 
Because Mr. Snyder's First Amendment claims are without merit, his claim under 
the federal Due Process Clause also fails. It is beyond argument that process is 
nThe court explained: 
This may well be, however, one of those very rare cases in which the plaintiffs 
beliefs are "so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation" that they are not 
entitled to First Amendment Protection Regardless, we need not decide 
whether Mr. Snyder's beliefs are religious in nature nor whether they are sincerely 
held. 
Snyder III, 124 F.3d at 1353 (Addendum at Tab 3). 
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due only when the government terminates a protected interest Mr. Snyder was 
not deprived of any protected interest and therefore he had no entitlement to any 
sort of process. 
Id. at 1354 (citations omitted)(Addendum at Tab 3). 
However, the Tenth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc solely on the dismissal of 
the Establishment Clause claim. The court again affirmed the district court. The court 
first explained the unusual posture in which this case is presented: 
Although there are many kinds of Establishment Clause claims, the prayer cases 
typically arise in a procedural posture that pits an audience member of a particular 
faith, often a minority religious view, against a government-sanctioned speaker 
who has recited a prayer, often expressing a majoritarian religious view, during a 
government-created prayer opportunity 
The difficulty of the establishment claim in this case flows partly from its 
inversion of the usual posture. Here, the plaintiff is the putative government-
sanctioned speaker, and he alleges that in preventing him from reciting his prayer 
against government prayers, the government has established a religion. Despite its 
unusual posture, the essence of Snyder's contention is straightforward: Snyder 
claims that in branding his particular prayer "unacceptable" and preventing him 
from offering it as part of the official "reverence period" of the municipal council 
meeting, Murray City has impermissibly preferred one religion over another. We 
must decide if this is so. 
Snyder IV, 159 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998) (emphasis supplied) (Addendum at 
Tab 4). 
Explaining the backdrop for and standard against which the federal 
constitutionality of legislative prayer is measured, the court stated: 
The point at which an invocational legislative prayer falls outside the traditions of 
the genre and becomes intolerable occurs when "the prayer opportunity has been 
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exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief." . . . Thus, the kind of legislative prayer that will run afoul of the [United 
States] Constitution is one that proselytizes a particular religious tenet or belief, or 
that aggressively advocates a specific religious creed, or that derogates another 
religious faith or doctrine. When a legislative invocation strays across this line of 
proselytization or disparagement, the Establishment Clause condemns it. 
As a second constitutional restriction on legislative prayer, the Court in Marsh also 
warned that the selection of the person who is to recite the legislative body's 
invocational prayer might itself violate the Establishment Clause if the selection 
"stemmed from an impermissible motive." . . . The [United States Supreme] Court 
implicitly indicated that the particular motive that is "impermissible" in this 
context is a motive in selecting the prayer-giver either to "proselytize" a particular 
faith or to "disparage" another faith, or to establish a particular religion as the 
sanctioned or official religion of the legislative body.
 t 
Id. at 1233-34 (citations omitted) (Addendum at Tab 4). 
Comparing Mr. Snyder's prayer with the foregoing standards, the court had no 
difficulty rejecting his federal Establishment claim and, in fact, stating that permitting the 
"prayer" would have run afoul of the federal Establishment Clause: 
Snyder's claim must fail as a matter of law because his proposed prayer falls well 
outside the genre of legislative prayers that the Supreme Court approved in Marsh 
and the record is devoid of evidence indicating an intent to promote or disparage 
any religion. Not only does Snyder's prayer explicitly attack the genre itself, it 
also disparages those who believe that legislative prayer is appropriate Most 
importantly, Snyder's prayer aggressively proselytizes for his particular religious 
views Snyder's prayer clearly draws from the tenets of his belief-which is an 
aspect of many different religious faiths-that prayer should only be conducted in 
private. Because Snyder's prayer seeks to convert his audience to his belief in the 
sacrilegious nature of governmental prayer, his prayer is itself proselytizing. As a 
result, Murray City was well within its rights under Marsh to deny permission for 
Snyder to recite his proposed prayer. A deliberative body has a right to take steps 
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to avoid the kind of government prayer that would run afoul of Marsh and the 
Establishment Clause.12 
Id. at 1235 (Addendum at Tab 4). 
In his original suit, Mr. Snyder made no Speech Clause claim under state or federal 
law, but under the doctrine of claim preclusion, that was a claim he could and should have 
brought. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S FREE EXERCISE CLAIM FAILS. 
The "Religious Liberty" Clause in the Utah Constitution provides in part: "The 
State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof;" Utah Const. Art. 1, § 4. 
1. THE CITY HAD NO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROVIDE MR. 
SNYDER A FORUM IN WHICH TO EXERCISE HIS RELIGION. 
Utah's "free exercise" language is identical to that in the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. The Tenth Circuit properly characterized and dispensed with 
Mr. Snyder's Free Exercise claim, quoted above. 
See 124 F.3d at 1353 (Addendum at Tab. 4). 
The City was fully within its legal prerogative to ask that Mr. Snyder wait a few 
minutes to give it. See Utah Constitution, Article XI; Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-501 et. 
12Thus, were the Utah Constitution interpreted to require the City to allow Mr. Snyder 
to give his "prayer" during the Opening Ceremony, that interpretation would result in a 
violation of the federal Establishment Clause. 
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seq.; id. § 10-3-601 et. seq. The Council has the right to carry out its legislative 
responsibilities in an orderly, civilized fashion. An individual's involvement in a Council 
Meeting is reasonably subject to rules of order and civility. An individual's religious 
beliefs do not excuse him from compliance with otherwise valid laws, rules or 
regulations. As the United States Supreme Court explained: 
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an 
organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself 
would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. 
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). 
In Employment Div.f Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court 
further explained: 
We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is 
free to regulate 
The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant 
concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the 
discharge of political responsibilities "Laws . . . are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious 
belief and opinions, they may with practices Can a man excuse his 
practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this 
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the 
law of the land and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto 
himself." 
[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation 
to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability on the 
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ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes)." 
Id. at 878-89. 
Mr. Snyder, along with any other public members who wished to criticize or 
comment on the City's policies, could reasonably be required to speak during the Public 
Comment portion of the Meeting or be placed on the agenda, consistent with the 
Council's rules of order. Asking that modest civility of Mr. Snyder hardly interfered with 
his right of religious exercise. 
2. MR. SNYDER DORS NOT HAVE A DEEPLY HELD RELIGIOUS 
BELIEF IN THE PRACTICE HE SOUGHT TO EXERCISE. 
The "prayer" was manifestly insincere as a religious exercise as Mr. Snyder 
testified: "As I have said, I have~I don't like public prayer. I don't think it is proper." 
(R. 396-98). Presumably, before one's "religious exercise" is entitled to constitutional 
protection, it must be real, that is it must be deeply or sincerely held. Mr. Snyder claims 
his "religious belief is prayers never be given at Council Meetings. The City agrees that 
is his deeply held belief. However, he sought to give a "prayer" as a form of purported 
"religious expression," before the Council, a practice in direct conflict with his sincerely 
held belief. By Mr. Snyder's own admission, the City did not burden a practice in which 
he had a sincerely held religious belief. By his own admission, Mr. Snyder's claim of 
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burden is insincere on its face. There was no violation of Mr. Snyder's right to the free 
exercise of his religion. 
Moreover, it was not an integral part of Mr. Snyder's "deeply held" or "sincere" 
religious belief that his statement be given only during the Opening Ceremony portion of 
the Meeting. The undisputed facts establish Mr. Snyder had no sincerely or deeply held 
religious belief concerning precise timing of when he must utter the words. He wanted a 
captive audience before the Council, and he could have had it, without restriction, by 
being placed on the agenda or speaking during the Public Comment portion of the 
Meeting. His only reason for not exercising his so-called religious expression as an 
agenda item or during the Public Comment portion of the Meeting had nothing to do with 
a sincerely or deeply held religious belief. It was his unfounded fear of interruption. 
Hence, his exercise of religion was in no way inhibited. 
C. PLAINTIFF'S SPEECH CLAIM FAILS. 
1. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THIS CLAIM 
AS TIME-BARRED, AND MR. SNYDER WAIVED ANY 
"ONGOING VIOLATION" ARGUMENT. 
The court below properly dismissed Mr. Snyder's Speech claim as time-barred. 
Mr. Snyder contends that although the City rejected his "prayer" in 1994, its wrongdoing 
continues today. He characterizes his Speech claim as a challenge to the current policies 
and practices of the City. This Court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is 
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sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or 
action....'" Dipoma v. McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225 (2001) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk 
Producers Ass '/i, 461 P.2d 290,293 n.2 (1969)). However, if "the ground or theory 
urged for the first time on appeal is not apparent on the record, the principle of affirming 
on any proper ground has no application." State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145,149 (Ct. App. 
Ut. 1997) (emphasis supplied). "Apparent on the record, in this context, means more than 
mere assumption or absence of evidence contrary to the 'new' ground or theory. The 
record must contain sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting the ground or 
theory to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the prevailing party may 
rely thereon on appeal." Id. 
Mr. Snyder failed to raise this argument in the court below, and his new argument 
for preserving the claim is not "apparent on the record." The argument does not appear in 
the trial Court's decision. Until Mr. Snyder filed his opening brief, the City did not know, 
and did not have any reason to know, that Mr. Snyder intended to rely upon this argument 
in an attempt to circumvent the obvious statute of limitations problem. Even if this Court 
overlooks Mr. Snyder's failure to preserve this issue for appeal, Mr. Snyder's argument is 
flawed for two reasons.13 
l3Although the trial court dismissed the Speech claim under a five year statute of 
limitations in its Memorandum Decision, the court was probably referring to the four 
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First, it was a claim he could and should have brought within the meaning of the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
Second, Mr. Snyder lacks standing to bring a Speech claim challenging the City's 
current policies and practices. Utah's "generally stated standing rule is that a plaintiff 
must have suffered 'some distinct and palpable injury that gives him [or her] a personal 
stake in the outcome of the legal dispute.' The need for such a personal stake frequently 
is described as a requirement that the plaintiffs injury be 'particularized.'" Soc 9y of Prof I 
Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987) (internal citations omitted). The 
City has not restricted Mr. Snyder's speech in any way, and in particular, since 1994 and, 
therefore, Mr Snyder does not currently have a "distinct and palpable injury." It is 
insufficient that Mr. Snyder disagrees with the City's current policies and procedures. 
Presently, Mr Snyder does not have an injury that is "particularized" and therefore lacks 
standing to bring a Speech claim. 
2. THE OPENING CEREMONY IS A NONPIJBLIC FORUM 
PROPERLY LIMITED BY A REASONABLE AND VIEWPOINT-
NEUTRAL RESTRICTION AT LOWING ONLY LEGISLATTVE 
PRAYERS. 
Section 15 of Article I, Utah Constitution, provides: "No law shall be passed to 
abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press." This language is nearly 
year "catch all" period for "relief not otherwise provided for by law" found at Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-15(3) (2001). 
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identical to that in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which 
provides: "Congress shall make no law.. . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press " There is little Utah case law interpreting this provision, and the City has 
found no Utah case law giving guidance concerning the speech rights of persons to gain 
access to a portion of a meeting the government has specifically reserved for its own 
official purposes (non-public forum), vis., the Opening Ceremony. Because of the 
virtually identical language in the state and federal Speech Clauses, the City turns to 
federal case law, of which there is an abundance, for guidance.14 
a. THE OPENING CEREMONY IS A NONPUBLIC FORUM, 
NOT A DESIGNATED OR A LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM. 
Appellant contends that the Opening Ceremony constitutes a designated public 
forum.15 Brief for Appellant, at 25-28. Citing as his sole authority a dissenting opinion 
14See supra, note 10. 
15Appellant confuses the definitions of "designated public forum" and "limited public 
forum," and consequently does not take a clear position on whether the Opening 
Ceremony constitutes the former or the latter. See Brief for Appellant, at 28 ("The 
Opening Ceremony is a limited (or designated) public forum"). "[PJublic property which 
the state has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity" is known as a 
"designated public forum," see, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass 'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass 'n9 
460 U.S. 37,45 (1983), not a "limited public forum," as Appellant states, see Brief for 
Appellant, at 24. A "limited public forum" is a designated public forum the access to 
which is limited by speaker identity or subject matter restrictions. E.g., Good News Club 
v. MilfordCen. School, 121 S.Ct. 2093,2100 (2001) ("When the State establishes a 
limited public forum, [it] many be justified 'in reserving [its forum] for certain groups or 
for the discussion of certain topics'") (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. 
ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)); see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.47 ("A public forum 
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joined by only two of the thirteen judges in Snyder IV, 159 F.3d 1227,1245-47 (10th Cir. 
1999) {en banc), Appellant argues that the City's selection of a religiously diverse set of 
speakers to participate in the Opening Ceremony, together with an alleged lack of 
restrictions on the subject matter such speakers are to address, "created a public forum 
where people are allowed to express their ideas, religious and nonreligious." Brief for 
Appellant, at 28. 
A designated public forum is "public property that the state has opened for use by 
the public as a place for expressive activity." Perry Educ. Ass 'n v. Perry Local 
Educators' Ass 'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983). It is well established that government creates a 
designated public forum "only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public 
discourse:' Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) 
(4-3 decision) (emphasis supplied), quoted with approval in Arkansas Educ. Telev. 
Comm 'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998). A designated public forum cannot be 
created by "inaction," by the government's merely "permitting limited discourse," or in 
may be created for limited purposes such as use by certain groups or for the discussion of 
certain subjects") (citations omitted). 
Since Appellant argues only the constitutional test for restrictions on access to 
designated public forums, and nowhere suggests any limits on such access, see Brief for 
Appellant, at 27-28, Appellee has understood Appellant to be arguing only that the 
Opening Ceremony is a designated public forum. 
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the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802, 803, cited and 
quoted with approval in Arkansas Educ. Tel, 523 U.S. at 677. 
The record is devoid of evidence that the City had any intention of converting the 
Opening Ceremony into a designated public forum open for the expression of any 
message whatsoever. To the contrary, the record shows that the City has consistently 
acted to reserve the Opening Ceremony exclusively for speech that constitutes 
"legislative prayer." 
As the Tenth Circuit recognized in en banc proceedings relating to this case, 
"legislative prayer" is a "long-accepted genre" of expression "that seeks to bind peoples 
of varying faiths together in a common purpose," and "typically involves nonsectarian 
requests for wisdom and solemnity, as well as calls for divine blessing on the work of the 
legislative body." Snyder IV, 159 F.3d at 1234 & n.l 1 (citing and discussing Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). This Court has recognized the same genre. See 
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916,930 (Utah 1993) (noting the "carefully ecumenical prayer 
practices" of the chaplain in Marsh and of the participants in the 1895 Utah Constitutional 
Convention). 
Although the City had no written guidelines, the record clearly shows that the City 
intended that every participant in the Opening Ceremony give a message that fell within 
the genre of "legislative prayer," that it communicated this intent to every participant, and 
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that every participant understood this limitation and complied with it. Thus, it is not true, 
as Appellant argues, see Brief for Appellant, at 23-24, that the City had no policies or 
procedures in place prior to Appellant's request to participate in the Opening Ceremony, 
or that decisions relating to what kind of speech to permit in the Opening Ceremony were 
left to the sole discretion of Mr. Hall. 
For example, the federal courts in prior proceedings in this case repeatedly found 
or affirmed the finding that the purpose of the Opening Ceremony was to "encourage 
lofty thoughts, pronounce blessings and set an inspirational tone for the meeting." Snyder 
I, 902 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (D.Utah), aff'don rehearing, Snyder II, 902 F. Supp. 1455, 
1456 (D.Utah 1995) (Finding No. 3), adopted on appeal, Snyder III, 124 F.3d 1349, 1351 
(10th Cir. 1997). Speakers invited to participate in the Opening Ceremony were asked in 
the written invitation "to give an 'invocation, appropriate message, or inspirational 
thought.'" Snyder III, 124 F.3d at 1357 (quoting from the record). Indeed, Appellant 
himself assumes that the purposes of the Opening Ceremony were to promote "high-
mindedness," order," and "civility." See Brief for Appellant, at 27. Finally, Mr. Hall 
testified that since the Opening Ceremony began in 1982, "a custom and practice of 
'positive, upbeat' prayers exhorting the City Council to do what they ought to do under 
their statutory responsibilities had developed." Snyder III, 124 F.3d at 1357. 
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The fact that the City has invited speakers who, as a group, represent "a broad 
cross-section of the community," see Brief for Appellant, at 27 (quoting Snyder, 159 F.3d 
at 1246-47 (dissenting opinion)), does not convert the Opening Ceremony into a 
designated public forum in which the general public is presumptively entitled to express 
any and all ideas. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,177 (1983) ("Publicly owned 
or operated property does not become a "public forum" simply because members of the 
public are permitted to come and go at will"). Government is empowered to reserve 
property not constituting a public forum for the discussion of certain subject matters, even 
if it chooses not to restrict the identity of the speakers. See Cornelius, A12> U.S. at 806 
("[A] speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not 
encompassed within the purpose of the forum"); cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
the Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) ("The necessities of confining a forum to the 
limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving 
it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics"). Although the City has 
indeed indicated that any member of the general public may participate in the Opening 
Ceremony, it has consistently limited that participation to delivery of a message that falls 
within the genre of legislative prayer, and thus has not created a designated public forum. 
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b. THE CITY PROPERLY RESTRICTS ACCESS TO THE 
OPENING CEREMONY TO MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC 
WHO DELIVER WHAT IS COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD 
TO BE A LEGISLATIVE PRAYER. 
"Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and 
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose 
served by the forum and are viewpoint-neutral." Cornelius, A12> U.S. at 806; accord 
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 ("[T]he state may reserve the [nonpublic] forum for its intended 
purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable 
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the 
speaker's view"). Although subject-matter restrictions are necessarily content-based, 
they trigger strict scrutiny only if they discriminate on the basis of the speaker's 
viewpoint. 
(1) Restricting Access to Members of the Public Willing to 
Deliver a Legislative Prayer Is Viewpoint Neutral. 
Appellant argues that the policies articulated by Mr. Hall in response to 
Appellant's request were merely post hoc justifications intended specifically to exclude 
Plaintiff because of the religious viewpoints expressed in his proposed "prayer." Brief for 
Appellant, at 27-28. This contention is wrong. 
Speakers may say whatever they wish, so long as what they say falls within the 
genre of legislative prayer. For example, a participant in the Opening Ceremony may 
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invoke religiously based blessings, such as asking for "the assistance of heaven," for 
strength to act according to "the faith and beliefs of our religions" and the "principles and 
directives that should guide us," or for divine "guidance" and "wisdom" in the face of the 
challenges of the day. Snyder TV, 159 F.3d at 1234 n.l 1 (giving examples of appropriate 
legislative prayers delivered by Benjamin Franklin at the 1787 Constitutional Convention 
and by the chaplain in Marsh). But a participant might also make nonreligious moral or 
secular exhortations, such as emphasizing the "common purposes" or "ties that bind us 
together," Snyder IV, 159 F.3d at 1234 n.l 1, or asking that Council members remember 
their responsibility to act for the common good, to consider carefully the issues before 
them, and to seek just and proper resolutions of those issues. A participant might even 
ask merely for a moment of reflective silence, as indeed one participant has. Snyder III, 
124 F.3d at 1351-57. 
Appellant's proposed "prayer" fell well without the definitional boundaries of 
legislative prayer. It criticizes those who do not subscribe to Appellant's normative 
vision of the separation of church and state, and mocks those who support the very 
practice of legislative prayer. Rather than affirming our unity and common purposes as 
citizens, or encouraging the City Council to perform its statutory and constitutional 
duties, or communicating any of the many other ideas that one might express in a 
legislative prayer, Appellant would use the Opening Ceremony to persuade others of the 
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correctness of his constitutional theological views and to disparage the constitutional and 
theological views of others. Compare Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) 
(observing that the content of a legislative prayer is not constitutionally significant so 
long as "there is no indication that the prayer oppotunity has been exploited to proselytize 
or advance any one, or to disparage any other faith or belief). What Appellant proposed 
to say in the Opening Ceremony is not a legislative prayer at all, but a piece of partisan 
political rhetoric. 
Accordingly, when Mr. Hall wrote to Appellant on June 30,1994 that the purpose 
of the messages delivered in the Opening Ceremony was "to allow individuals the 
opportunity to express thoughts, leave blessings, etc.," and not to "express political views, 
attack city policies or practices or mock city practices or policies," he was not taking an 
ad hoc position designed to exclude Appellant from the Opening Ceremony on the basis 
of his religious views, but was merely articulating a viewpoint-neutral subject-matter 
restriction that had been instituted and consistently followed for over a decade, even if it 
had not been reduced to writing-namely, the well-established and -understood 
boundaries to the genre of legislative prayer. Cf. Snyder IV, 159 F.3d at 1236 (finding 
that evidence did not support contention that Hall drafted guidelines specifically to 
exclude Appellant's proposed prayer; rather, "Hall was concerned with the political 
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nature of the proposed prayer and with the fact that it was not consistent with the genre of 
legislative invocational prayer for which the [Opening Ceremony] had been reserved"). 
(2) Restricting Access to Speakers Willing to Deliver a 
Legislative Prayer Is Reasonable. 
"The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of 
regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable/" Groyned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 
VAND. L. REV. 1027,1042(1969)). Thus, whether a subject matter restriction is 
"reasonable" depends on whether the excluded expression "is basically incompatible with 
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Id. The reasonableness of 
a subject-matter restriction might also depend on whether there are adequate alternative 
places for expression of the excluded speech. 
The purpose of the Opening Ceremony is to set a lofty and inspirational tone for 
the City Council meeting by means of thoughts that promote civility, pronounce 
blessings, and direct serious attention to agenda items. (R. 340-41,345-46,349-50,354, 
356); see also Snyder /, 902 F. Supp. at 1448. Attacks on city policies, mocking 
references to city practices, and other political criticisms such as those contained in 
Appellants proposed "prayer" are obviously not consistent with the purpose of the 
Ceremony. Indeed, allowing an unrestricted political free-for-all as part of the Opening 
39 
Ceremony would completely frustrate its intended purpose of solemnizing the opening of 
City Council meetings. 
The reasonableness of the City's subject-matter restriction is buttressed by the fact 
that the City has provided a "Public Comment'' period in every Council meeting which is 
specifically reserved to members of the public for unrestricted speech about city policies 
and practices. Indeed, Appellant was expressly invited by Mr. Hall to deliver his 
"prayer" during the Public Comment period. The City's restriction of speech in the 
Opening Ceremony to legislative prayer is reasonable, not only because it allows the 
Opening Ceremony to accomplish the purposes for which it was created, but also because 
political criticism and other speech excluded from the Opening Ceremony can be fully 
expressed later on in the meeting. 
"The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the 
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Adderley v. 
Florida, 385 U.S. 39,48 (1966). On government property that does not constitute a 
public forum, the government is empowered to restrict speech to that which is reasonably 
consistent with normal use of the property. It was clearly reasonable for the City to 
restrict speech in the Opening Ceremony to that falling within the genre of legislative 
prayer, so as to accomplish its purpose of solemnizing and setting the proper tone for 
Council meetings by promoting civility, lofty thoughts, and attention to agenda items. 
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Since Appellant's proposed "prayer" fell outside of that subject-matter restriction, it was 
properly excluded from the Opening Ceremony. 
D. THE DELIVERY OF LEGISLATIVE PRAYERS IN THE OPENING 
CEREMONY DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, § 4 BECAUSE 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER A PRAYER IS PROVIDED ON 
A RELIGIOUSLY NEUTRAL BASIS AND THUS PROVIDES ONLY 
AN INDIRECT BENEFIT TO RELIGION. 
Appellant claims that the City's refusal to allow Snyder to deliver his "prayer" as 
part of the Opening Ceremony violated the prohibition against the government 
expenditure of money or use of property to aid religion contained in Article I, § 4 of the 
Utah Constitution. Specifically, he argues that by excluding Snyder from the Opening 
Ceremony, it has discriminated against those who hold "nontraditional religious tenets" or 
no religious tenets at all in violation of § 4's constitutional mandate of neutrality. Brief 
for Appellant, at 39-40. 
The test for the constitutionality of government action under Article I, § 4 was set 
forth by this Court in Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). Reviewing Salt Lake City's 
practice of opening city council meetings with prayer, this Court held that Article I, § 4 is 
not violated when "public money or property that benefits religious worship exercise, or 
instruction or any ecclesiastical establishment qualifies as an indirect benefit." Id. at 
938. The Court went on to hold that a benefit to religion from state money or property is 
indirect if (1) it is "provided on a nondiscriminatory basis," and (2) it is "equally 
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accessible to all." Id. Applying this test, this Court upheld an opening ceremony that was 
virtually identical to the City's Open Ceremony at issue in this case. Id. at 939. 
The Opening Ceremony satisfies both elements of the Society of Separationists 
test. First, access to the Opening Ceremony is provided "without regard to the belief 
system" of the participant. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938. The record shows 
that the City has taken great pains to draw participants from a broad and religiously 
diverse cross-section of the City's population. Indeed, in prior proceedings in this case, 
the federal district court expressly found that the manner in which the City selected 
participants for the Opening Ceremony "is neutral and nondiscriminatory and does not 
constitute a preference of one group or religion over another." Snyder II, 902 F. Supp. at 
1457 (Finding No. 3), affd, Snyder III, 124 F.3d at 1354 ("The record in this matter is 
devoid of evidence that Murray City had impermissible motives either in extending 
invitations to speak, or in denying Mr. Snyder's request. Similarly absent is any 
suggestion that Murray City used the reverence portion of its city council meetings to 
advance a particular faith or to disparage any faith") (footnote omitted). Appellant 
himself concedes this, using the admitted diversity of the participants in the Opening 
Ceremony as a basis for his mistaken argument the Opening Ceremony is a designate 
public forum. In fact, the record shows that any member of the general public, including 
Mr. Snyder, who wishes to deliver a message within the genre of legislative prayer, 
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regardless of religious affiliation or lack thereof, is presumptively eligible to do so. (See, 
e.g., R. 134.) Compare Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 938 ("Lutherans or Latter-
day Saints who wish to use the facilities must have access on exactly the same terms as 
the Loyal Order of Moose, the American Atheist Society, or the Libertarian Party"). 
The second element of the Society ofSeparationists test does not apply here 
because the opportunity to participate in the Opening Ceremony is not a scarce resource 
that needs to be allocated. To the contrary, the record indicates that the City had to solicit 
persons to participate in the Opening Ceremony. (R. at 143,151, 340, 350-51.) Compare 
Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 939 (""[T]he record shows that the resource here is 
not one that had to be allocated; there were more opportunities in the schedule for 
participants to give opening remarks than there were interested speakers"). 
Even if this second element does apply, the City's practices satisfy it. If a 
government benefit is a scarce resource that must be allocated among multiple users, "the 
government must implement a system that awards the benefit so that each group, religious 
or secular, has a realistically equal opportunity" to receive the benefit. Society of 
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938. (R. at 340,350-51.) 
Appellant has misunderstood the neutrality requirement of Society of 
Separationists. That requirement does not require that a participant be permitted to say 
whatever he or she wishes in the Opening Ceremony, but rather, that what a participant is 
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permitted to say be determined "without regard to the belief system" of the participant. 
Id. Appellant was not excluded because Mr. Hall or the City disagreed with Appellant's 
religious beliefs, as he maintains, but because Appellant's proposed "prayer" did not fall 
within the subject-matter restriction which the City has properly placed on the Opening 
Ceremony. 
The City's exclusion of Appellant from the Opening Ceremony did not violate 
Article I, § 4. Any benefit to religion was indirect, the result of the City's provision of a 
government benefit on a religiously nondiscriminatory basis. 
E. PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS CLAIM FAILS.16 
Utah's Due Process Clause provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law." Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 7.17 There are several 
problems with Mr. Snyder's due process claims. 
Due process is meant to reduce the chance of an erroneous deprivation through 
safeguards. Due process is fact-dependent, fluid and flexible. It calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands; no single model of procedural fairness, let 
alone a particular form of procedure, is dictated by the due process clause. Matthews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 
See, supra, note 7. 
See supra, note 10. 
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482-83, reh 'g denied, 458 U.S. 1133 (1982). Conceptually, it is that before the 
government may deprive life, liberty or property, one has a right to notice and an 
opportunity to respond in a meaningful way. The more significant the underlying 
interest, the more formal the process.18 The type of procedural requirement in any given 
situation depends on the private interests at stake, the risk that the procedures used will 
lead to erroneous results and the probable value of the suggested procedural safeguards, 
and the governmental interest affected. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1981); 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976). 
The Due Process Clause, however, "has never been construed to require that the 
procedures used to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a protectible... interest be 
so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error." Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 
1,13 (1979). Due process "does not mandate that all governmental decision making 
comply with standards that assure perfect, error-free determinations." Id. Rather, the 
concept of due process is that some procedure minimizes the risk of erroneous decisions. 
Id. The "specific dictates of due process must be shaped by 'the risk of error inherent in 
18As the Supreme Court explained: 
"[W]hat procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances 
must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function 
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental 
action." 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972) (citations omitted). 
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the truth finding process as applied to the generality of cases '" Id. at 14 (citations 
omitted). The fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result obtained in 
any given case, but rather on whether the process provided safeguards against risk of 
error inherent in truth finding as applied generally. Walters v. National Ass 'n of 
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321 (1985). 
What life, liberty or property was Mr. Snyder deprived within the meaning of 
procedural due process? As held by the Tenth Circuit, nothing. He was offered every 
reasonable opportunity to air his grievances or to practice his "religion" consistent with 
Murray City's rules of order and civility and the purpose of the Opening Ceremonies. 
The City offered Mr. Snyder the opportunity to discuss the matter, which he declined to 
do. It offered him the opportunity to be put on the agenda, which he declined. It offered 
him the opportunity to give his "prayer" during the Public Comment portion of the 
Meeting, which he declined. Mr. Hall asked Mr. Snyder to contact him or provide a 
means for him to contact Mr. Snyder, which Mr. Snyder declined. 
In addition, the Due Process Clause is not implicated by official conduct which 
amounts to negligence or inadvertence. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,329-33 (1986) 
(adopting the analysis in the concurring opinions of Justices Powell and Stewart 
in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 545, 548 (1981) (to hold that losses based on 
negligence or inadvertence violate the due process clause "trivialize[s]" and "grossly... 
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distorts] the meaning and intent of the Constitution")19). Appellant cannot show the 
City's conduct amounted to anything more than inadvertence in terms of procedural due 
process. The City offered Mr. Snyder the opportunity to discuss the matter, the 
opportunity to be put on the agenda, and the opportunity to give his "prayer" during the 
Public Comment portion of the Meeting, all of which he declined. Instead, upon 
receiving the letter from Murray City, he promptly faxed it to his attorney, and the same 
day filed the federal complaint. He could have had his captive audience and given his 
statement, but he chose not to. 
19Justice Powell stated: 
A "deprivation" connotes an intentional act denying something to someone, 
or at the very least, a deliberate decision not to act to prevent a loss. The 
most reasonable interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would limit 
due process claims to such active deprivations [S]uch a rule would 
avoid trivializing the right of action provided in § 1983. That provision was 
enacted to deter real abuses by state officials in the exercise of 
governmental powers. It would make no sense to open the federal courts to 
lawsuits where there has been no affirmative abuse of power, merely a 
negligent deed by one who happens to be acting under color of state law. 
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 548-49 (emphasis in original); Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County 
Sheriffs Dept, 905 F.2d 1445,1446-47 (10th Cir. 1990) (police officer's negligent 
operation of vehicle did not violate due process clause). 
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XII. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the trial court's Order should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^  day of December, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Richarc FAlvan Wagoner 
Allan L. Larson 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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XIII. ADDENDUM 
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Utah 1995), reh 'g denied. 
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Utah 1995) 
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349 (10th Cir. 1997) 
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir 1998), cert. denied,{\999) 
Determinative Provisions 
Memorandum Decision, dated February 9,2001 
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1444 902 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
911, 914 (10th Cir.1984), the portion of the 
settlement proceeds allocable and allocated 
to punitive damages and distributed to Plain-
tiff herein was not "received on account of 
personal injury and thus is not excludable 
from income pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 
§ 104(a)(2). Plaintiff argues that because 
the claim on which the punitive damages 
were awarded was one which sounds in tort, 
and an award of actual damages is necessary 
under Oklahoma law to support an award of 
punitive damages, punitive damages are nec-
essarily "received on account of personal in-
jur/9 and excludable under Section 104(a)(2) 
to the same extent that the underlying tort 
claim (for compensatory damages) is a per-
sonal injury tort claim. This argument is 
foreclosed by the following statement by the 
Supreme Court in Schleier: 
There are two independent requirements 
that a taxpayer must meet before a recov-
ery may be excluded under § 104(a)(2). 
First the taxpayer must demonstrate that 
the underlying cause of action giving rise 
to the recovery is based upon tort or tort 
type rights; and second, the taxpayer 
must show that the damages were received 
on account of personal injuries or sickness. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 
Schleier, 515 U.S. at , 115 S.Ct at 
2167, 132 L.Ed^d at 307. 
Moreover, while there is some superficial 
appeal to Plaintiffs argument that "but for99 
the underlying personal injury tort, the Au-
tery Estate would have had no claim for 
punitive damages and thus that punitive 
damages must be considered "received on 
account of personal injury," the Court agrees 
with the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Com* 
missioner of Internal Revenue v. Miller, 914 
F.2d 586 (4th Cir.1990) and those circuit 
courts which have followed Miller in reject-
ing this argument 
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is 
GRANTED in part, to the extent that the 
settlement proceeds may be and are allocat-
ed to $600,000.00 in contract damages, $130,-
000.00 in compensatory damages on the tort 
claim for bad faith and $583,754.00 in puni-
tive damages and to the extent that Plain-
tiffs distribution of her share of the contract 
damages and compensatory bad faith dam-
ages are excludable from gross income pur-
suant to 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(3) and 
§ 104(a)(2), respectively. Plaintiff is entitled 
to a refund of income taxes paid on her 
distributive share of the $730,000 of the set-
tlement proceeds attributable to contract 
damages and compensatory bad faith dam-
ages. Plaintiffs motion is DENIED insofar 
as Plaintiff asserts that the settlement pro-
ceeds attributable to punitive damages and 
her distributive share thereof are excludable 
from income pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 
§ 104(a)(2). Defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment is likewise GRANTED in 
part and DENIED in part Defendant's mo-
tion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs 
distributive share of $583,754.00 of the settle-
ment proceeds attributable to punitive dam-
ages. Plaintiff is not entitled to a refund of 
income taxes paid on said amount In all 
other respects Defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
O iciYNUMltftSVTOM> 
Tom SNYDER, Plaintiff, 
v/ 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a mu-
nicipal corporation, and H. Craig Hall, 
City Attorney for Murray City Corpora-
tion, Defendants. 
No. 94-CV-667 G. 
United States District Court, 
D. Utah, 
Central Division. 
Sept 13, 1995. 
Challenger filed civil rights action 
against city council after his "prayer" was 
not chosen for reading during portion of 
meeting set aside for prayer. On cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment the District 
Court, J. Thomas Greene. J., held that (1) 
SNYDER v. MURRAY CITY CORP. 
Cite M 902 F.Supp, 1444 (D.Uuh IWS) 
city corporation was not entitled to Eleventh plaintiff did not have 
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Amendment immunity; (2) prayer submitted 
by plaintiff for reading at city council meet-
ing was not entitled to protection under free 
exercise clause; (3) regulation that prayers 
be given during "reverence portion* at open-
ing of meeting, and that such embody lofty 
thoughts, was reasonable; (4) plaintiffs 
rights to free exercise or freedom of speech 
rights were not violated by not selecting his 
prayer to be read at "reverence portion" of 
meeting; (5) establishment clause was not 
violated; (6) neither plaintiffs substantive 
nor procedural due process rights were vio-
lated; (7) plaintiff could not bring direct 
action under nonself executing clauses of 
Utah Constitution; and (8) city corporation 
and city attorney were immune from state 
law claims. 
Defendants' motion granted, plaintiffs 
motions denied. 
1. Federal Courts o»418 
Whether state agency is entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity is matter of 
federal law. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 11. 
2. Federal Courts C=»270 
City corporation was not entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from § 1983 
civil rights action. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 
11; 42 U.S.CJL § 1983. 
3. Civil Rights e=»192 
To prevail under any § 1983 claim, 
plaintiff must establish that defendants de-
prived her of right, privilege, or immunity 
secured by United States Constitution. 42 
US.CA. § 1983. 
4. Constitutional Law e»84.2 
For free exercise of religion claim to 
survive dispositive motion, threshold deter-
mination that religious belief or practice in 
question is sincere and "truly heldw by party 
claiming injury must be made. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 1. 
5. Constitutional Law e=>84.5(l) 
Municipal Corporations G»92 
Prayer submitted by plaintiff for reading 
at city council meeting was not entitled to 
protection under free exercise clause, since 
truly held" belief; 
"prayer" offered by plaintiff presented argu-
ment against tradition of opening meetings 
with prayer, prayer set forth political com-
ment concerning city practices and policies, 
prayer conditionally addressed "mother in 
heaven," and closed conditionally in name of 
God's son. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 1. 
6. Constitutional Law e=»84«5(l) 
A prayer that is not rooted in religion, 
that is conditional in expression, and that is 
devoid of truly held religious beliefs, is not 
afforded protection under free exercise 
clause; furthermore, secular views do not 
qualify as protected speech under free exer-
cise clause. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1. 
7. Constitutional Law e=>84.1 
Free exercise of religion does not excuse 
compliance with otherwise valid regulation of 
conduct U.S.CA ConstAmend. 1. 
8. Constitutional Law e=>84JKD 
Regulation by city council that prayers 
be given during "reverence portion" at open-
ing of meeting, and that such embody lofty 
thoughts, was reasonable and did not impose 
burden on free exercise of religion. U&CA. 
ConstAmend. 1. 
9. Constitutional Law <S>90(3), 90.1(1) 
Government may place reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions on religious as 
well as non-religious speech, especially in 
non-public forum such as city council meet-
ings; nature of forum and pattern of its 
normal activities, dictate kinds of regulations 
of time, place, and manner that are reason-
able. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 1. 
10. Constitutional Law e»845(l), 90.1(1) 
Although plaintiffs "prayer" was not se-
lected to be read at opening of city council 
meeting reserved for prayer, plaintiffs rights 
of free exercise of religion or freedom of 
speech were not violated, since plaintiff was 
not excluded from meeting and was invited to 
give his statement at later portion of meeting 
reserved for public comment U.S.CA. 
ConstAmend. 1. 
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11. Constitutional Law <2>84.l 
Fundamental tenet of establishment 
clause is that government shall be neutral 
and must not favor one religious view over 
another. U5.C.A. ConstAmend. 1. 
12. Constitutional Law e»84.5(l) 
Municipal Corporations €=>92 
City council's act of not allowing plaintiff 
to offer his particular prayer during "rever-
ence portion" of meeting set aside for prayer 
did not violate establishment clause; rever-
ence portion of meeting was non denomina-
tional, non sectarian and non proselyting in 
character, plaintiffs "prayer" disparaged 
faith and beliefs of others, it constituted po-
litical commentary concerning dty's prac-
tices, and it proselytized and advanced plain-
tiffs belief concerning church and state, and 
plaintiff was given opportunity to present 
prayer at portion of meeting reserved for 
public comment U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1. 
13. Constitutional Law e=»254.1, 277(1) 
Essential prerequisite to any claim that 
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause 
has been violated is existence of constitution-
ally cognizable liberty or property interest 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
14. Constitutional Law e=»274(3.1) 
Municipal Corporations e»92 
Although plaintiffs "prayer" was not 
chosen to be read at opening of dty council 
meeting, plaintiff could not assert that his 
substantive due process rights were violated 
thereby, since no constitutionally cognizable 
liberty or property interest was implicated; 
plaintiffs religious expression did not pass as 
"truly held" statement of belief and plaintiff 
was given other adequate methods of expres-
sion. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
15. Constitutional Law C=»318(2) 
Municipal Corporations <£=»92 
City council had no due process obli-
gation to provide plaintiff with hearing on 
whether plaintiffs "prayer" criticizing dty 
council's practice of reading prayer at open-
ing of meetings was itself fit to be opening 
prayer, since there was no deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 
14. 
16. Action e=»2, 3 
Constitutional Law 0=>29 
There was no direct statutory or com-
mon law private cause of action for violation 
of provisions of Utah Constitution which 
were not self-executing; free exercise, estab-
lishment and due process clauses of Utah 
Constitution were not self-executing and con-
tained no provision or mechanism for court 
action or remedy. Utah Const Art 1, §§ 4, 
7. 
17. Action C=»2, 3 
Plaintiff could not bring direct action 
under free exercise, establishment or due 
process clauses of Utah Constitution in chal-
lenging dty council's practice of opening 
meetings with prayer, and for asserted viola-
tions of rights after dty counsel refused to 
read his "prayer" in portion of meeting re-
served for prayer. Utah Const Art 1, §§ 4, 
7. 
18. Municipal Corporations ^723 
Pursuant to Utah Governmental Immu-
nity Act dty corporation was immune from 
suit by plaintiff who challenged dty council's 
practice of opening meeting with prayer, and 
who asserted that dty council's refusal to 
read his prayer at portion of meeting re-
served for prayer was violation of his rights 
under state law. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-3(1). 
19. Officers and Public Employees $=»119 
In situations where governmental immu-
nity is waived as to governmental employees, 
notice and other requirements of Utah Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act must be met as 
condition precedent to bringing action. 
U.CJL1953, 60-30-4(4), 63-30-10(2). 
20. Municipal Corporations <$=»747(1) 
Pursuant to Utah Governmental Immu-
nity Act dty attorney was immune from suit 
by plaintiff who challenged dty council's 
practice of opening meeting with prayer, and 
who asserted that dty council's refusal to 
read his prayer at portion of meeting re-
served for prayer was violation of his rights 
under state law, since state did not waive 
immunity of employee for negligent violation 
of dvil rights and there was no allegation of 
fraud or malice or that attorney acted out-
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side scope of authority, also, plaintiff failed assistance in the resolution of this matter 
to comply with notice requirements of Act and will decide the motions on the basis of 
U.C.A.1953, 62-30-3(1). the extensive written materials which have 
been presented, and the files and records of 
this case-
Brian M. Barnard, John Pace and Joro 
Walker, Salt Lake City, for plaintifif. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Allan L. Larson and Richard A. Van Wag-
oner, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
J. THOMAS GREENE, District Judge. 
This matter is before the court on Defen-
dants' Murray City Corporation ("Murray") 
and H. Craig Hall CHalT) Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and Plaintifif Tom Snyder's 
("Snyder") Motion for Summary Judgmentl 
and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff is represented by Brian M. Barnard, 
John Pace, and Joro Walker. Defendants 
are represented by Allan L. Larson and 
Richard A. Van Wagoner. The United 
States has intervened to present an argu-
ment in regard to the constitutionality of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
All parties filed memorandums and sup-
porting materials. The court determines 
that oral argument would not be of material 
1. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings which this court ruled should be re-
garded as a motion for summary judgment. 
2. The text of the prayer is as follows: 
"Our mother, who art in heaven (if. indeed 
there is a heaven and if there is a Cod that takes 
a woman's form) hallowed be thy name, we ask 
for thy blessing for and guidance of those that 
will participate in this meeting and for those 
mortals that govern the state of Utah; 
"We fervently ask that you guide the leaders of 
this city. Salt Lake County and the state of Utah 
so that they may see the wisdom of separating 
church and state and so that they will never 
again perform demeaning religious ceremonies 
as part of official government functions; 
'•We pray that you prevent self-righteous politi-
cians from mis-using the name of Cod in con-
ducting government meetings; and. that you lead 
them away from the hypocritical and blasphe-
mous deception of the public, attempting to 
make the people be I i esc that bureaucrats' deci-
sions and actions have thy stamp of approval if 
prayers arc ofTcrcd at the beginning of govern-
ment meetings; 
Since 1982, Murray City Council meetings 
have followed the tradition and practice of 
beginning with a short prayer in the opening 
"reverence portion" of the meeting in order 
to encourage lofty thoughts, pronounce bless-
ings and set an inspirational tone for the 
balance of the meeting. The Murray City 
Council invites individuals representing a 
broad cross section of religious faiths to give 
these opening prayers. 
After the opening prayer or message, 
there is an open "citizen comment9* period in 
which any citizen has the opportunity to ex-
press his or her political views and comments 
on city practices and policies with no restric-
tion as to content Citizens may participate 
in this portion of the meeting without prior 
notice, or they may arrange prior to any 
council meeting to be formally scheduled on 
the meeting's agenda in order to express 
viewpoints. 
On June 9,1994, plaintiff sent a letter with 
a "prayer" enclosed2, which was referred to 
"We ask that you grant Utah's leaders and 
politicians enough courage and discernment to 
understand that religion is a private matter be* 
tween every individual and his or her deity; we 
beseech thee to educate government leaders that 
religious beliefs should not be broadcast and 
revealed for the purpose of impressing others; 
we pray that you strike down those that misuse 
your name and those that cheapen the institution 
of prayer by using it for their own selfish politi-
cal gains; 
"We ask that the people of Utah will some day 
learn the wisdom of the separation of Church 
and State; we ask that you will teach the people 
of Utah that government should not participate 
in religion; we pray that you smite those govern-
ment officials that would attempt to censor or 
control prayers made by anyone to you or to any 
other of our gods: 
"We ask that you deliver us from the evil of 
forced religious worship now sought to be im-
posed upon the people of the state of Utah by the 
actions of misguided, weak and stupid politi-
cians, who abuse power in their own self-righ-
teousness; 
"All of this we ask in thy name and in the 
name of thy son (if in fact you had a son that 
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Murray City Attorney Craig Hall with the 
request that plaintiff be allowed to present 
the statement as a prayer at the next city 
council meeting. On June 30, on behalf of 
Murray City, Mr. Hall sent a letter to plain-
tiff rejecting this statement as a "prayer" to 
be given in the opening portion of the meet-
ing, but advising that it could be presented 
as an agenda item at the public comment 
portion of the meeting3. Plaintiff chose not 
to offer his statement or "prayer" during the 
public comment portion of any meeting, nor 
did he request to be put on the agenda. 
Instead, he filed this suit 
Plaintiff is familiar with the Utah Supreme 
Court decision in Society ofSeparationists v. 
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993) and 
does not agree with the ruling of the Utah 
court in that case.4 Defendants allege that 
plaintiffs "prayer" constitutes a response to 
that decision as well as a statement of plain-
tiffs political views on the separation of 
church and state and disparagement of per-
sons and the practice of permitting prayers 
to be given at the opening of city council 
meetings. 
ANALYSIS 
Plaintiff asserts seven causes of action: 1) 
Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the 
Free Exercise of Religion under the United 
States Constitution; 2) Violation of the Free 
Exercise of Religion under the Utah Consti-
tution; 3) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
based on the Establishment Clause of the 
United States Constitution; 4) Violation of 
the Establishment Clause of the Utah Con-
stitution; 5) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
visited earth) for the eternal betterment of all of 
us who populate the great state of Utah. 
"Amen." 
3. Mr. Hall wrote in the June 30 response letter 
'The Municipal Council has not established 
formal policies regarding the nature and/or con* 
tent of this reverence portion of their agenda. 
However, the Council has established the policy 
that atl council meetings will start with prayer. 
'The purpose of the 'prayer' is to allow indi-
viduals that opportunity to express thoughts, 
leaves blessings, etc. It is not a time to express 
political views, attack city policies or practices or 
mock city practices or policies. 
"Comments on present city practices or poll* 
cie* may be made at city council meetings by one 
of two method*; cither by requesting to be 
based on the denial of Federal Due Process; 
6) Denial of State Due Process; 7) Violation 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
The claims asserted under the United States 
Constitution and the claims asserted under 
the Utah Constitution will be considered sep-
arately. 
L CLAIMS UNDER THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
[1,2] Plaintiff brings his federal constitu-
tional claims under authority of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 which permits suits against any 
person who, under color of statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State . . . subjects, or causes to be subject-
ed, any citizen of the United States . . . to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the constitution . . . 
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1983 
to be applicable to municipalities. In Monell 
v. New York City Dept Of Soc Sera, the 
Court held: 
Our analysis of the legislative history of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the 
conclusion that Congress did intend munic-
ipalities and other local government units 
to be included among those persons to 
whom § 1983 applies. Local governing 
bodies, therefore, can be sued directly un-
der § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or 
injunctive relief . . . 
436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.O. 2018, 2035, 56 
L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). However, for purposes 
of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court 
limited the scope of such actions to govern-
mental units that are not part of the state for 
placed on the agenda, or taking up to three 
minutes during the 'citizen comment' portion of 
the meeting. The later method requires no prior 
arrangements to be made." 
4. In Wltitchead. the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the Salt Lake City Council's practice of 
allowing prayer to be given during the opening 
remarks portion of city council meetings did not 
violate the Utah Constitution's prohibitions 
against union of church and state. 
Plaintiff proclaims his disagreement as follows: 
"I don't like public prayer. I don't think it « 
proper. I disagree with the Utah Supreme 
Court " (Snyder Depo. at 84). 
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Eleventh Amendment analysis. Id. at 690 n. 
54, 98 S.Ct at 2035 n. 54. Recently, in Hess 
v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson, — U.S. 
, 115 S.Ct 394, 130 L.Ed^d 245 (1994), 
•the Supreme Court declared that city and 
county governments do not enjoy Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.5 In light of the Hess 
case, Murray City Corporation is not entitled 
to Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
plaintiffs § 1983 claims. 
[3] To prevail under any § 1983 claim, a 
plaintiff must establish that defendants) de-
prived her of a right, privilege, or immunity 
secured by the United States Constitution. 
ParraJtt v. Taylor, 451 US. 527, 535, 101 
S.Ct 1908,1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Go-
mez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct 
1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed^d 572 (1980). 
A. Free Exercise of Religion. 
Plaintiff bases the first of his § 1983 
claims on defendants* alleged violation of his 
constitutional right of free exercise of reli-
gion.1 For the following reasons, plaintiffs 
claim fails as a matter of law. 
1. Sincerity of Belief. 
[4] The threshold determination for a 
free exercise of religion claim to survive a 
dispositive motion is that the religious belief 
or practice in question is sincere and "truly 
held99 by the party claiming injury.7 In this 
regard, the Supreme Court stated in United 
States v. Seeger, 380 VS. 163, 185, 85 S.Ct 
850, 863, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965): 
5. The Tenth Circuit arrived at a similar conclu-
sion as to school districts in Ambus v. Granite 
Board of Education. 995 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 
1993). The Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
defines a "political subdivision" as "any county, 
city. town, school district. . . . . or other govern-
mental subdivision or public corporation." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(7). However, whether a 
state agency is entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is a matter of federal law. Garcia v. 
Board ofEduc. of Socorro Consol. Sch. Dist.. 777 
F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1985). cert, denied. 479 U.S. 
814. 107 S.Ct. 66. 93 L.Ed.2d 24 (1986). 
6. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall 
make no law respecting the establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof 
. . ." This amendment applies to states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment under clearly estab* 
lished Supreme Court case law. 
But we hasten to emphasize that while the 
'truth* of a belief is not open to question, 
there remains the significant question 
whether it is truly held9. This is the 
threshold question of sincerity which must 
be resolved in every case. 
(emphasis added). Thus, while it is not the 
province of this court to question the content 
of plaintiffs belief, it is the duty of this court 
to resolve the threshold question of the sinc-
erity thereof and whether it is "truly held" as 
related to the "prayer" he desires to deliver. 
[5] Examination of the text, of plaintiffs 
"prayer99 provides a definitive! perspective 
from which the determination of sincerity can 
be made. On its face, the so-called "prayer" 
to be offered by plaintiff presents an argu-
ment against the tradition of opening meet-
ings with prayer as being akin to the "evil of 
forced religious worship," and sets forth po-
litical comment concerning city practices and 
policies which are disapproved by plaintiff, 
rather than sincere religious beliefs.* Plain-
tiff would use the "prayer99 as a vehicle to air 
his views concerning the separation of church 
and state, and to disparage and "strike 
down99 "misguided, weak and stupid99 politi-
cians and government officials who are 
caught up in the "evil of forced religious 
worship.99* Moreover, Snyder's "prayer99 
does not reveal a truly held belief in deity in 
that it only conditionally addresses a "mother 
in heaven,99 Le. ("if, indeed there is a heaven 
and if there is a God that takes a woman's 
form99), and closes conditionally in the name 
7. See Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employ* 
ment Security. 489 U.S. 829. 109 S.Ct. 1514. 103 
L.Ed.2d 914 (1989); Thomas v. Review Board of 
the Indiana Employment Security Division. 4S0 
U.S. 707. 101 S.Ct. 1425. 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205. 92 S.Ct. 1S26. 
32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); United States v. Seeger. 
380 U.S. 163. 85 S.Ct. 850. 13 LEdJd 733 
(1965); Society of Separationists v. Whitehead. 
870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). 
8. Plaintiff admittedly is unsure of his religious 
beliefs, does not adhere to any particular church 
or group, does not profess any single faith, and 
has no definitive structure of religious views. 
Snyder Depo. at 14-15. 21-25. 
9. See supra note 2. 
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of God's son, Le. ("if in fact you had a son 
that visited earth.") 
[6] A "prayer", such as plaintiff's, that is 
not rooted in religion, that is conditional in 
expression, and that is devoid of truly held 
religious beliefs, is not afforded protection 
under the free exercise clause.10 Further-
more, secular views do not qualify as protect-
ed speech under the free exercise clause. 
Frazee v. Employment Security Department, 
489 UJS. 829, 833, 109 S.Ct 1514, 1517, 103 
L.Ed.2d 914 (1989) (citing Seeger and Vo-
der)." 
This court determines that on the face of 
the "prayer* which plaintiff wants to offer, 
the threshold question of whether a sincerely 
held religious belief exists and is "truly held" 
must be answered in the negative.12 
10. In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana 
Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. at 713-
714. 101 S.Ct at 1429-1430. the Supreme Court 
stated: "[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its 
terms, gives special protection to the exercise of 
religion.*' In Thomas, the court held that denial 
of unemployment compensation to a member of 
Jehovah's Witnesses, who voluntarily quit his job 
because of his religious beliefs, was a violation of 
the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 
Thomas is distinguishable from the case at bar 
because Snyder claims he does not believe in 
prayer at city council meetings, but nevertheless 
wishes to present his prayer in the reverence 
portion of the council meeting. 
11. In Frazee. the Supreme Court stated that 
"Cplurely secular views do not suffice (to warrant 
first amendment protection)." 489 U.S. at 533. 
109 S.CL at 1517. 
12. Both parties, as well as the State of Utah as 
intervener, address the constitutionality of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. However* 
in view of this court's conclusion that plaintiffs 
free exercise claim is not based on a sincere, 
"truly held" religious belief, the Murray City 
policy of providing for prayer only during the 
reverence portion of its meetings imposes no 
"substantial burden" on plaintiffs free exercise 
of religion rights. Moreover, he was given the 
option of expression during other portions of the 
council meeting. Accordingly, the court does 
not reach the constitutional challenge of the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act which plaintiff 
asserts in the wake of Dept. of Human Resources 
v. Smith. The Alaskan Supreme Court ques-
tioned the constitutionality of RFRA in Suxittner 
v. Atwhoratv Equal Rights Commission, et al., 
874 P.2d 274. Z$Q n. 9 (1994). but the U.S. 
2. Restrictions on the Offering of 
Prayer and Religious Speech 
at Public Meetings. 
[7,8] There is an additional reason for 
determining that plaintifiTs "prayer" does not 
constitute the legitimate free exercise of reli-
gion under the United States Constitution. 
Free exercise of religion does not excuse 
compliance with an otherwise valid regulation 
of conduct Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 
(1990)." Defendants* regulation of the offer-
ing of prayers at council meetings requires 
that such be given during the "reverence 
portion" at the opening of the meeting, and 
that such embody lofty thoughts, such as 
blessings, as distinguished from the expres-
sion of political views. This court considers 
the regulation to be reasonable and that it 
Supreme Court declined the opportunity to re-
view this question. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal 
Rights Commission, et al., — U.S. — , 115 
S.CL 460. 130 L.Ed.2d 368 (1994). The interest-
ing problem of whether Congress can constitu-
tionally establish an evidentiary standard of 
"compelling interest" despite the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Smith, which approved of neu-
tral governmental regulations which create no 
"substantial burden" on religion, must await an-
other day. 
13. In Smith, the plaintiffs were fired by a drug 
rehabilitation organization because they ingested 
peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental 
purposes at a ceremony in a Native American 
Church. The Supreme Court held that an Ore-
gon Statute prohibiting the knowing or intention-
al possession of a "controlled substance" did not 
violate the free exercise of religion clause of the 
First Amendment The Court said: 
We have never held that an individual's reli-
gion beliefs excuse him from compliance with 
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct 
that the State is free to regulate. On the 
contrary, the record of more than a century of 
our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts 
that proposition . . . 'Conscientious scruples 
have not. in the course of the long struggle for 
religious toleration, relieved the individual 
from obedience to a general (aw not aimed at 
the promotion or restriction of religious be-
liefs. The mere possession of religious convic-
tions which contradict the relevant concerns of 
a political society docs not relieve the citizen 
from the discharge of political responsibilities, 
(quoting Dust. Bd. of Ed. v. Golritis. 310 US* 
586. 594-95. 60 S.Ct. 1010. 1012-13. 84 UEd. 
1375 (1940)). 
494 U.S. at 878-79. 110 S.Ct. at 1599-1600. 
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does not impose a substantial burden on the 
free exercise clause. To find otherwise 
would be to grant every individual the ability 
to disobey otherwise valid laws and neutral 
regulations under the guise of free religious 
exercise.14 
[9] Plaintiff has neither suffered violation 
of his free exercise of religion nor his pro-
tected free speech rights under the First 
Amendment Manifestly, government may 
place reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions on religious as well as non-reli-
gious speech—especially in a non-public fo-
rum such as Murray City Council meetings. 
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, 473 VS. 788, 105 S.Ct 
3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (governmental 
workplace is treated as a non-public forum 
during hours of government business). The 
nature of a forum and "the pattern of its 
normal activities, dictate the kinds of regula-
tions of time, place and manner that are 
reasonable". Grayned v. City of Rockfori 
408 VS. 104, 116, 92 S.Ct 2294, 2303, 33 
L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). 
In Heffron v. International Soc for Krish-
na Consciousness, Inc., 452 VS. 640, 101 
S.Ct 2559, 69 L.Ed£d 298 (1981), the Su-
preme Court upheld a governmental restric-
tion on the manner of religious expression at 
a fair. The defendant in Heffron challenged 
the restrictions on similar grounds that plain-
tiff has challenged those of the Murray City 
Council. The Supreme Court held that such 
a restriction does not violate constitutionally 
protected free speech or free exercise of 
religion. Heffron is apropos to this case 
since the plaintiff in that case, like the plain-
tiff here, was not prohibited from exercising 
the right of expression only the means of 
exercising the right was restricted. 
[10] In the case at bar, plaintiff was not 
excluded from the Murray City Council 
meeting, nor was he prevented from airing 
14. The Supreme Court stated in Cox v. New 
Hampshire. 312 U.S. 569. 574. 61 S.CL 762. 765. 
85 LEd. 1049 (1941): 
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the ConsUtu-
tion. imply the existence of an organized soci-
ety maintaining public order without which 
liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of 
unrestrained abuses. 
his views at the council meeting or in any 
other forum. Instead, he was asked to give 
his statement or "prayer" at a later portion 
of the meeting reserved for public com-
ment15 As in Heffron, such a restriction 
does not constitute a violation of either free 
exercise of religion or freedom of speech. 
B. Establishment of Religion. 
Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim based on 
the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution wt 
asserting that by excluding plaintiffs reli-
gious expression, defendants have unconsti-
tutionally discriminated against plaintiffs re-
ligion and provided preferential treatment to 
"mainstream" religious views. 
[11] A fundamental tenet of the Estab-
lishment Clause is that the government shall 
be neutral and must not favor one religious 
view over another. Lee v. Weisman, 505 
VS. 577, 112 S.Ct 2649, 120 L.E(L2d 467 
(1992). In that case the Supreme Court 
stated: 
[T]he principle that government may ac-
commodate the free exercise of religion 
does not supersede the fundamental limita-
tions imposed by the Establishment 
Clause, which guarantees at a minimum 
that a government may not coerce anyone 
to support or participate in religion or its 
exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 
'establishes a [state] religion or religious 
faith, or tends to do so.9 Lynch v. Donnel-
ly. 465 VS. 668, 678, 79 L.Ed.2d 604, 104 
S.O. 1355 [1361 (1984)]. 
Id. 
In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 VS. 783, 103 
S.CL 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983), the Su-
preme Court held that the Nebraska Legisla-
ture's chaplaincy practice did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. The Court compared 
the Nebraska Legislature's practice to that 
of the United States Congress: where, since 
15. Set Metromedia. Inc. v. City of San Diego. 453 
U.S. 490. 516. 101 S.Ct. 2882. 69 LEd.2d 800 
(1981) (requiring government to leave open alter-
native channels of communication in light of 
regulation). 
16. See supra note 6. 
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the creation of Congress, prayer has been 
offered every session. The Court refused to 
interpret the Establishment Clause as impos-
ing more stringent first amendment limits on 
the states than are imposed upon the federal 
government and said: 
The tradition in many of the Colonies 
was, of course, linked to an established 
church, but the Continental Congress, be-
ginning in 1774, adopted the traditional 
procedure of opening its sessions with a 
prayer offered by a paid chaplain . . . Al-
though prayers were not offered during 
the Constitutional Convention, the First 
Congress, as one of its early items of busi-
ness, adopted the policy of selecting a 
chaplain to open each session with prayer. 
On September 25,1789, three days after 
Congress authorized the appointment of 
paid chaplains, final agreement was 
reached on the language of the Bill of 
Rights . . . Clearly the men who wrote 
the First Amendment Religion Clause did 
not view paid legislative chaplains and 
opening prayers as a violation of that 
Amendment, for the practice of opening 
sessions with prayer has continued without 
interruption ever since that early session 
of Congress. It has also been followed 
consistently in most of the states. 
Id. at 793-95, 103 S.Ct at 3337-38. 
In Marsh, the Court overruled the Eighth 
Circuit, which had concluded—following ap-
plication of the three-part test of Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 US. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct 
2105, 2111-12, 29 L.Ed£d 745 (1971), as set 
out in Committee for Public Education & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 US. 756, 
773. 93 S.CL 2955, 2965, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 
(1973)—that the chaplaincy practice violated 
all three prongs of the test; i.e. that no 
secular purpose was presented, that the pri-
mary effect of selecting the same minister for 
16 years and publishing his prayers was to 
promote a particular religious expression, 
and that use of state money for compensation 
and publication constituted unlawful entan-
glement Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F2d 228, 
233-55 (1982). The Supreme Court declined 
to apply the Lemon test and simply over-
ruled the Eighth Circuit based on a history 
of prayer analogous to the practice nationally 
adopted by the First Congress and followed 
traditionally since then. 
Plaintiff asserts that once a city encour-
ages and allows members of the public to 
give prayers during the "reverence portion" 
of its meeting, the Constitution requires the 
city to keep the forum open and available for 
the entire spectrum of religious expression, 
without restriction of access to the forum 
based on the content of the religious message 
to be expressed. Snyder Depo. at 86; Plain-
tiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 16-18. To 
the contrary of the wholly unrestricted ap-
proach advocated by plaintiff, the Supreme 
Court stated in Marsh that 
[t]he content of the prayer is not of con-
cern to judges where, as here, there is no 
indication that the prayer opportunity has 
been exploited to proselytize or advance 
any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief. That being so, it is not for us to 
embark on a sensitive evaluation or to 
parse the content of a particular prayer, 
/d, 463 US. at 794-95,103 S.Ct at 3337-58. 
This may be taken to signal that the content 
of a prayer that exploits, proselytizes, dispar-
ages other faiths or beliefs, or advances any 
one religion may require judicial evaluation. 
[12] In the case at bar, prayer is a tradi-
tional part of the Murray City Council meet-
ing. The practice is reasonably regulated to 
fit within a designated "reverence portion" of 
the meeting, rather than the "citizen com-
ment" portion of the meeting reserved for 
expression of political views and political dis-
cussion of city policies or practices. The 
reverence segment of the meeting is non 
denominational, non sectarian and non prose-
lyting in character. Plaintiffs "prayer" could 
properly be presented in the "citizen com-
ment" portion of the meeting, and plaintiff 
was offered that opportunity. Plaintiffs 
"prayer" was properly excluded from the 
"reverence portion" of the meeting, however, 
because it disparages the faith and beliefs of 
others, it constitutes political commentary 
concerning the city's practices, and it prose-
lytizes and advances plaintiffs belief concern-
ing church and state. This court holds that 
Murray City's actions which did not allow 
plaintiff to offer his particular -prayer" dur-
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ing the reverence portion of the meeting, but 
did provide him with such an opportunity 
during the public comment portion of the 
meeting, did not violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
C. Due Process. 
[13,14] Plaintiff claims that his rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment have been 
violated.17 An essential prerequisite to any 
claim that the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process clause has been violated is the exis-
tence of a constitutionally cognizable liberty 
or property interest Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 US. 564,92 S.O.2701,33 L.EA2d 
548 (1972). Under this court's analysis, 
plaintiffs religious expression does not pass 
as a "truly held** statement of belief. Be-
cause this threshold requirement is missing, 
and in view of the adequacy of other easily 
accessible methods of expression which were 
made available to plaintiff, no constitutionally 
cognizable liberty or property interest is im-
plicated here and no substantive due process 
claim has been violated. 
[15] Plaintiff also asserts violation of his 
procedural due process rights because the 
Murray City Council denied him a hearing 
concerning its decision to reject plaintiff's 
"prayer." Plaintiff has no right to require 
the Murray City Council to conduct a hear-
ing on whether plaintiffs "prayer" is fit to be 
an opening prayer. Moreover, since there 
was no deprivation of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, defendants had no due process obligation 
17. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law: . . . (emphasis 
added). 
18. There is no statutory authorization in Utah for 
the bringing of private actions for violation of 
civil rights under the Utah Constitution analo-
gous to the Federal Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C 
§ 1981. et seq.. under which private actions for 
violation of the United States Constitution may 
be asserted. 
19. Article I. section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation. 
to provide plaintiff with such a hearing in any 
event 
IL CLAIMS UNDER THE UTAH CON-
STITUTION. 
A. Private Actions Under Non-Self Ex-
ecuting Provisions of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
[16] There appears to be no direct statu-
tory or common law private cause of action 
for violation of provisions of the Utah State 
Constitution which are not self-executing." 
In Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 
P.2d 622 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme 
Court recognized an exception in Article I 
§ 22 which relates to just compensation for 
the taking of private property.1* In Colman, 
the Court held the just compensation section 
of the Utah Constitution to be self-executing, 
mandatory, and obligatory. Id. at 635. The 
court noted that whether a particular consti-
tutional provision is self-executing "involves 
the issue of whether the constitutional provi-
sion requires a legislative enactment to be 
enforced in the courts." Id at 630. The 
free exercise, establishment, and due process 
clauses of the Utah Constitution are not self-
executing and contain no provision or mecha-
nism for court action or remedy.20 
[171 The Utah Supreme Court enter-
tained a private cause of action based upon 
Article I, Section 4, of the Utah Constitution 
in Society of Separationists v. Whitehead^ 
870 PJ2d 916 (Utah 1993) in order to review a 
written policy of the Salt Lake City Coun-
20. In Sauers v. Salt Lake County. 735 F.Supp. 
381. 386 (D.Utah 1990). this court observed: 
[I]n the absence of remedies otherwise ex* 
pressly provided, there appears to be no gener-
al right to a private cause of action for viola-
tion of the Utah State Constitution . . . 
Of course, whether a private cause of action 
could be brought for violation of Utah State 
Constitutional provisions is a matter for determi-
nation by the Utah Supreme Court. Id. at 386 n. 
9. See also Condemarin v. University Hospital, 
77S ?2d 348 (Utah 1989) (Hall. J., dissenting) 
(noting that no private cause of action under the 
Utah State Constitution appears to exist since no 
remedy is provided); Brown v. Wightman. 47 
Utah 31. 151 P. 366 (1915). 
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cil.*1 In the case at bar, while Murray City 
follows a tradition and practice that "all 
meetings will start with prayer," it "has not 
established formal policies regarding the na-
ture and/or content of [the] reverence por-
tion- of the meeting.12 Plaintiff attacks the 
Murray City practice of permitting prayers 
insofar as it would exclude his expression, 
but seeks to participate in the "reverence 
portion" of the meeting by presenting his 
"prayer* and insisting that it be presented in 
that segment In furtherance of plaintiffs 
asserted right to do so, he brings direct 
causes of action under non-self-executing 
provisions of the Utah Constitution, This 
court opines and holds that such direct ac-
tions may not be asserted under Utah law. 
In addition, as is next discussed, this court 
also opines that plaintiffs claims are barred 
because defendants are immune from such 
claims under Utah law. 
B. Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
(the "Act") provides: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in 
this chapter, all governmental entities are 
immune from suit for any irgury which 
results from the exercise of a governmen-
tal function . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (1993). 
[18] The Act does not provide for waiver 
of immunity for claims based on the free 
2!. The Utah Supreme Court in Whitehead con* 
sidered whether the opening ceremony policy for 
prayers in city council meetings adopted by the 
Salt Lake City Council was constitutional under 
the Utah Constitution* That policy provides in 
part: This opening to the City's legislative pro-
cess is solely for a secular purpose, among other 
reasons, to: (I) provide a moment during which 
Council members and the audience can reflect 
on the Importance of the business before the 
Council; (2) promote an atmosphere of civility; 
(3) encourage lofty thought and high-minded-
ness; (4) recognize cultural diversity; (S) foster 
sensitivity for and recognize the uniqueness of all 
segments of our community. The presentations 
are meant to be non-denominational and non-
proselytizing in character; however, the City will 
not dictate the form or content. 
22. See supra note 3. 
23. The Supreme Court of Utah has not passed 
upon the constitutionality of the Governmental 
Immunity Act a* applied to actions based upon 
exercise, establishment, and/or due process 
clauses of the Utah Constitution as against 
political subdivisions of the state. A "politi-
cal subdivision" is defined as any county, city, 
town, school district, public transit district, 
redevelopment agency, special improvement 
or taxing district, or other governmental sub-
division or public corporation. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-50-2(7) (1994). It follow that 
Murray City Corporation is immune from 
plaintiffs claims under Utah law.8 
[19] As to governmental employees, such 
as defendant Murray City Attorney Hall, the 
Act does not waive immunity from claims for 
damages asserted in actions which arise from 
the negligent violation of civil rights." In 
other actions, such as intentional conduct, the 
statute provides only a limited waiver for 
acts "due to fraud or malice." s Moreover, 
in those situations where immunity is waived, 
the notice and other requirements of the 
legislation must be met as a condition prece-
dent to bringing an action. 
[20] This court holds that Murray City 
Attorney, Defendant Hall, is not subject to 
plaintiffs suit It appears that the state has 
not waived immunity of its employees for 
injuries arising out of alleged negligent viola-
tion of civil rights, and that as to other 
actions for damages against state employees, 
immunity has been waived only for conduct 
the Utah Constitution, and this court declines to 
do so. 
24. Immunity Is waived for a negligent act or 
omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of their employment except if the injury 
arises out of... a violation of civil rights. Utah 
Code Ann. § 65*30-10(2) (emphasis added). 
25. The Governmental Immunity Act states: 
An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmental entity in a representa-
tive capacity if the act or omission complained 
of is one for which the governmental entity 
may be liable, but no employee may be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occur* 
ring during the performance of the employee s 
duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under the color of authority, unless it is estab-
lUlied that the employee acted or failed to act 
due to fraud or malice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-3<M(4) (1993) (emphasis 
added). 
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due to fraud or malice. There is no allega-
tion here of fraud or malice as concerns 
defendant Hall, or that he was acting outside 
the scope of his authority or without color of 
authority. Also, the notice requirements of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act have 
not been complied with. Accordingly, this 
court opines and rules that Murray City At-
torney Hall is immune from plaintiffs dam-
ages claims. In addition, as previously dis-
cussed, the said defendant is not subject to a 
direct lawsuit based upon the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment is GRANTED and plaintiffs 
motions for summary judgment and partial 
summary judgment are DENIED with re-
spect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 which assert violation of the free ex-
ercise of religion, the establishment of reli-
gion, the free speech, and the due process 
clauses of the United States Constitution; it 
is further 
ORDERED, Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment is GRANTED and plaintiffs 
motions are DENIED with respect to claims 
asserted under the Utah State Constitution. 
Tab 2 
due to fraud or malice 
tion here of fraud or malice as concerns 
defendant Hall, or that he was acting outside 
the scope of his authority or without color of 
authority. Also, the notice requirements of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act have 
not been complied with. Accordingly, this 
court opines and rules that Murray City At-
torney Hall is immune from plaintiffs dam-
ages claims. In addition, as previously dis-
cussed, the said defendant is not subject to a 
direct lawsuit based upon the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment is GRANTED and plaintiffs 
motions for summary judgment and partial 
summary judgment are DENIED with re-
spect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 which assert violation of the free ex-
ercise of religion, the establishment of reli-
gion, the free speech, and the due process 
clauses of the United States Constitution; it 
is further 
ORDERED, Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment is GRANTED and plaintiffs 
motions are DENIED with respect to claims 
asserted under the Utah State Constitution. 
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There is no allega- present "prayer" at opening portion of city 
council meeting reserved for nondenomina-
tional prayer violated provisions of the Unit-
ed States and Utah Constitutions. After 
summary judgment was entered in favor of 
city, 902 F-Supp. 1444, plaintiff moved for 
new trial and to amend findings and judg-
ment The District Court, J. Thomas 
Greene, J.v held that- (1) city's refusal to 
permit plaintiff to deliver his "prayer" at 
opening "reverence portion" of city council 
meeting, on ground it represented political 
commentary, did not violate due process 
clause of the Utah Constitution; (2) city's 
prayer policy did not violate the "no public 
money or property" provision of Utah Con-
stitution because subsidy religion was only 
indirect; (3) prayer policy did not violate 
provision of Utah Constitution prohibiting 
any church from dominating the state or 
interfering with its functions, because prayer 
policy did not allow any one religious denomi-
nation to dominate or directly interfere with 
city business; (4) city's prayer policy as ap-
plied in instant case did not violate religion 
clauses of the Utah Constitution because pol-
icy as applied was neutral and nondiscrimina-
tory and did not constitute preference for 
one group or religion over another; and (5) 
plaintiffs "prayer" was political statement 
about propriety of public prayer set in frame-
work and language of a prayer, and was akin 
to parody, and as such was not entitled to 
protection under religion clauses of the Utah 
Constitution. 
2> 
Tom SNYDER, Plaintiff, 
v. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Mu-
nicipal Corporation, and H. Craig Hall, 
City Attorney for Murray City Corpora-
tion, Defendants. 
No. 94-CV-S67 G. 
United States District Court, 
D. Utah, 
Central Division. 
Nov. 2, 1995. 
Citizen brought suit against city, con-
tending that city's refusal of his request to 
Motion for reconsideration and new trial 
denied; motion to amend granted in part 
1. Constitutional Law C=>274.1(5) 
City's refusal to permit citizen to deliver 
proposed "prayer" at "reverence portion" of 
city council meetings traditionally reserved 
for a short prayer, on ground that proposed 
"prayer" constituted political commentary, 
did not violate due process clause of the Utah 
Constitution. Const Art 1, § 7. 
2. Constitutional Law e=>84.5(l) 
Municipal Corporations $=>92 
City's practice of beginning city council 
meetings with short nondenominational pray-
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er in opening "reverence portion" of meeting 
did not violate the "no public money or prop-
erty9* provision of the Utah Constitution be-
cause subsidy of religion was only indirect; 
nor did practice violate provision of Utah 
Constitution prohibiting any church [from] 
dominating the State or interfering with its 
functions because prayer policy did not allow 
any one religious denomination to dominate 
or directly interfere with city business. 
Const Art. 1, § 4. 
3. Constitutional Law <3=>84.5(1) 
Municipal Corporations <s=>92 
Application of city's policy of beginning 
city council meetings with short prayer, 
which denied citizen's request to present 
"prayer" on ground that it constituted politi-
cal commentary, did not violate religion 
clauses of the Utah Constitution because pol-
icy as applied was neutral and nondiscrimina-
tory and did not constitute preference of one 
group or religion over another. Const Art 
1, § 4. 
4. Constitutional Law <S=>84.5(1) 
Municipal Corporations <£=*92 
Citizen's proposed "prayer* which he 
sought to present at opening portion of city 
council meeting traditionally reserved for 
short nondenominational prayer was not enti-
tled to protection under the religion clauses 
of the Utah Constitution, where proposed 
"prayer" was a political statement about the 
propriety of public prayer set in the frame-
work and language of a prayer, and was akin 
to a parody. Const Art 1, § 4. 
Brian Barnard, John Pace and Joro Walk-
er, Salt Lake City, UT, for plaintiff. 
Allan L. Larson and Richard A. Van Wag-
oner, Salt Lake City, UT, for defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND OR-
DER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MO-
TION FOR NEW TRIAL AND FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF JUDG-
MENT 
J. THOMAS GREENE, District Judge. 
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff 
Tom Snyder's Motion for New Trial and 
I. (n addition, plaintiff has (tied a document end* 
Motion to Amend Findings and Judgment 
Defendants have responded to the motional, 
and plaintiff has filed a reply.1 This court 
determines that oral arguments would be of 
no material assistance, and will decide the 
pending motions on the basis of the existing 
record and the recently filed memorandums. 
After due consideration, the court denies 
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and for 
new trial, and grants in part the motion to 
amend by entering the following additional 
findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
Findings of Fact 
1. Reference to the State of Utah as in-
tervener in this action is deleted and the 
United States is substituted therefor at p. 8, 
n. 12 of the court's Memorandum Decision 
and Order dated September 12, 1995. The 
reference obviously was intended to be the 
United States rather than the State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff observes that the court ad-
dressed plaintiffs claims as though at least in_ 
part plaintiff was seeking money damages. 
Plaintiff's counsel corrects the court by stat-
ing that "plaintiff sought no monetary dam-
ages under his slate law claims," and the 
court so finds. Accordingly, the court wilt 
not further discuss the arguments set forth 
by plaintiff (PL's Reply Mem. at 4-10) con-
cerning issues of money damages for viola-
tion of state constitutional rights and how the 
Supreme Court of Utah might address such 
matters in a proper case 
3. All other findings of fact as set forth in 
the Memorandum Decision and Order dated 
September 12, 1995, are reaffirmed. 
Conclusions of Law 
Although most certainly it is here recog-
nized that the Supreme Court of Utah is the 
final arbiter of state constitutional matters, 
this court entered its prior Memorandum 
Decision and Order relative to state law 
claims only because plaintiff included them 
for ruling by this court under federal supple-
mental jurisdiction. In addition to the rul-
ings concerning state constitutional issues 
entered by this court, and in further support 
ded "Exhibit Re: Prayer* of Episcopal Church." 
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thereof, this court opines that the Supreme 
Court of Utah would rule against plaintiff on 
the merits of the state constitutional claims 
presented and now sets forth the following 
conclusions of law: 
[11 1. Murray City's prayer policy is not 
violative of the due process provision of the 
Utah Constitution. 
The due process provisions of the Utah 
Constitution and the United States Constitu-
tion are similarly worded. In this regard, 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution guarantee that 
the government shall not "deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law ...;" and article I, section 7 
of the Utah Constitution states that "No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." In 
the several cases in which the Utah Supreme 
Court has discussed the interpretation of the 
Utah due process provisions, federal case law 
has been relied upon. See Terra Utilities, 
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm% 575 P.2d 1029, 
1033 (Utah 1978) (holding that decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court regarding 
the due process guarantees of the United 
States Constitution "are highly persuasive as 
to the application of that [due process] clause 
of our state Constitution"). 
It therefore appears to the court that Mur-
ray City's refusal to permit plaintiff to deliv-
er his "prayer" at the reverence portion of 
the City Council meetings is not violative of 
the due process clause of the Utah Constitu-
tion for the same reasons that this court has 
determined no violation to have occurred as 
to the federal due process clause. 
[2] 2. Murray City's prayer policy does 
not violate the "no public money or property* 
2. The religion and conscience clauses of the Utah 
Constitution are found in article I. section 4, 
which provides: 
The rights of conscience shall never be in* 
fringed 
The State shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of 
public trust or for any vote at any election; nor 
shall any person be incompetent as a witness 
or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. 
provision of article I, section 4, nor does it 
violate the provision prohibiting "any church 
[to] dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions." 
For purposes of this discussion, this court 
will assume without deciding that the infor-
mal policy of Murray City concerning prayer 
before the City Council is tantamount to the 
formal policy of Salt Lake City discussed by 
the Supreme Court of Utah in Society of 
Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P2& 916 
(Utah 1993). As with Salt Lake City's pray-
er policy, the Murray City policy does not 
violate the "no public money or property" 
provision of article I, section 4 because the 
subsidy of religion is only indirect, nor does 
it violate the provision prohibiting "any 
church [to] dominate the State or interfere 
with its functions" because the prayer policy 
does not allow any one religious denomina-
tion to dominate or directly interfere with 
city business. Id at 937-38, 939. 
[3] 3. Murray City's prayer policy as 
applied in this case does not violate the re-
maining religion clauses * of the Utah Consti-
tution because such policy as applied is neu-
tral and non-discriminatory and does not con-
stitute a preference of one group or religion 
over another. 
In the case at bar, plaintiff presents an 
argument that is markedly different from the 
arguments presented in Whitehead That 
case concerned a direct challenge to the poli-
cy of conducting prayers at the beginning of 
City Council meetings. By way of contrast, 
plaintiff does not challenge the Murray City 
policy of permitting prayer. Instead, plain-
tiff asserts that once prayer is permitted in 
City Council meetings, the provisions of arti-
cle I, section 4 require that the forum for 
There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. 
No public money or property shall be ap-
propriated for or applied to any religious wor-
ship, exercise or instruction, or for the support 
of any ecclesiastical establishment. 
No property qualification shall be required 
of any person to vote, or hold office, except as 
provided in this Constitution. 
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prayer be open and available to any person 
or group for any type of purported religious 
message. In this regard, plaintiff contends 
that his rights under article I, section 4 were 
violated when he was denied the opportunity 
to deliver his "prayer" at the reverence por-
tion of a Murray City Council meeting.1 In 
support of this argument, plaintiff cites por-
tions of Whitehead which stress the para-
mount importance of neutrality in interpret-
ing application of the Utah Constitution's 
religion clauses, such as: 
[I]f government allows all groups to apply 
for [a] benefit but then discriminates in the 
• selection process, it would be preferring 
one group over the other in violation of the 
constitutional principle of neutrality.. 
Id at 938. In Whitehead, the Court found 
that "the record indicates no preference by 
the City Council for any religious group or 
for organized religion in general." Id at 
939. 
This court determines that Murray City's 
prayer policy as applied in rejecting plain-
tiffs request for permission to deliver his 
"prayer" in the reverence portion of the City 
Council meeting is consistent with the afore-
said interpretation of neutrality toward reli-
gion. 
[4] 4. Plaintiffs proposed "prayer" is 
not entitled to protection under the religion 
clauses of the Utah Constitution. 
Not every statement that recites the name 
of a deity or is structured grammatically and 
semantically in a manner commonly associat-
ed with Judeo-Christian prayers automati-
cally qualifies as a religious expression. 
Plaintiffs "prayer" is a political statement 
about the propriety of public prayer set in 
the framework and language of a prayer, and 
is akin to a parody. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated 
that 
[The religion clauses in the Utah Constitu-
tion] are designed to protect religious ex- * 
erase and freedom of conscience in gener-
y In Whitehead. 870 P.2d at 935. the Supreme 
Court of Utah noted that certain provisions of 
article (. section 4 "are unique to Utah." but that 
other provisions at issue in this case "were 
drawn directly from" the United States Constitu-
tion. Despite the simitar language, the Court 
al, to separate government from active fi-
nancial support of religion, to prevent one 
religion from dominating the public schools 
or the government itself, and to prevent 
the imposition of civil limitations based on 
one's religious beliefs or lack thereof. 
IdL at 935 (emphasis added). This court 
opines and holds that a non-religious activity 
or viewpoint does not gain protection under 
the religion clauses of the Utah Constitution 
simply by being masked in the language of 
religion. This conclusion is consonant with 
the extensive historical analysis and philo-
sophical discussion concerning article I, sec-
tion 4 set forth by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Whitehead In this regard, this court 
found in its September 12, 1995, Order that 
"[pjlaintiff admittedly is unsure of his reli-
gious beliefs, does not adhere to any particu-
lar church or group, does not profess any 
single faith, and has no definitive structure of 
religious views." Snyder v. Murray City 
Corpv 902 F.Supp. 1444, 1449, n. 8 (D.Utah 
1995). Further, plaintiff has stated: "I don't 
like public prayer., I don't think it is proper. 
I disagree with the Utah Supreme 
Court...." PL's Depo. at 84. Plaintiff vol-
untarily submitted the text of his "prayer" 
for review, which was properly determined to 
be in the nature of a political statement, 
which plaintiff was allowed to make in the 
"citizen comment" portion of the City Council 
meeting. 
This court opines that plaintiffs "prayer* 
is not a religious exercise or activity that is 
entitled to protection under the religion 
clauses of article I, section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
For the foregoing reasons, including the 
additional findings and conclusions set forth 
herein, plaintiffs motion for new trial and to 
amend judgment is hereby DENIED. 
Counsel for defendants is directed to lodge 
with the court a form of judgment consistent 
with this and the court's September 12,1995, 
stated that Utah's unique history may effect • 
"divergent approach" in the interpretation of the 
Utah Constitution, resulting in "different mean-
ings and different nuances" than the interpreta-
tion of the United States Constitution. 
NATIONAL PETRO. MKTG. v. PHOENIX FUEL CO. 
Clle u 902 fSupp. US* (D.Utah I99S) 1459 
Order, after first complying with local rule 
D.Ut 206. 
iCtYNUMltRSVSRM> 
NATIONAL PETROLEUM MARKETING, 
INC., a Nevada Corporation; d/h/a Ari-
zona Fuel Terminal; Sunshine Western, 
Inc., a Nevada Corporation; John 
Knight II, and Miller Distributing, Inc^ 
a Nevada Corporation, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PHOENIX FUEL CO., INC., an Arizona 
Corporation; d/h/a Firebird Fuel Co. 
and Mesa Fuel Co. and Tucson Fuel Co.; 
Jack Keller and Jane Doe Keller, Hus-
band and Wife, William Wilhoit and 
Jane Doe Wilhoit, Husband and Wife; 
United Communications Group, Ltd, a 
Maryland Limited Partnership, d/b/a Oil 
Price Information Service and Oil Ex-
press; Bruce Levenson, Scott Berhang; 
Julia Blalock; Carol Donoghue; Mary 
Welge; The United States of America; 
and John Does 1-35, Defendants* 
Civ. No. 95-CV-296W. 
United States District Court, 
D. Utah. 
Central Division. 
Oct 6, 1995. 
Oil company with its principal place of 
business in Utah and company's sole share-
holder, who was Utah resident, brought ac-
tion for defamation and related business 
torts against various nonresidents in connec-
tion with preparation and publication of al-
legedly defamatory article in oil industry 
print and electronic publications. On mo-
tions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, the District Court, Winder, Chief Judge, 
held that: (1) all defendants were subject to 
jurisdiction under Utah long-arm statute; (2) 
"minimum contacts" remains element of due 
process test in libel suit; (3) Arizona compet-
itor and its officers, allegedly responsible for 
providing information used in article, lacked 
sufficient minimum contacts with Utah; (4) 
employees of publisher who were not in-
volved in preparation or publication of article 
in question lacked sufficient minimum con-
tacts with Utah; and (5) publisher and re-
porter had sufficient minimum contacts with 
Utah and exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over them comported with considerations of 
fair play and substantial justice. 
Motions granted in part, denied in part 
1. Federal Courts e=»76.20 
While employee's contacts with jurisdic-
tion are not to be judged according to their 
employer's activities there in determining 
whether personal jurisdiction is appropriate, 
status as employee does not somehow insu-
late employee from jurisdiction; instead, 
each defendant's contacts with forum state 
must be assessed individually. 
2. Federal Courts €=»76.10 
In contrast to exercise of general juris-
diction, specific jurisdiction is appropriate 
only when nonresident contacts with forum 
state arise from, or are directly related to, 
cause of action. 
3. Constitutional Law c=>305(5) 
Courts e=»12(2.10) 
Evaluation of specific jurisdiction in 
Utah mandates three-part inquiry: (1) defen-
dant's acts or contacts must implicate Utah 
Under Utah long-arm statute; (2) nexus must 
exist between plaintiffs claims and defen-
dant's acts or contacts; and (3) application of 
long-arm statute must satisfy requirements 
of federal due process. U.S.GA. Const 
Amend. 14; U.CJL1953, 78-27-24. 
4. Federal Courts e=»76.25 
Allegations by corporation with its prin-
cipal place of business in Utah and share-
holders who resided in Utah regarding 
sources and impact of allegedly defamatory 
article in print and electronic publications 
were sufficient to subject all nonresident de-
fendants allegedly involved in either provid-
ing information for article or publishing and 
Tab 3 
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At best, then, the record shows no more 
than thst LDL-H briefly nude vague* worst* 
rose plans. Even were we to find dear error 
in the Tax Court's refusal to credit the oral 
testimony offered, the partnership has not 
shown that it ever had an objectively realistic 
prospect of entering the 3100 business. See 
Edate of Cook u Commissioner, 66 T.CM. 
(CCH) 1523 (1993) (recognizing that taxpay-
ers* "understanding that contingency plans 
existed to exploit the research if the license 
agreement . . . expired or was terminated," 
insufficient to establish necessary connection 
to taxpayers9 trade or business). Without a 
far stronger evidentiary showing that the 
partnership regarded its takeover of the 3100 
business as probable, and planned with seri-
ous intent for that probability, we cannot 
conclude that the Tax Court erred in its 
"realistic prospect** analysis. 
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Tom SNYDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a mu-
nicipal corporation; H. Craig Hall, City 
Attorney for Murray City Corporation* 
Defendants-Appelle 
United States of America, Intervcnor. 
No. 96-4087. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit 
Sept 10,1997. 
(13] Section 174(aXD was expressly in-
tended to encourage businesses to carry out 
research, and we are sympathetic to the view 
that "[without R & D partnerships, many of 
today's new technologies would still Toe on the 
drawing board.*9 Robert L. Wolff, Tax 
Treatment of Research and Development 
Limited Partnerships* 32 Prac Law. 37, 43 
<19S6). Certainly, *tt]he uncertain contours 
of trade and business* create opportunities 
for fair debate." Levin. 832 R2d at 406. 
Ultimately, however, "(flair debates about 
(act-bound matters of characterisation are 
resolved on appeal in favor of the solution the 
trier of facts reaches." Id Before making 
any research expenditures, LDL-II negotiat-
ed a set of structured agreements that un-
dermined its proprietary control of the com* 
ptoted research, and leave it now unable to 
overcome the obvious inference that it con* 
tractually assumed the role of an investor. 
AFFIRMED. 
^ 
muNl 
Individual who sought to present prayer 
during city council meeting filed civil rights 
action against city council after his prayer 
was not chosen for reading. The United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, 
J. Thomas Greene, J., entered summary 
judgment in favor of city council, 902 F-Supp. 
1444, and individual appealed, the Court of 
Appeals, Paul J. Kelly, Jr., Circuit Judge, 
held that (1) even assuming that individual 
was possessed of sincerely held religious be-
liefs, as expressed in his proposed prayer, 
city coundTs refusal to allow individual to 
speak did not violate free exercise clause of 
First Amendment; (2) city council did not 
violate establishment clause; and (3) Court of 
Appeals would not exercise supplemental jur-
isdiction over claims under Utah Constitu-
tion. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
Briscoe, Circuit Judge, (Qed opinion con* 
curring in part and dissenting in part 
1. Federal Courts C-»776 
Court of Appeals* review of questions of 
constitutional law and dispositions on sum* 
mary judgment is de novo. 
2. Constitutional Lawe»8t«2 
First questions in any First Amendment 
free exercise daim are whether plaintiffs 
beliefs are religious in nature, and whether 
those religious beliefs are sincerely held. 
U.S.OA. ConstAmend. 1. 
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X Constitutional Law €*$A2 
Only beliefs which are religious in na-
ture are protected by the free exercise 
clause; nevertheless, religious beliefs need 
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or com-
prehensible to others in order to merit First 
Amendment protection. U&GA. Const 
Amend 1. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure **249LS 
Inquiry into sincerity of free-exercise 
plaintiffs religious beliefs is almost exclusive-
ly credibility assessment, and therefore issue 
of sincerity can rarely be determined on 
summary judgment. US.C A. ConstAmend. 
I. 
5. Constitutional Law 084.5(1) 
Municipal Corporations c=*92 
Even assuming that individual was pot* 
sessed of sincerely held religious beliefs, as 
expressed in his proposed prayer that he 
%
 wished to present during "reverence* portion 
of city council meeting, city council's refusal 
to allow individual to speak did not violate 
free exercise clause of First Amendment 
US.C JL ConstAmend. 1. 
6. Constitutional Law €*U.1,845(1) 
To protect right to believe and possess 
whatever religious doctrine one desires, free 
exercise clause prohibits government from 
impermissibly burdening individual's free ex* 
erase of religion; however, free exercise 
clause should not be understood to require 
government to conduct its own internal af-
fairs in ways that comport with religious 
beliefs of particular citizens. U&CA. 
Const-Amend L 
7. Constitutional Law *»8tS(l) 
Free exercise clause does not guarantee 
any person right to pray whenever and wher* 
ever he or she chooses; nor does clause guar* 
antee person right to speak during portions 
of public meetings set aside for devotional or 
invocational purposes. U&CA. Const 
Amend. 1. 
8. Constitutional Law C»M.SQ) 
Municipal Corporations *»92 
City did not violate establishment clause 
when it denied individual permission to give 
proposed prayer during reverence portion of 
city council meeting, where prayer dispar-
aged those who believed in propriety of pub-
lic prayer and was in conflict with city's 
legitimate objectives in presenting such pray, 
ers. U&CA. ConstAmend. L 
9. Constitutional Law *»84.l 
Establishment dause assures that gov* 
eminent wiD not favor particular* religion, nor 
religion over nonreligion. U.S.GA. Const 
Amend. L 
10. Constitutional Lawe»8ti(l) 
Establishment clause does not give any 
individual right to establish his or her reli-
gion by guaranteeing opportunity to pray 
during public meetings. U&CA. Const 
Amend. I. 
IL Federal Civil Procedure C2Sf6 
Genuine issues of material facts preclud-
ing summary judgment may be founded upon 
inferences; however, those inferences must 
be reasonable inferences, and must amount 
to more than a scintilla of evidence. 
12. Federal Courts *»18 
Court of Appeals would not exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over claims under 
Utah Constitution brought by individual who 
was denied opportunity to present prayer at 
city council meeting, where individual's fed* 
eral claims were resolved prior to trial, and 
interpretation of state constitutional provi-
sions was evolving. U&GA. ConstAmend 
1; Utah Const Art 1,IS 1,7. 
Brian M. Barnard (Andrea Garland and 
the Utah Legal Clinic, with him on the 
briefs). Cooperating Attorneys for Utah Civil 
Rights k Liberties Foundation, Inc* Salt 
Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Allan L. Larson (Richard A. Van Wagoner, 
with him on the brief). Snow, Christensen k 
Martineau, Salt Lake City, UT. for Defen* 
dints-Appellees. 
Before KELLY, HOLLOWAY, and 
BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 
PAUL KELLY, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff Tom Snyder appeals from the dif 
trict court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants Murray City and It 
Craig Hall, the City Attorney of Murray 
City, tn his 42 VS.C i IMS action. Mr. 
SNYDER *. MURRAY CITY CORP. 
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Snyder alleged that Murray City's refusal to 
permit htm to speak during the reverence 
portion of a Murray City Council meeting 
violated his rights under the United States 
Constitution. He also alleged violations of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and 
the Utah Constitution. The talk Mr. Snyder 
desired to present—which he characterizes 
as a prayer and the City characterizes as a 
diatribe against City officialsf—requests the 
"Mother in Heaven" to cause the cessation of 
prayers at public meetings. We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 US.C. S 1291, and af-
firm in part and reverse in part. 
Background 
Since 1982, Murray City has opened its 
city council meetings with a reverence peri-
od, during which an invocation or devotional 
is presented. The reverence portion of the 
meetings is designed to encourage lofty 
thoughts, promote civility, and cause the par-
ticipants to set aside other matters in order 
to focus on the topics to be addressed at the 
meeting. The city council extends invitations 
to speak during the reverence period to indi-
1. We recognize that (he parties disagree over 
whether Mr. Snyder's proposed speech was a 
prayer and whether Murray City denied his re* 
quest. The City's tetter to Mr. Snyder informed 
him that, until his "proposed prayer satisfies (the 
City's] guidelines, an invitation to participate in 
our opening ceremonies will noc be lorthcom-
inf." The City also advised Mr. Snyder that he 
could request a place on the meeting agenda or 
voice his thoughts during the citizen comment 
portion of the meeting. For ease of reference, 
however, we adopt the terminology used by the 
parties and refer to Mr. Snyder's talk as a prayer 
•nd the City's action as a denial of his request to 
deliver his prayer. 
2* Mr. Snyder's proposed prayer read as follows: 
OUR MOTHER, who an in heaven (if. indeed 
there is a heaven and if there is a God that takes 
a woman's form) hallowed be thy name, we ask 
for thy blessing for and guidance of those that 
wilt participate in this meeting and for those 
mortals that govern the state of Utah: 
We fervently ask that you guide the leaders of 
this city. Salt Lake County and the State of Utah 
so that they may see the wisdom of separating 
church and state and so that they will never 
again perform demeaning religious ceremonies 
as part of official government functions; 
We pray that you prevent self-righteous politi-
cians from mis-using the name of Cod in con-
ducting government meetings; and. that you lead 
them away from the hypocritical and blasphe-
viduals representing a broad cross-section of 
religious faiths, and invocations or devotion-
sis have been presented at the Murray City 
Council meetings by Christians; Navajos, 
Quakers, and Zen Buddhists. One speaker 
simply requested a moment of silence. Mr. 
Snyder, who does not reside in Murray City, 
wrote to the City, advising of his interest in 
presenting a prayer at a council meeting. 
Mr. Snyder attached his two-page proposed 
"Opening Prayer" to the letter.1 Mr. Sny-
der's request was part of his personal cam-
paign to stop prayers at public meetings, 
waged in response to a recent decision of the 
Supreme Court of Utah which upheld Salt 
Lake City's practice of opening public meeU 
ings with a prayer. 
Although Mr. Snyder was reared as a 
member of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, he is no longer a practic-
ing member of that faith, or any other orga-
nised religion. He testified that he considers 
himself deeply religious, but is not yet sure 
what his beliefs are, and leans towards ag-
nosticism. Mr. Snyder cites the Book of 
mous deception of the public, attempting to 
make the people believe that bureaucrats* deci-
sions and actions have thy stamp of approval if 
prayers are offered at the beginning of govern-
ment meetings; 
We ask that you grant Utah's leaders and poli-
ticians enough courage and discernment to un-
derstand that religion is a private matter between 
every individual and his or her deity; we beseech 
thee to educate government leaders that religious 
belied should not be broadcast and revealed lor 
the purpose of impressing others; we pray that 
you strike down those that mis-use your name 
and those that cheapen the Institution of prayer 
by using it for their own selfish political gains; 
We ask that the people of the State of Utah will 
some day learn the wisdom of the separation of 
church and sute: we ask that you will teach the 
people of Utah that government should not par-
ticipate in religion; we pray that you smite those 
government officials that would attempt to cen-
sor or control prayers made by anyone to you or 
to any other of our Cods; 
We ask that you deliver us from the evil of 
forced religious worship now sought to be im-
posed upon the people of the State of Utah by the 
actions of mis-guided, weak and stupid politi-
cians, who abuse power in their own scuVigh-
All of this we ask in thy name and in the name 
of thy son (if in (act you had a son that visited 
earth) for the eternal betterment of all of us who 
pupulatc the Great Sute of Utah. 
Amen. 
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Mormon ind the Gospel of St. Matthew as 
the religious bases for his prayer* He be-
lieves that prayer should be a private matter 
between an individual and his or her God, 
and that Jesus Christ opposed public pray* 
era, including those before government meet* 
tags. Although Mr. Snyder testified at his 
deposition that he believes in God. he also 
testified that he questions God's existence. 
On behalf of Murray City* Mr. Hall re* 
sponded to Mr. Snyder's request and in* 
formed him that his proposed prayer was 
unacceptable because it did not follow the 
guidelines for prayers which the City had 
previously provided to Mr. Snyder. Al-
though the council had no formal, written 
policy, Mr. Snyder had been informed by 
letter prior to the submission of his proposed 
prayer that the purpose of the 'prayer' is to 
allow individuals [the] opportunity to express 
thoughts, leave blessings, etc It is not a 
time to express political views, attack dty 
policies or practices or mock dty practices or 
policies.* Mr. Snyder had also been advised 
that comments on City practices and policies 
could be made during city council meetings 
either by requesting a place on the meeting 
agenda or by speaking during the citizen 
comment portion of the meeting. The citizen 
comment portion of the meeting immediately 
follows the reverence portion. 
Mr. Snyder filed this f 1983 action upon 
receiving in the mail Murray City's denial of 
his request to give a prayer. He alleges that 
the City's refusal of his request violated his 
rights under the United States and Utah 
Constitutions to free exercise of his religion 
and to due process. Mr. Snyder also alleges 
violations of the Establishment Clause of 
both Constitutions, and the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 US.C. 
i i 2000bb-a000bb-L Both Defendants and 
Mr. Snyder moved for summary judgment 
which the district court granted in favor of 
the Defendants and denied to Mr. Snyder, 
who brings this appeal. 
Discussion 
HI Our review of questions of constitu-
tional law and dispositions on summary judg-
ment is de novo. United States v. One Par-
cel Property 106 FJd 336, 338 (10th Cir. 
1997). 
L Claims Under the United 
States Constitution 
Mr. Snyder brings this action under 42 
U5.C. I 1983. To prevail in a f 1983 claim, 
a plaintiff must establish that the defendants, 
while acting under color of state law, de-
prived him of a right, privilege, or immunity 
secured by the United States Constitution. 
We therefore consider whether Murray 
City's denial of Mr. Snyder's request to deliv-
er his proposed prayer during the reverence 
portion of a city council meeting violated his 
rights under the Free Exercise, Establish* 
ment, or Due Process Clauses of the Federal 
Constitution. 
In his briefs, Mr. Snyder relies upon ease 
law interpreting the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment Since he did not 
allege a violation of his right to free speech, 
however, we need not consider the argu* 
ments raised under that body of law. 
A. Free Exercise Claim 
[2,3] The first questions in any finee ex-
ercise claim are whether the plaintiff* beliefs 
are reKgious in nature, and whether those 
religious belied are sincerely held. United 
States v. Seeger. 380 VS. 163,185, 85 S.CL 
850, 863-64, 13 L£d2d 733 (1965). Only 
beliefs which are religious in nature are pro* 
tected by the Free Exercise Clause. Never-
theless, "religious beliefs need not be accept-
able, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to 
others in order to merit First Amendment 
protection." Thomas v. Review BdL of the 
Ind Employment Sec Ditu 450 US. 707, 
714, 101 S.CL 1425, 1430, 67 L£<L2d 624 
(1981). 
(4) Although Mr. Snyder swore out affi-
davits attesting to his sincerity, the district 
court held that he was not sincere in the 
beliefs espoused in his proposed prayer. 
The district court reached this conclusion 
based upon the text of Mr. Snyder's prayer, 
which the court found to contain political 
instead of religious content, and on Mr. Sny-
der's deposition testimony that he was un-
sure of his religious beliefs. The inquiry into 
the sincerity of a free-exercise plaintiffs reli-
gious beliefs is almost exclusively a credibili-
ty assessment, see Seeger. 380 UJS. at 186.85 
SNYDER r. MURRAY CITY CORP. 
Ow*U4 tM IMS (IS* Or. 
SXX at 864; Afotter tt Afaynont 937 R2d 
1521.1526 (10th Cir.1991), and therefore the 
issue of sincerity can rarely be determined 
on summary Judgment This may well be, 
however, one of those very rare eases in 
which the plaintiffs beliefs are "so bizarre, so 
dearly nonreligious in motivation" that they 
are not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion. Thomas, 450 VS. at 715,101 SXX at 
1431. 
(S| Regardless, we need not decide 
whether Mr. Snyder's beliefs are religious in 
nature nor whether they are sincerely held. 
Nor need we address Mr. Snyder's argument 
that summary judgment was inappropriate. 
Even assuming that Mr. Snyder is possessed 
of sincerely held religious beliefs, as articu-
lated in his proposed prayer, we find that 
Mr. Snyder's claim is not eognizable under 
the Free Exercise Clause. In fact, Mr. Sny-
der's arguments evince a fundamental mis-
conception about the rights bestowed by the 
Clause. 
(61 The Free Exercise Clause is one of 
the Bill of Rights9s "thou shall not" prohibi-
tions against certain government actions. 
The Clause "is written in terms of what the 
government cannot do to the individual, not 
in terms of what the individual can exact 
from the government19 Sherbert & Verner, 
374 US. 398. 412, 83 SXX 1790. 1798. 10 
LEA2d 965 (1963) (Douglas, J . concurring). 
To protect "the right to believe and profess 
whatever religious*doctrine one desires." 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 US. 872. 
877. 110 SXX 1595, 1599, 108 L.E<L2d 876 
(1990). the Free Exercise Clause prohibits 
the government from impermissibly burden-
ing an individual's free exercise of religion. 
However. Itjhe Free Exercise Clause simply 
cannot be understood to require the Govern-
ment to conduct its own internal affairs in 
ways that comport with the religious beliefs 
of particular citizens." Bowen a Roy. 476 
US. 693. 699, 106 SXX 2147, 2152. 90 
LEA2d 735 (1986). 
171 The Free Exercise Clause does not 
guarantee any person the right to pray 
whenever and wherever he chooses. Nor 
tloe* the Clause guarantee a person the right 
to speak during portions of public meetings 
set aside for devotional or ^vocational pur-
puses. Suggestion to the contrary is incon-
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aistent with both common sense and constitu-
tional doctrine. Cf. Heffron VL International 
Soc> far Krishna Consciousness. 452 US. 
640,647.101 &Ct 2559.2564.69 LE42d 296 
(1981) (TOhe First Amendment does not 
guarantee the right to communicate one's 
views at aO times and places or in any man-
ner that may be desired"). We find no 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Establishment Clause Claim 
Mr. Snyder daims that Murray 
B. 
[S-101 
City's denial of his request to speak at the 
reverence portion of its city council meeting 
violated the Establishment Clause. This ar-
gument also misapprehends the protections 
afforded by that Clause. The Establishment 
Clause assures that the government will not 
favor a particular religion, nor religion over 
nonrefigion. Board ofEduc ofKiryas Jod 
Village Sck Diet * Gtumet, 512 US. 687, 
703, 114 SXX 2481, 2491, 129 LEA2d 546 
(1994). Like the Free Exercise Clause, the 
Establishment Clause is a prohibition against 
certain government actions. The Establish-
ment Clause does not give any individual the 
right to establish his religion by guarantee-
ing an opportunity to pray during public 
meetings, and certainly does not require 
Murray City to permit all comers to speak 
during the reverence portion of its city coun-
cil meetings. 
In Marsh v. Chambers. 463 US. 783.103 
SXX 3330. 77 LE<L2d 1019 (1983). the Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
opening governmental meetings with pray-
ers. The Court observed that the "opening * 
of sessions of legislative and other delibera-
tive public bodies with prayer is deeply em-
bedded in the history and tradition of this 
country* Id. at 786,103 SXX at 3331 T o 
invoke Divine guidance on a public body en-
trusted with making the laws is not . . . an 
'establishment9 of religion or a step toward 
establishment....91 Id at 792.103 SXX at 
33361 
(III Mr. Snyder does not argue that 
Murray Cit/a practice of opening its city 
council meetings with prayer violates the Es-
tablishment Clause. Marsh appears to fore-
close such an argument Instead, Mr. Sny-
der argues that Murray City violated the 
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Establishment Clause by permitting others 
to prey, yet denying him the same opportuni-
ty. Martk suggests that a governmental 
body's practices in selecting persons to defiv-
er prayers at public meetings may violate the 
Establishment Clause if the selections are 
the product of impermissible motives, / d a t 
793, 103 S.CL at 3337. The record in this 
matter is devoid of evidence suggesting that 
Murray City had impermissible motives et* 
ther in extending invitations to speak, or in 
denying Mr. Snyder's request1 Similarly 
absent is any suggestion that Murray City 
used the reverence portion of its city council 
meetings to advance a particular faith or to 
disparage any faith or belief, Sec id at 794-
95, 103 S.CL at 3337-38. In contrast, Mr. 
Snyder's prayer itself disparages those who 
believe in the propriety of public prayer. 
Clearly, the content of Mr. Snyder's prayer 
is in conflict with the City's legitimate objec-
tives in presenting audi prayers. Martk 
controls the issue before us, and we find no 
violation of the Establishment Clause. 
C Due Process Claim 
Because Mr. Snyder's First Amendment 
daims are without merit, his daim under the 
Federal Due Process Clause also fails. It is 
beyond argument that process is due only 
when the government terminates a protected 
interest Soanf of Regent* v. Roth. 408 US. 
564.568.92 S.O.2701.2705.33 L.Ed2d $i& 
(1972). Mr. Snyder was not deprived of any 
protected interest and therefore be had no 
entitlement to any sort of process. 
II. Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act Claim 
Mr. Snyder appeals from the district 
court's advene decision on his RFRA daims. 
Since this case was argued, however, the 
Supreme Court has held RFRA uneonstitu* 
S. Conceding diat no acuiat evidence of improper 
motive csfaas. the dissent attempts to create a 
material time ef (act sufficient to justify a trial by 
citing a collection of suppoacd inferences. Dis-
tent at IJ5J. A mere demonstration that the 
City cknied Mr. Snyder's request hecauxe of the 
content of his prayer does not prove a violation 
of the EstahtUhment Clause. To survive the mo-
tion for summary judgment. Mr. Snyder was 
required to produce evidence from which rea»on« 
able junws v*utd find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the City had an impermissible mo-
tive. Atuirrxm r. Lihrriv tdJhby. 477 U.S. 242. 
tionaL City 0/ fioeme * Flort*> — *j£ 
* 117 &(X 2157,138 L£d2d 624 (199Q. 
We therefore need not consider the merits of 
Mr. Snyder's RFRA daima. 
1IL Claims Under the Utah Constitution 
(121 Mr. Snyder also aDegea that the 
QQ^s denial of his request violates the Free 
Exercise, Establishment, and Due Process 
Clauses of the Utah Constitution. Although 
the district court did not reach the merits of 
these state4aw daima. it ruled against Mr. 
Snyder; finding that the provisions of the 
Utah Constitution were not 'self-executing* 
and therefore did not provide a cause of 
action. 
We have held that when federal claims are 
resolved prior to trial the district emit 
should usually dedine to exercise jurisdiction 
over pendent state law daims and allow the 
plaintiff to pursue them in state court. See 
Ball a Rentier, 54 FJM 664, €69 (10th Or. 
1995). We believe this general practice k 
particularly appropriate in this case. 
The Supreme Court of Utah recently re-
jected a challenge to Salt Lake City's prac-
tice of opening its city council meetings with 
a prayer. Society of SeparatimisU ft 
Whitehead. 870 ?2d 916 (Utah 1993}. While 
that challenge was brought under the provi-
sion of Utah's Constitution which prohibited 
the expenditure of public monies for religious 
purposes and not under its Free Exercise or 
Establishment Clauses, the Supreme Coot 
of Utah stated in Society of Separation*** 
that it would not foOow federal constitutional 
models in interpreting the Religion Clauses 
of the Utah Constitution, ti at 930.931 n. 
36. Given that the interpretation of those 
Clauses appears to be undergoing an evolu-
tion, and given the complex issues of state 
252. 106 S.CL 2505. 2512. t l LEdJd 202 
(tOfc* in other Mrds. that the CHydcnkd Mr. 
Smdcr's request because it preferred another 
fdi^ion.ormmretifion.ovcrhbrelipon. Genu* 
ine i**ucs of material (acts may be founded upon 
inferences: however, thewe inferences mutf * 
rriMwwhlc inferences, and must amount to more 
than a scintilla of evidence. Ids *v tf to eVeet 
r. &d*r M Tools. 107 FJd U57. I4c4 ( l « 
Cir.l"*7i. Even a»«uming that a ctilWctioasi 
mfcrenccs can create a genuine MJC tif material 
(act. thw revtird cannot reasonably he conrideree 
to tu%e created «uch an fettic. 
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law presented, we decline to exercise supple- Religious Freedom 
mental Jurisdiction over Mr. Snyder's state-
law daima. 
We therefore reverse ts to the state-law 
daima and remind them to the district court 
irith instructions to dismiss without pr^fo-
dice, 
AFFIRMED in put, REVERSED in part, 
and REMANDED to the district court. 
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Restoration Act daim. 
The Court held in Boeme that RFRA's re-
strictions on state and local government ac-
tions affecting religion are unconstitutional 
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, concurring and 
dissenting: 
Federal Free Exercise Claim 
I concur with the majority's conclusion 
that Snyder failed to establish a federal free 
exercise daim. I agree that the Free Exer* 
dse Clause did not guarantee Snyder the 
right to give his prayer as the opening pray-
er at dty council meetings, and that by ex-
chiding Snyder's prayer the City did not 
impermissibly burden Snyder's right to be-
lieve and profess his religious doctrines. His 
claim is not cognizable under the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 
However, I disagree with any suggestion 
that Snyder's daim could be rejected at the 
summary judgment stage on the ground that 
his beliefs are not religious in nature. In 
reviewing the grant of summary judgment, 
we examine the factual record and reason-
able inferences drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing sum-
mary judgment Kaul v. Stephen. 83 F-3d 
1208,1212 (10th Or.1996). The record con-
tains evidence that the beliefs expressed in 
Snyder's prayer have a religious basis, and 
whether religious beliefs are sincerely bdd is 
a question of fact Montr v. MaynanL 837 
F2& 1521.1523 (10th Or.1991). See United 
Stain * Seeger. 380 US. 163,176, 85 S.Ct 
850,859.13 UE<L2d 733 (1965). The record 
does not support a conclusion that the beliefs 
expressed by Snyder are ao biiarre or so 
clearly nonrdigious in nature that the dis-
trict court could properly resolve the issue on 
summary judgment 
Religious Freedom Restoration. Act Claim 
I concur with the majority's conclusion 
that after City of Bonne ft FlortK — U JS. 
. 117 S.Ct 2157,138 LE<L2d 624 (19971. 
we need not consider the merits of Snyder's 
Claims under Utah Constitution 
1 also concur with the majority's conclusion 
that it was an abuse of discretion for the 
district court to exercise supplemental juris-
diction to decide the delicate state constitu-
tional issues. We cannot predict from Soci-
ety of SeparationitU, Inc. u Whitehead, 870 
P.2d 916 (Utah 1993), how the Utah Supreme 
court would decide the state constitutional 
issues in this case. 
Federal Establishment Clause Claim 
I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
condusion that Snyder's federal Establish-
ment Clause daim is preduded by Marth tt 
Chamber* 463 VS. 783,103 S.Ct 3330, 77 
L.EdJ2d 1019 (1983J. There are significant 
differences between this case and Monk 
The sole issue in Marth waa whether the 
Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening 
each day's session with a prayer by a chap-
lain paid by the state violated the Establish-
ment Clause. Using a purely historical anal-
ysis, the Court conduded the practice did not 
establish religion in violation of the First 
Amendment The Court reasoned the prac-
tice did not establish religion within the 
meaning of the First Amendment because 
the First Congress that drafted the Bill of 
Rights hired chaplains to give prayers at 
sessions of Congress. The practice of open-
ing legislative sessions with prayer by a* 
chaplain paid by the government is not an 
establishment of religion within the meaning 
of the First Amendment, but "is simply a 
tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely 
held among the people of this country.* 463 
US. at 792.103 S.Ct at 3336. 
Here, the City did not hire or appoint a 
chaplain as its official religious spokesperson, 
which was the sole practice at issue in 
Mank Instead, the City sponsored a fonim 
for private individuals to engage in prayer at 
dty council meetings and excluded Snyder 
from that forum because of the content of his 
prayer. Snyder does not challenge the Cit/a 
practice of sponsoring prayer at its council 
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meetings. He challenges only his exclusion 
from the City-aponsored forum for prayer 
based on the unacceptable content of hia 
proposed prayer* 
Martk is distinguishable from this ease for 
three reasons. First, the historical record 
does not support censorship of prayer by 
private individuals at the start of government 
meetings. Second, prayer by private individ-
uals at the start of meetings of governmental 
bodies is fundamentally different from pray* 
er by a chaplain who is appointed aa the 
official paid religious spokesperson for the 
governmental body. Third, the record con* 
Uins circumstantial evidence that the City 
had impermissible motives for excluding Say-
der's prayer. 
Although from Marsh we know the mem* 
bersof the First Congress who drafted the 
First Amendment believed appointment of 
chaplains did not violate the Establishment 
Clause, we simply do not know what they 
would have thought about censorship of 
prayer at a government-sponsored forum for 
prayer by individuals at the atari of meetings 
of a legislative body. The censorship of 
chaplains9 prayers at government meetings 
doea not find support in the actions of the 
First Congress. Research reveals no histori-
cal record of the prayers offered by the 
chaplains of the First Congress. The record 
of debates and proceedings in the first eigh-
teen congresses in the Annals if Congress do 
not include chaplains' prayers1 and, other 
than the decision of the First Congress to 
appoint two chaplains of different denomina-
tions, one by each house to interchange 
weekly, see i Annals ef Congress 968,1077, 
1773, there appears to be no record of the 
measures, if any, taken by Congress to con* 
trol the content of such prayers. 
Manh suggests that chaplains* prayers 
could be censored without violating the Con* 
stitution. The Court suggested that to be 
lawful a legislative chaplain'a prayer must be 
noctsectarian and non-proselytising: 
The content of the prayer is not of concern 
to judges where, as here, there is no indi-
cation that the prayer opportunity has 
been exploited to proselytise or advance 
I. Nor deir* the C<m&rxx*m*t Globe* which cov-
er* the mid-IOth century. The opening prayer* 
of coof ressiunal chaplain* were not recorded in 
any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief! That being so, ft is not for us to 
embark on a sensitive evaluation or to 
parse the content of a particular prayer. 
463 VS. at 794-85,103 S.O. at 3337-38. 
Conversely, the content of sectarian, pros-
elytizing prayer by a legislative chapUa 
wouldbeof concern to the courts as a possi-
ble establishment of religion. Sw County tf 
Allegheny VL American Civil Liberties On-
ton, 492 VS. 573, 603.109 S.CL 3086,3106, 
106 LEA2d 472 (1989). Such prayer by a 
legislative body's official religious spokesper-
son could reasonably be viewed aa govern-
mental endorsement of a particular religion 
in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
Consequently, it may not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause for a government official to 
determine whether a chaplain's prayers are 
sufficiently nonsectarian and nonproselyttt-
ing in order to avoid violating the Establish-
ment Clause. Censorship or control of the 
content of a legislative chaplain's prayers 
could be justified only by the need to avoid 
violating the Establishment Clause by keep-
ing the prayers within the limits allowed by 
Martk. 
It is true Snyder's proposed prayer was 
proselytising in nature because it was intend* 
ed to convert listeners to his point of view on 
the impropriety of prayer at a governmental 
(taction. It Is also true that although Sny-
der wis not a member of any organised 
religious sect, his prayer waa sectarian in the 
sense that it represented his particular be-
liefs and did not attempt to encompass 
shared beliefs. However, Snyder is not a 
chaplain hired or appointed to be the City's 
official religious spokesperson. The prayers 
at the atari of the city council meetings are 
not offered by a chaplain, but by members of 
the public representing a broad range of 
religious beliefs. The Establishment 
Clause's guarantee of government neutrality 
toward religion ia not offended, but respect-
ed, when the government, following neutral 
criteria and evenhanded policies, gives access 
to a forum to recipients wtoae ideologies and 
viewpoints, including religious ones, are 
the C«mcfY«*«Mul Record from it* *ttrt in U73 
until the early twentieth century. 
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broad and diverse. Ste Rosenberger % Rec-
tor and Visitor* of the University cf Virgi-
nia. 515 VS. 819. 837-99. 115 &Ct 2510, 
2521, 132 L.E42d 700 (1995). See also 
Board of Education * Mergens. 496 US. 
226, 248-19. 110 S.CL 23% 2370-71, 110 
LEd2d 191 (1990); Widmar* Vincent. 454 
VS. 263,277.102 SXX 269,278.70 LJSdJd 
440(1981). If the City permitted Snyder to 
offer hit prayer, a reasonable observer aware 
of the City's practice of inviting penona rep-
resenting a broad range of religious and non-
religious viewpoints to give invocations would 
not regard Snyder's prayer as representing 
the Cit/s endorsement of his particular be-
liefs. Consequently, permitting the prayer 
would not have violated the Establishment 
Clause. See Rosenberger, 515 VS. at 842-
43.115 a ( X at 2523; GapOof Square Review 
and Advisory Board v.Pmette, 615 VS. 753, 
768-70,115 S.O.2440.2450,182 LE<L2d 650 
(1995); Mergens, 496 VS. at 250-61, 110 
S.Ct at 2372; see also Capitol Square, 515 
US. at 779-81.115 S.Ct at 2455 (O'Connor. 
J„ concurring); County of Allegheny, 492 
VS. at 636.109 S.Ct at 3123-24 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring). Because permitting Sny-
der's prayer would not have violated the 
Establishment Clause, justification for per* 
mitting governmental censorship or control 
of the content of chaplain's prayers suggest-
ed by Monk is not present here. 
Marsh also suggests that a governmental 
bod/s selection of persons to deliver prayers 
at fta meetings may violate the Establish-
ment Clause if the selections art the product 
of impermissible motives, I disagree with 
the majority's conclusion that the record b 
devoid of evidence suggesting the City had 
impermissible motives in denying Snyder's 
request to offer his prayer. I do not, aa 
footnote 3 of the majority opinion asserts, 
concede there is no actual evidence of imper-
missible motive. There is no direct evidence, 
but there is circumstantial evidence of imper-
missible motive. Direct evidence of discrimi-
natory intent is rarely available, and it is not 
a novel proposition to say that intent may be 
proved by circumstantial evidence. Seccg^ 
Denieon a Swaco Geolograph COL, 941 F2d 
1416. 1420 (10th Or.1991). Viewed fat the 
light most favorable to Snyder, the record 
supports an inference that the guidelines 
were drafted specifically to exclude Snyder's 
prayer because its content was offensive. 
Snyder wrote to the City in March 1994, 
expressing interest in presenting a prayer at 
a council meeting and asking if there were 
any guidelines or restrictions on such pray-
ers. Snyder received no reply and wrote 
again fat May, again expressing interest in 
presenting a prayer and inquiring about any 
guidelines or restrictions. His request waa 
forwarded to H. Craig Hall, City Attorney of 
Murray City, who answered Snyder's letter 
on June 1,1994. 
The City had no formal, written guidelinea 
or restrictions on prayers before council 
meetings until Snyder asked if there were 
any. Persons asked to give invocations were 
simply asked to give an 'Invocation, appro-
priate message, or inspirational thought" 
(Appellant's append, at 2810 According to 
Hall, since the prayers began in 1982, a 
custom and practice of "positive, upbeat" 
prayers "exhorting the City Council to do 
what they ought to do under their statutory 
responsibilities'' had developed. No one had 
ever attacked City policies or the council 
during an invocation. 
By the time Snyder made his request, the 
City Council of Salt Lake City had decided 
not to have prayer at the opening of council 
meetings rather than deal with a request by 
Snyder that he be permitted to deliver a 
prayer virtually identical to the prayer at 
issue fat this case. Snyder's prayer was like-
ly to offend a great many people of a variety 
of Christian faiths on reEgious grounds. The" 
prayer questions the divinity of Jesus and 
the existence of heaven, and expresses a 
belief that God may take the form of a 
woman. These views are controversial, to 
say the least. Snyder's proposed prayer and 
the decision of the Salt Lake City Council 
were reported in the newspapers. Hall had 
read newspaper articles about Snyder's re-
quest to present the prayer at a Salt Lake 
City Council meeting, and this knowledge 
influenced his response to Snyder's request 
The record establishes that Hall believed 
(correctly, as it turned out) Snyder would 
propose a similar or identical prayer to Mur-
ray City, and he drafted his response to 
exdude the expected prayer. This response 
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constituted the City's first written or unwrit-
ten guictelines for piayer at council meetings. 
In his letter to Snyder. Kail stated that 
acceptable invocations. Inspirational mes-
sages, or prayers must not "express political 
views, attack City policies or practices or 
mock City practices or policies." (Appel-
lant's append, at 10.) In his deposition, how-
ever, he said that not all political views are 
prohibited: apparently only views critical of 
the council or its policies and practices. 
Upon receiving HalFs response, Snyder 
sent a copy of his prayer and a request that 
he be permitted to offer it at a council meet-
ing. On June 30, Hall responded with a 
letter stating the text of the proposed prayer 
was "unacceptable* under the guidelines set 
out in his letter of June 1. (Appellants ap-
pend at 14.) The next month, the City 
invited the pastor of a local church to deliver 
an invocation and the invitation made no 
mention of any guidefines or restrictions. 
The record would support inferences that 
the City had no restrictions on the eontent of 
prayers until Snyder made his request, that 
the restrictions were drafted specifically to 
exclude Snyder's prayer, and that the re-
strictions were not applied to others. Al-
though there was evidence the City had the 
permissible motive of promoting civility, and 
although there was no direct evidence of im-
permissible motives, the circumstantial evi-
dence is sufficient to support an inference 
that the City acted to exclude Snyder's pray* 
er because it found the content offensive. 
Because the record contains evidence the 
City acted with impermissible motives. 
Monk cannot justify entry of summary judg* 
ment for the City. 
Because Stank is not controlling, deter-
mining whether the City's exclusion of Sny-
der based on the content of his prayer vio-
lates the Establishment Clause requires 
further analysis. The long-standing test for 
determining whether government action vio-
lates the Establishment Clause first set out 
in Lemon v. Knrtsman. 403 VS. 602, 612-
13, 91 S.O. 2105. 2111, 29 L.E<L2d 745 
(1971), has been modified in recent cases. 
Under the Lemon test government action 
regarding religion violates the Establish-
ment Clause unless it meets three condi-
tions: (1) It must have a secular purpose; 
(2) its principal or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits re t 
gion; and 13) it must not foster exeessitt 
government entanglement with nfigfao. 
The Court has in some eases recast the 
first and second parte of the Lemon test to 
ask whether the challenged government no-
tion was intended to endorse or disapprove, 
or has the effect of endorsing or disapprov. 
ing, religion. See County of Allegheny9 A<& 
VS. at 592-93, 109 S.CC at 31CO-01; 
Lynch * Donnelly 465 VS. 668, 687-94, 
104 SCt 1355, 1366-70, 79 L.E<L2d 604 
(19S4) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Robinton 
9. City of Edmond. 68 F-3d 1226, 1229 
(10th Or.1995), ceil denied — US. , 
116 S.CL 1702,134 LEdid 801 (1996),, In 
Agoetini * FtUon, — UJS. , 
, 117 S.CL 1997, 2014-16, 138 LE&2& 
391 (1997), the Court explained that entan-
glement is properly understood as an aspect 
of an inquiry into the effect of the govern-
ment action rather than as a separate (sc-
tor in the test 
The stated purpose for the Cit/s exclusion 
of Snyder's prayer was secular—to promote 
civility at city council meetings. However, as 
discussed above, the record supports an in-
ference that the City drafted its prayer 
guidelines and applied them only to Snyder 
because it found the content of his prayer 
offensive. On this record, whether the stat-
ed purpose was a pretext for impermissible 
motives is a question of fact The exclusion 
of Snyder's prayer also had the effect of 
expressing disapproval of his religious views. 
A reasonable observer familiar with the 
Cit/s practices could conclude from exclu-
sion of the prayer that the City disapproved 
of Snyder's beliefs. Sec Chandler v. Janut, 
958 FSupp. 1550.1566 OLD JUa.1997). 
The City's censorship of the content of the 
prayer also constitutes excessive entangle-
ment. Governmental monitoring and control 
of the content of prayer inevitably estab-
lishes religion by entangling the government 
in religious issues. IRJevtew of prayers by 
government officials is one of the very prac-
tices vfcieh the First Amendment was de-
signed to prevent The framers knew that 
government involvement with one's religious 
practices would inevitably taint the sanctity 
of one's faith." Chandler. 958 FSupp. * 
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1566 (holding statute permitting student-led, 
nonseetarian, nonproselytixing prayer in pub-
lie schools unconstitutional*. See also Inge-
brttscn v. Jackson Publk School District, f& 
F2dZH,Zl9(5th Or.), ceit denied— US. 
f 117 &Ct 388.136 LX<L2d 304 0996). 
In Lee * Weisman. 60S US. S77,112 SXX 
2649,120 L£d2d 467 (1992). the Court heM 
prayer at a high school graduation by a 
clergyman invited by the principal violated 
the Establishment Clause. The Court did 
not apply the Lemon or endorsement testa, 
but focused on the susceptibility of high 
school students to coercion. However, the 
Court in effect found excessive entanglement 
in concluding the principal's control over the 
content of the prayer offended the Establish* 
ment Clause. The Court concluded: "It lea 
cornerstone principle of our Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence that It is no part of the 
business of government to compose official 
prayers for any group of the American peo-
ple to recite as a part of a religious program 
carried on by the government,9 end that is 
what the school officials attempted to do." 
505 VS. at 588,112 SXX at 2656 (quoting 
Engd v. Vttofe 370 VS. 421. 425. 82 S.CL 
1261.1264.8 L.E<L2d 601 (1962)). 
Similarly, in Sands v. Morongo Unified 
School DieL 53 CaL3d 863,281 CaLRptr. 34, 
809 PJ2d 809 (1991), cert denied 505 VS. 
1218,112 S.Ct 3026.120 L.E<L2d 897 (1992), 
the court held a school district's attempt to 
control the content of high school graduation 
prayers constituted excessive entanglement 
T o allow preventive monitoring by the state 
of the content of religious speech inevitably 
leads to gradual official development of what 
is acceptable public prayer. This result is as 
contrary to the requirements of the Estab-
lishment Clause as is . . . composition of an 
official state prayer/* 281 CaLRptr. at 43, 
809 ?2d at 818 (quoting Weisman * Lee 728 
F-Supp. 68. 74 (DJLU990), affd 505 UJS. 
577,112 S.CL 2649.120 LE<L2d 467 (1992)). 
Courts that have reeded Establishment 
Clause challenges to state and local legisla-
tive prayer have also recognised the risk of 
excessive entanglement even aa they upheld 
the practice in general. In Bogen v. Dot* 
598 F2d 1110 (8th Cir.1979), the court re-
jected an Establishment Clause challenge to 
a county board's practice of opening meet* 
bigs with prayer by an unpaid local clergy* 
man. However, the court stated: 
We would be leu than candid if we did 
not warn the county of the quagmire It is 
near. Up to the time of oral argument, all 
persons delivering invocations were mem* 
bers of the Christian taith. We have no 
reason to believe that persons of any reli-
gious persuasions have volunteered and 
been tuned down by the board. If in the 
future this should occur the board win be 
in a very difficult position to defend 
against an allegation that it is excessively 
entangled in religion by giving public ap-
proval to some groups while denying it to 
others. 
598 FJEd at 1114. In upholding a statute 
authorizing the use of public funds to pay 
salaries of ^•pfafaf for the state legislature, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted: 
There is no evidence that a great degree 
of government entanglement with religion 
b occasioned by the employment of legisla-
tive chaplains. The prayers offered are 
brief, the content unsupervised fcy the 
State, and attendance completely volun-
tary. There is no evidence that the State 
has become embroiled in any difficult it* 
eisions about which religions art to be 
represented or what sorts cf invocations 
are to be offered. 
Colon Treasurer and Receiver General 378 
Mass. 550,392 KE2& 1195,1200 (1979) (em* 
phask added). See Lincoln % Page, 109 
NJL30,341Jl2d799,800(1968); Manas. 
Wemik 86 NJ. 232,430 A2d 888,901 (1981) 
(Pashman. J„ concurring). 
Not all government oversight of religious 
activities violates the Establishment clause*-* 
the entanglement must be excessive. Al-
though mere custodial oversight of religious 
activities at a government-sponsored forum 
does not constitute excessive entanglement, 
see Mergens. 496 VS. at 253, 110 S.CL at 
2373, the censorship of prayer goes far be-
yond mere custodial oversight, and strikes at 
the heart of the Establishment Clause. 
Moreover, if the City applied its guidelines to 
an prayers at council meetings, the censor-
ship would be regular and frequent In 
Lemon. 403 US. at 620,91 &CL at 2114-15. 
the Court held state aid to parochial schools 
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violated the EftibSfhfitfnt Clause berause of 
the moniioring required to ensure that teach-
ers paid with public ftinda did not teach 
religion. "A comprehensive, discriminating; 
and continuing state furveOIanee will inevita-
bly be required to ensure that these restric-
tions are obeyed and the First Amendment 
otherwise respected.... These prophylactic 
contacts wiD involve excessive and enduring 
entanglement between state and church.* 
Here, if Murray City were to consistently 
apply its prayer guidelines and review alt 
prayers before its meetings, the city attorney 
would have to censor prayers approximately 
thirty-six times a year. 
I recognize that the invocation ceremony 
at the start of dty council meetings b not a 
public forum open for indiscriminate public 
speech by the general public It is a limited 
forum from which the government may ex-
clude a speaker who wishes to address a 
topic not encompassed within the purpose of 
the forum, although it cannot exclude a 
speaker solely to suppress a point of view 
espoused on an otherwise indudibie subject. 
Cornelius «, NAACP Legal Defense and Ed* 
national Fund. Inc. 473 U-S. 788,806,105 
S.Ct 3439.8451.87 L£<L2d 567(1965). See 
Rosenberger. 515 U-S. at 827-31, U5S.CL at 
2516-17; Lamb's Chapel * Center Moriches 
Union Free School Diet. 508 U-S. 384,392-
94,113 S.Ct 2141,2147-48,124 L£d2d 352 
(1993). The City limited the forum to speech 
appropriate for an invocation ceremony. The 
stated purpose of the invocation ceremony 
l i t to promote civility, solemnize the occa-
sion, and encourage concentration on the 
matters on the agenda by appropriate inspi-
rational mesM^es, Including prayers. When 
confronted with a prayer it deemed inappro* 
priate for the invocation, the City drew tip 
guidelines prohibiting prayer expressing po» 
Btical views or attacking or mocking City 
policies and practices. Such prayer would 
not tend to promote dvQity or aolemnixe the 
occsstoit 
The City could not properly exclude prayer 
attacking or mocking the dty council or its 
policies and practices unless it also excluded 
prayer defending or supporting the council 
and its policies and practices. Otheiwise.it 
would be allowing prayer on political mat* 
ten. but from only one point of view. The 
guidelines purported to exclude all prayer 
expressing political views, but the record b» 
dkates some political views were permitted, 
and the record would support an inference 
that the Ctty drafted its guidelines specified, 
ty to exclude Snyder's religious views. 
Moreover, even neutral exclusion of all 
prayer expressing political views would vio-
late the Establishment Clause. The Oty 
specifically invited reHgious speech in the 
form of prayer. Neutral enforcement of the 
rule prohibiting prayer expressing political 
views would entangle the City in religion by 
requiring censorship of prayer. It could also 
convey a message of governmental disap. 
proval of religions whose adherents feel com* 
peDed to address political issues. 
Procedural Due Process Claim 
Because in my view, the district court 
erred in entering summary judgment against 
Snyder's federal Establishment Clause data, 
I also dissent from the majority's conclusion 
that because Snyder was not deprived of any 
protected interest, his due process data 
fids. 
UNITED STATES of America* 
PlaintifT-AppclIee. 
v. 
Michael Demetrius KNOX, also 
known as Michael Asbenry, 
Defendant-Appellant 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit 
Sept 17,1997. 
Defendant was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Northern Dif 
trict of Oklahoma, Teny C. Kern. X. of mail 
fraud and conspiracy to commit msS fraudt 
and defendant appealed The Court of Ap-
peals, Lucero, Circuit Judge, held that: 0 J 
witnesses9 prior statements at their own 
Tab 4 
Tom SNYDER, Plaintiff-Appellant 
v. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a mu-
nicipal corporation; H. Craig Hall, City 
Attorney for Murray City Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
United States of America, Intervenor.1 
No. 96-1087. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit 
Oct 27, 1998. 
Plaintiff who sought to present prayer 
during city council meeting filed civil rights 
action against city council after his prayer 
was not chosen for reading. The United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, 
J. Thomas Greene, J., 902 F.Supp. 1444, en-
tered summary judgment for city council, 
and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
124 F.3d 1349, initially affirmed the district 
court's resolution of federal claims. On re-
hearing en banc, the Court of Appeals, Ebel, 
Circuit Judge, held that city council did not 
violate Establishment Clause by denying citi-
zen permission to recite his proposed prayer. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
Lucero, Circuit Judge, concurred in 
judgment and filed opinion. 
Briscoe, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting 
opinion in which Seymour, Circuit Judge, 
joined. 
1. Constitutional Law e=>84.5(l) 
"Legislative prayer^ in opening session 
does not violate Establishment Clause. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. I. 
2. Constitutional Law<S=»84.5U> 
Legislative body does not violate Estab-
lishment Clause when it chooses particular 
person to give its invocational prayers; simi-
I. The government intervened in this case in the 
district court solely lor the purpose of defending 
the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993. The government did 
not participate in the initial appeal of this case 
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larly. there can be no Establishment Clause 
violation merely in fact that legislative body 
chooses not to appoint certain person to give 
its prayers. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1. 
3. Constitutional Law <S=>84.5(1) 
The kind of legislative prayer that will 
run afoul of Establishment Clause is one that 
proselytizes particular religious tenet or be-
lief, or that aggressively advocates specific 
religious creed, or that derogates another 
religious faith or doctrine. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 1. 
4. Constitutional Law e»84.5(l) 
There is no "impermissible motive" un-
der Establishment Clause when legislative 
body or its agent chooses to reject govern-
ment-sanctioned speaker because prayer ten-
dered by him for legislative invocation falls 
outside long-accepted genre of legislative 
prayer. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1. 
5. Constitutional Law C=»84.5(l) 
Municipal Corporations e»92 
City council did not violate Establish-
ment Clause by denying citizen permission to 
recite his proposed prayer at opening of 
council meeting, where proposed prayer ex-
plicitly attacked genre of legislative invoca-
tional prayer, disparaged those who believed 
that legislative prayer was appropriate and 
aggressively proselytized for citizen's partic-
ular religious views. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
1. 
Brian M. Barnard (Andrea Garland of the 
Utah Legal Clinic, with him on the briefs), 
Cooperating Attorneys for Utah Civil Rights 
& Liberties Foundation, Inc., Salt Lake City, 
Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Allan L. Larson (Richard A. Van Wagoner, 
with him on the brief) Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defen-
dants-Appellees. 
and did not participate in this en banc rehearing. 
Thus, although the government remains named 
in the caption of this case, it is not a party to the 
appeal. 
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Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, 
HOLLOWAY, Senior Circuit Judge, 
PORFILIO, ANDERSON, TACHA, 
BALDOCK, BRORBY, EBEL, KELLY, 
HENRY, BRISCOE, LUCERO, and 
MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 
EBEL, Circuit Judge, 
This court has agreed to rehear this case 
en banc * to consider whether the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment pre-
vents a city council from denying a request 
from a private citizen to give a prayer at the 
opening of the council's meeting when the 
denial is made on the basis of the content of 
the proposed prayer. The Supreme Court of 
the United States has previously held in 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S.Ct 
3330,77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983), that the United 
States Constitution is not violated if a legisla-
tive or other deliberative body chooses to 
speak prayerfully when it opens its meetings. 
Applying Marsh, we now hold that no viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause arises when 
a city chooses who may offer the invocational 
prayer to open a city council meeting. 
Background 
The background of this case is reported in 
the district court and original panel opinions, 
see Snyder v. Murray City Corp. 902 
F.Supp. 1444 (D.Utah 1995) ["Snyder /"] 
and Snyder v. Murray City Corp.% 902 
F.Supp. 1455 (D.Utah 1995) [uSnyder / / " ] , 
affd in part & rev'd in part, Snyder v. 
Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349 (10th Cir. 
1997) [uSnyder III"]. We provide only those 
2. The original panel in this case voted to affirm 
in part and reverse in part the district court's 
order. See Snyder v. Murray City Corp.. 124 FJd 
1349 (10th Cir. 1997). This court granted the 
appellant's petition for rehearing en banc limited 
to the Establishment Clause issues presented in 
the case. We now vacate Part I.B. of the panel's 
opinion. We did not grant rehearing as to the 
other portions of the panel decision, and conse-
quently, the remainder of the panel opinion re-
mains in effect. 
3. The text of Snyder's proposed prayer is as 
follows: 
OPENING PRAYER 
OUR MOTHER, who art in heaven (if. in-
deed there is a heaven and if there is a god that 
takes a woman's fonn) hallowed be thy name. 
details that are germane to the Establish-
ment Clause issue that we deal with here. 
In 1993, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
the religion clauses of Utah's state constitu-
tion do not prohibit a city council from open-
ing its meetings with a prayer. See Society 
of Separationists, Inc. u. Whitehead, 870 
P2d 916 (Utah 1993). In the wake of that 
decision, the municipal council of Murray 
City resumed a practice it had maintained 
since 1982—but suspended during the pen-
dency of the appeal in Separationists—of 
opening each of its meetings with a prayer. 
Those prayers had been offered by members 
of the religious communities in and around 
Murray City, including various members of 
Judeo-Christian congregations, Zen Bud-
dhists, and Native Americans. Each of those 
offering prayers during Murray City's coun-' 
cU meetings did so at the initial request of 
the City Council, usually in response to a 
form letter the council circulated to local 
religious communities. Prior to the events' at * 
issue in this case, the city had never received 
an unsolicited request from a private individ-
ual to give a prayer at a council meeting. In 
light of this historical practice, Murray City 
had no written policy on its council prayers, 
and it had no formal guidelines for the con-
tent of its council prayers. 
The decision in Separationists, and the 
ensuing resumption of legislative prayers by 
city councils throughout Utah, prompted 
Tom Snyder, plaintiff-appellant here, to draft 
a prayer that calls on public officials to cease 
the practice of using religion in public af-
fairs.8 Although Snyder's putative prayer is 
we ask for thy blessing for and guidance of 
those that will participate in this meeting and 
for those mortals that govern the state of Utah; 
We fervently ask that you guide the leaders 
of this city. Salt Lake County and the state of 
Utah so that they may see the wisdom of sepa-
rating church and state and so that they will 
never again perform demeaning religious cere-
monies as part of official government funcr 
lions; 
We pray that you prevent self-righteous polf 
ticians from mis-using the name of Cod in 
conducting government meetings; and. that 
you lead them away from the hypocritical and 
blasphemous deception of the public, attempt-
ing to make the people believe that bureau-
crats' decisions and actions have thy stamp of 
approval if prayers are offered at the beginning 
of government meetings; 
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unusual and iconoclastic, because this case 
was decided on summary judgment we will 
assume without deciding that it is an invoca-
tional prayer.1 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421, 424, 82 S.Ct 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962) 
(noting that a "solemn avowal of divine faith 
and supplication for the blessings of the Al-
mighty^ is a "prayer" with an explicitly reli-
gious character); Karen B. v. Treen, 653 
F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.1981) 
("Prayer is an address of entreaty, supplica-
tion, praise, or thanksgiving directed to some 
sacred or divine spirit, being, or object"). 
Although Snyder's supposed prayer can per-
haps as easily be characterized as political 
harangue, the political aspect of a religious 
supplication does not necessarily invalidate 
the invocation's prayerful character. See 
Karen B., 653 F.2d at 901 (That [a prayer] 
may contemplate some wholly secular objec-
tive cannot alter the inherently religious 
character of the exercise."). Nevertheless, 
the Establishment Clause speaks only to the 
religious aspect of Snyder's prayer, which we 
presume for purposes of this appeal, and as a 
result, we are not called in this case to 
evaluate the prayer's political overtones. By 
assuming the religious content of Snyder's 
prayer, we expressly reserve for another day 
the very difficult issue of attempting to dis-
cern the line between prayer and secular 
speech masquerading as prayer. 
We ask that you grant Utah's leaders and 
politicians enough courage and discernment to 
understand that religion is a private matter 
between every individual and his or her deity: 
we beseech thee to educate government lead-
ers that religious beliefs should not be broad-
cast and revealed for the purpose of impress-
ing others: we pray that you strike down those 
that mis-use your name and those that cheapen 
the institution of prayer by using it for their 
own selfish political gains; 
We ask that the people of the state of Utah 
will some day learn the wisdom of the separa-
tion of church and state; we ask that you will 
teach the people of Utah that government 
should not participate in religion; we pray that 
you smile those government officials that 
would attempt to censor or control prayers 
made by anyone to you or to any other of our 
gods; 
We ask that you deliver us from the evil of 
forced religious worship now sought to be im-
posed upon the people of the state of Utah by 
the actions of mis-guided, weak and stupid 
politicians, who abuse power in their own self-
righteousness; 
Snyder first presented this prayer, and his 
request to recite it, to the city council in Salt 
Lake City, prompting media coverage of the 
proposed prayer including publication of ex-
tensive excerpts. See; e.g^ Jon Ure, S.L 
Man Wants to Ask Mother in Heaven to 
End Public Prayer, Salt Lake Trib., Jan. 19, 
1994, at Bl. Rather than allowing Snyder to 
recite the prayer, officials in Salt Lake City 
decided to discontinue that city's practice of 
opening their city council meetings with a 
prayer. 
Snyder next contacted officials in Murray 
City with a letter on March 23, 1994, ex-
pressing his interest in presenting a prayer 
at one of the council's upcoming meetings 
and asking for information on guidelines for 
such prayers and how a person is selected to 
give such prayers. This letter gave no hint 
as to the text of Snyder's proposed prayer. 
When Snyder received no response to his 
first letter, he sent a second letter on May 9, 
1994, again expressing interest in giving a 
prayer at a city council meeting. This sec-
ond letter again included no mention of the 
text of his proposed prayer. 
On June 1, 1994, City Attorney H. Craig 
Hall responded to Snyder's letters by ex-
plaining that the city council had established 
an explicit policy that "all council meetings 
All of this we ask in thy name and in the 
name of thy son (if in fact you had a son that 
visited Earth) for the eternal betterment of all 
of us who populate the great state of Utah. 
Amen. 
4. Snyder's supplications draw on religious tenets 
held by many. See Matthew 6:5: Book of Mor» 
mon. 3 Nepht 13:6. Although there is admittedly 
some contradictory evidence in the record, Sny-
der has presented sufficient evidence to create a 
genuine dispute of fact as to the sincerity of his 
religious belief that prayer should be a private 
matter and should not be used to self-aggrandize 
the prayer-giver. 
Nevertheless, if Snyder's invocation is not a 
''prayer/' our ultimate conclusion that Murray 
City did not violate the Establishment Clause 
would remain the same. If Snyder's speech is a 
non-prayer, then for the reasons we discuss be* 
low in Part III. there would be no "impermissi-
ble motive" in preventing Snyder from reciting a 
non-prayer during a time permissibly reserved 
for legislative prayer. Thus, there would be no 
Establishment Clause violation. See Part III. in-
fra. 
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will start with prayer," but the council had 
not established "formal policies regarding the 
nature and/or content of this reverence por-
tion of their agenda." Hall's letter contin-
ued: 
The purpose of the "prayer" is to allow 
individuals that opportunity to express 
thoughts, leave blessings, etc It is not a 
time to express political views, attack city 
policies or practices or mock city practices 
or policies. 
Comments on present city practices or 
policies may be made at city council meet-
ings by one of two methods; either by 
requesting to be placed on the agenda, or, 
taking up to three minutes during the "citi-
zen comment" portion of the meeting. The 
later [sic] method requires no prior ar-
rangements to be made.s 
Nowhere in his June 1 letter did Hall re-
spond to Snyder's particular request for per-
mission to give a prayer at a city councfl 
meeting. 
On June 9,1994, Snyder sent a third letter 
to Murray City, again repeating his request 
for permission to give a prayer at a city 
council meeting and this time including a 
copy of the text of his proposed prayer. 
Three weeks later, Hall responded to Sny-
der's third letter, this time explicitly denying 
permission for Snyder to give a prayer at a 
city council meeting: 
The text of the proposed prayer is unac-
ceptable. It does not follow the guidelines 
set forth in my letter dated June 1, 1994. 
Until your proposed prayer satisfies these 
guidelines, an invitation to participate in 
our opening ceremonies will not be forth-
coming. 
5. The text of this letter, with its references to 
attacks on city policies, suggests that City Attor-
ney Hall already was aware of the general tenor 
of Snyder's proposed prayer even though Snyder 
had not yet included a copy of it in his letters to 
Murray City. At a later deposition in this case. 
Hall conceded that he was influenced by media 
coverage of Snyder's dealings with the Salt Lake 
City council when he wrote the June 1. 1994. 
letter. 
6. The order for rehearing en banc initially speci-
fied two questions for the parties to address. 
This court, however, subsequently modified that 
Snyder received Hall's denial letter on July 
1, 1994, and filed the original complaint in-
this case the same day. 
Snyder's subsequently amended complaint' 
sought compensatory and punitive damages, 
as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, 
on the basis of Murray City's alleged viola-
tions of Snyder's First Amendment and pro-' 
cedural due process rights under the United 
States Constitution and the Utah Constitu-
tion, as well as his rights under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Following 
discovery and cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the district court ruled against all-
of Snyder's claims. See Snyder I, 902 
FJSupp. at 1455 (granting summary judg-
ment to Murray City); Snyder II, 902 
FiJupp. at 1458 (denying Snyder's motion for* 
new trial). On appeal, a divided panel of this* 
court affirmed the district court's resolution 
of Snyder's federal claims but instructed the 
district court to dismiss, without prejudice, 
Snyder's state-law claims for want of ade-
quate supplemental jurisdiction. See Snyder 
III, 124 F.3d at 1353-55. This court subse-
quently agreed to rehear only Snyder's fed-
eral Establishment Clause claim en banc1 
Discussion T 
The very first command of our Bill of 
Rights, as it applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is that state and 
local governments "shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion." U.S. 
Const, amend. I, cL 1. At its core, the Estab-
lishment Clause enshrines the principle that 
government may not act in ways that "aid 
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another." See Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 600, 112 S.Ct 2«9, 120 
L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
order to delete the specific questions presented 
and "clarify that rehearing en banc is granted on 
the Establishment Clause issues in this case." 
7. In light of the First Amendment issue raised in 
this appeal and our consequential " 'obligation to 
make an independent examination of the whole 
record." ** we review the district court's summary 
judgment decision dc novo. Sec t.vtlc r. C'i/v of 
Ha\s\-ilU\ Kansas. 138 F.id 8S7. 862 tlOih Cir. 
19481 (quoting Bote Carp. v. Consumer's I'nton of 
UniutI Stales. Inc.. 466 U S. 485. 4W. |J4 S.Ct. 
1944. 80 L.Ed.2dS02 (1984)). 
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ring). As Justice Black declared for the 
Supreme Court more than fifty years ago, 
-Neither a state nor the Federal Government 
can, openly or secretly, participate in the 
affairs of any religious organizations or 
groups and vice versa." Everson v. Board of 
Educ, 330 US. 1,16, 67 S.Ct 504, 91 L.EA 
711 (1947). This core understanding of our 
notion of religious liberty stretches back to 
the very genesis of the First Amendment 
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 
Otto.) 145,164, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (discuss-
ing the history of the Establishment Clause 
and quoting Jefferson's letter to the Danbury 
Baptist Association on the purpose of the 
clause to Mbuild[ ] a wall of separation be-
tween church and State"). 
Although there are many kinds of Estab-
lishment Clause claims, the prayer cases typ-
ically arise in a procedural posture that pits 
an audience member of a particular faith, 
often a minority religious view, against a 
government-sanctioned speaker who has re-
cited a prayer, often expressing a majoritari-
an religious view, during a government-creat-
ed prayer opportunity. See, eg., Lee, 505 
U.S. at 581, 112 S.Ct 2649 (involving a stu-
dent's challenge to a public school graduation 
prayer prepared by a local rabbi in compli-
ance with school district guidelines developed 
by the National Conference of Christians and 
Jews); Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 
232, 233^34 (6th Cir.1997) (involving a Hindu 
professor's challenge to a public university's 
practice of beginning university events and 
faculty meetings with prayers), cert de-
nied, — U.S. , 118 S.CL 1308, 140 
L.Ed.2d 473 (1998); see also Bauchman v. 
West High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 546 (10th 
Cir.1997) (involving a Jewish student's chal-
lenge to a Mormon music teacher's various 
practices and selection of allegedly religious 
music for a high school choir in Salt Lake 
City), cert denied, — VS. , 118 S.Ct 
2370,141 L.Edid 738 (1998). 
The difficulty of the establishment claim in 
this case flows partly from its inversion of 
the usual posture. Here, the plaintiff is the 
putative government-sanctioned speaker, and 
he alleges that in preventing him from recit-
ing his prayer against government prayers, 
the government has established a religion. 
Despite its unusual posture, the essence of 
Snyder's contention is straight-forward: 
Snyder claims that in branding his particular 
prayer "unacceptable" and preventing him 
from offering it as part of the official "rever-
ence period" of the municipal council meet-
ing, Murray City has impermissibly pre-
ferred one religion over another. We must 
decide if that is so. 
/. Sui generis status of 
legislative prayers 
Prior to 1983, the lower courts had reached 
a consensus, but without any consistent ratio-
nale, on the conundrum of whether overtly 
religious prayers by local and state legisla-
tive bodies in opening their legislative ses-
sions constituted the kind of religious activity 
banned by the Establishment Clause. With 
varying reasoning, the lower courts agreed 
that such legislative prayers did not fall with-
in the prohibition against a "law respecting 
an establishment of religion." See Bogen v. 
Doty, 598 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (8th Cir.1979) 
(applying the three-part test of Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct 2105, 29 
L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), in upholding a county 
board's practice of invocational prayers be-
cause they had a "clearly secular purpose," 
but warning that the county's selection pro-
cedures for who should give such prayers 
were dangerously close to the "quagmire" of 
"excessive entanglement" and that the board 
would be in a "difficult position" if it rejected 
a volunteer because of his or her religious 
persuasion); Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver 
General 378 Mass. 550, 392 N.E.2d 1195, 
1199-1200 (1979) (upholding the state's prac-
tice of paying legislative chaplains in large 
part because of the practice's long history 
and tradition and because it did not present 
substantial "divisive political potential"); 
Marta v. Wernik 86 N J. 232, 430 A-2d 888, 
895-96 (upholding invocational prayers at a 
borough council meeting because the reli-
gious dimension of the prayers did not pre-
dominate over secular goals, nor was the 
primary effect of the prayer to promote or 
inhibit religion), cert denied, 454 VS. 958, 
102 S.CL 495, 70 L.Ed.2d 373 (1981); Lin-
coln v. Page, 109 N.H. 30, 241 A^d 799, 800-
01 (1968) (upholding a town's practice of 
invocational prayers at each annual town 
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meeting because of a de minimis religious 
effect, historic use, and similarity to religious 
references on coins, currency, public build-
ings and plaques). 
In 1983, however, the Supreme Court 
swept away the various approaches with its 
pathmarking decision in Marsh v. Chambers, 
463 VS. 783,103 S.Ct 3330,77 L.Ed.2d 1019 
(1983). Noting that a[t]he opening of ses-
sions of legislative and other deliberative 
public bodies with prayer is deeply embed-
ded in the history and tradition of this coun-
try ,n the Court held that "[t]his unique histo-
ry leads us to accept the interpretation of the 
First Amendment draftsmen who saw no real 
threat to the Establishment Clause arising 
from a practice of prayer [opening a legisla-
tive session].* MarsK 463 U.S. at 786, 791, 
103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Edid 1019. In the 
course of reaching this holding, the Court 
surveyed the historical record of the views of 
the framers of the Constitution as well as the 
practices of the early Congresses and the 
infant state legislatures. The Court conclud-
ed, "Clearly the men who wrote the First 
Amendment Religion Clause did not view 
paid legislative chaplains and opening pray-
ers as a violation of that Amendment, for the 
practice of opening sessions with prayer has 
continued without interruption ever since 
that early session of Congress." Id. at 788, 
103 S.CL 3330. 
Although the Court relied solely—and to 
the exclusion of its traditional establishment 
tests—on a historical analysis to justify the 
practice of legislative prayers in Marsh,* 
since that decision the Court has repeatedly 
avoided applying Marsh fs mode of histori-
cal analysis. See, eg.. County of Allegheny 
v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 
U.S. 573, 603, 109 S.Ct 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 
472 (1989) (rejecting the dissenting argu-
ment in Allegheny County that the Marsh 
historical analysis controlled the constitu-
tionality of traditional crfeche displays at 
8. The historical analysis that formed the basis of 
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Marsh 
has templed many litigants and some courts to 
argue that the Supreme Court in Marsh created a 
whole new mode of analysis for Establishment 
Clause claims generally. See, e.g.. Stein v. Plain-
MV// Community Schools. 822 F.2d 1406. 1409-
10 (6ih Cir.1987) (holding that Maiyh *s reliance 
on historical acceptance controlled the court's 
Christmas: "However history may affect^  
the constitutionality of nonsectarian refers 
ences to religion by the government, history 
cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate; 
the government's allegiance to a particular, 
sect or creed.") Instead, the evolution of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence indi-
cates that the constitutionality of legislative 
prayers is a sui generis legal question. As* 
Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in 
Marsh, the kind of legislative prayers at 
issue in Marsh simply would not have sur-
vived the traditional Establishment Clause2 
tests that the Court had relied on prior to* 
Marsh and has continued to rely on in dif-
ferent contexts since Marsh. See MarsK 
463 VS. at 796, 103 S.Ct 3330 (Brennan,r 
J., dissenting). For this reason, the main-
line body of Establishment Clause case law 
provides little guidance for our decision in 
this case. Our decision, instead, depends 
on our interpretation of the holding in 
Marsh. 
In describing its conclusion that legislative 
prayers do not violate the First Amendment, 
the Marsh Court approached the question 
first and foremost as a facial issue, separate 
from the particular nuances of the Nebraska 
practice there under review. The Court 
made clear that it was considering legislative 
prayers as a kind of religious genre,.and it 
was this particular genre that was unvitiated 
by the Establishment Clause: 
In light of the unambiguous and unbro-
ken history of more than 200 years, there 
can be no doubt that the practice of open-
ing legislative sessions with prayer has" 
become part of the fabric of our society. 
To invoke Divine guidance on a public 
body entrusted with making the laws is 
not, in these circumstances, an ••establish-
ment" of religion or a step toward estab-
lishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowl-
holding that nonsectarian. nondenominational 
school graduation prayers are constitutional). 
But set Lee. 505 U.S. at 589. 596-97. 112 S.CL 
2649 (rejecting the view in Stein that school 
graduation prayers could be justified by their 
historical acceptance anJ stressing again the lim-
ited nature of its ruling in Marsh permitting 
invocational legislative prayers). 
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edgment of beliefs widely held among the 
people of this country. 
At at 792, 103 S.Ct 3330. This religious 
genre known as "legislative prayer* includes 
the traditional kind of invocational legislative 
prayers with which the Court was familiar, 
as well as similarly traditional governmental 
invocations such as the ay, "God save the 
United States and this Honorable Court," 
intoned by the Court's bailiff at the begin-
ning of its own sessions.9 See id at 786,103 
S.Ct 3330. As Justice O'Connor later ex-
plained, these kinds of "government acknowl-
edgments of religion serve, in the only ways 
reasonably possible in our culture, the legiti-
mate secular purposes of solemnizing public 
occasions, expressing confidence in the fu-
ture, and encouraging the recognition of 
what is worthy of appreciation in society." 
Lynch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 668, 693, 104 
S.Ct 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring). In Lynch* the majority ob-
served that the Establishment Clause cannot 
mechanistically be applied to draw unwaver-
ing, universal lines for all of the varying 
contexts of public life. Rather, the clause 
erects a M'blurred, indistinct, and variable 
barrier depending on all the circumstances of 
a particular relationship.'" I<L at 679, 104 
S.Ct 1355 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 614, 91 S.Ct 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 
(1971)). The Court noted that "[i]t would be 
difficult to identify a more striking example 
of the accommodation of religious belief in-
tended by the Framers [than legislative invo-
cational prayer]." IdL at 674,104 S.Ct 1355-
[1,2] We are obliged, therefore, to read 
Marsh as establishing the constitutional 
principle that the genre of government reli-
gious activity that has come down to us 
over 200 years of history and which we now 
call "legislative prayer" does not violate the 
Establishment Clause. Furthermore, as a 
consequence of the fact that this genre of 
government religious activity cannot exist 
without the government actually selecting 
someone to offer such prayers, the decision 
in Marsh also must be read as establishing 
the constitutional principle that a legislative 
body does not violate the Establishment 
Clause when it chooses a particular person 
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to give its invocational prayers. Similarly, 
there can be no Establishment Clause viola-
tion merely in the fact that a legislative 
body chooses not to appoint a certain per-
son to give its prayers. The act of choosing 
one person necessarily is an act of excluding 
others, and as a result, if Marsh allows a 
legislative body to select a speaker for its 
invocational prayers, then it also allows the 
legislative body to exclude other speakers. 
//• Constitutional limits on 
legislative prayers 
Snyder argues that even if Marsh allows 
legislative prayers, that case imposes some 
limits on a legislative body's discretion to 
appoint or to exclude the persons who will 
recite its prayers. Snyder points out that 
when the Court turned to the particular nu-
ances of the Nebraska practice in Marsh* the 
Court gave only conditional approval to the 
legislative chaplain system there. See 
Marsh. 463 U.S. at 793-95, 103 S.Ct 3330. 
Snyder argues that in light of those condi-
tions in Marsh, Murray City may not dis-
criminate against his request to give an 
opening prayer based on the content of his 
proposed prayer. 
Although we agree with Snyder that 
Marsh, implicitly acknowledges some consti-
tutional limits on the scope and selection of 
legislative prayers, those limits are not the 
ones Snyder would have us adopt The Es-
tablishment Clause and Marsh dimply do not 
require that a legislative body ensure a kind 
of equal public access to a legislative body's 
program of invocational prayers. Instead, 
the constitutional restraints on legislative 
prayers flow directly from the scope of the 
religious genre blessed in Marsh What 
matters under Marsh is whether the prayer 
to be offered fits within the genre of legisla-
tive invocational prayer that "has become 
part of the fabric of our society" and consti-
tutes a "tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs 
widely held among the people." See id. at 
792,103 S.Ct 3330. 
[3] The point at which an invocational 
legislative prayer falls outside the traditions 
of the genre and becomes intolerable occurs 
9. This judicial invocational prayer also wa* recit- ed prior to (he oral arguments in this very case. 
1234 159 FEDERAL REPORTER. 3d SERIES 
when "the prayer opportunity has been ex-
ploited to proselytize or advance any one, or 
to disparage any other, faith or belief."10 
See id at 794-95, 103 S.Ct 3330; see also 
Coles v. Cleveland Bd ofEduc. 950 F.Supp. 
1337, 1347 (N.D.Ohio 1996) (relying on 
Marsh to uphold a school board's practice of 
invocational prayer because "the record does 
not support a finding that the board was 
using prayer as an attempt to convert audi-
ence members or to promote any particular 
belief); Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified Sch. 
DisL Bd of Educ, 11 F.Supp.2d 1192 
(C.D.Cal.1998) (denying a request for a pre-
liminary injunction against a school board's 
practice of invocational prayer in light of 
Marsh). As Marsh indicated, the danger is 
not just an effort to proselytize or disparage 
an entire religion, but also efforts to prosely-
tize or disparage the particular tenets or 
beliefs of individual faiths. See Marsh, 463 
U.S. at 794-95, 103 S.O. 3330. The Court 
explained six years after Marsh that "not 
even the *unique history* of legislative prayer 
can justify contemporary legislative prayers 
that have the effect of affiliating the govern-
ment with any one specific faith or belief." 
See Allegheny County, 492 US. at 603, 109 
S.CL 3086 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791, 
103 S.CL 3330). Thus, the kind of legislative 
prayer that will run afoul of the Constitution 
is one that proselytizes a particular religious 
tenet or belief, or that aggressively advocates 
a specific religious creed, or that derogates 
another religious faith or doctrine. When a 
legislative invocation strays across this line 
of proselytization or disparagement, the Es-
tablishment Clause condemns i t 
10. Of course, alt prayers "advance" a particular 
faith or belief in one way or another. The act of 
praying lo a supreme power assumes the exis-
tence of that supreme power. Nevertheless, the 
context of the decision in Marsh—in which the 
Court considered the constitutionality of a Pres-
byterian minister's "Judeo Christian." "nonsecta* 
rian" invocations for the Nebraska Legislature-
underscores the conclusion that the mere fact a 
prayer evokes a particular concept of Cod is not 
enough to run afoul of the Establishment Clause. 
Rather, what is prohibited by the clause is a 
more aggressive form of advancement, i.e.. pros-
elytization. See Marsh. 463 U.S. at 793 n. 14. 
794-95. 103 S.Ct. 3330. By using the term 
"pro\clyti/e." the Court indicated that the real 
danger in this area is effort by the government to 
As a second constitutional restriction on 
legislative prayer, the Court in Marsh also 
warned that the selection of the person who 
is to recite the legislative body's invocational 
prayer might itself violate the Establishment 
Clause if the selection "stemmed from an 
impermissible motive." See Marsh, 463 UiL 
at 793,103 S.Ct 3330. The Court implicitly 
indicated that the particular motive that is 
"impermissible* in this context is a motive in 
selecting the prayer-giver either to "prosely-
tize" a particular faith or to "disparage" an* 
other faith, or to establish a particular reli-
gion as the sanctioned or official religion of 
the legislative body. See id at 793-95, 103 
S.Ct.3330. 
[4] It is dear under Marsh that there is 
no "impermissible motive" when a legislative 
body or its agent chooses to reject a govern-
ment-sanctioned speaker because the ten-
dered prayer falls outside the long-accepted 
genre of legislative prayer. The genre ap-
proved in Marsh is a kind of ecumenical 
activity that seeks to bind peoples of varying 
faiths together in a common purpose. That 
genre, although often taking the form of 
invocations that reflect a Judeo-Christian 
ethic, typically involves nonsectarian re-
quests for wisdom and solemnity, as well as 
calls for divine blessing on the work of the 
legislative body. When a legislative body 
prevents its agents from reciting a prayer 
that falls outside this genre, the legislators 
are merely enforcing the principle in Marsh 
that a legislative prayer iis constitutional if it 
is "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of be-
liefs widely held among the people of this 
country." See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792, 103 
S.Ct 3330." 
convert citizens to particular sectarian views. 
See Websiers Tfiird New International Dictionary 
(Unabridged) 1826 (1986) (defining "proselytize" 
as "to convert from one religion, belief, opinion, 
or party to another"). As the Court reiterated in 
Lee. °'[I]n the hands of government what might 
begin as a tolerant expression of religious views 
may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce. 
A stale-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that 
freedom of belief and conscience which are the 
sole assurance that religious faith is real, not 
imposed/* Lee. 505 U.S. at 591-92. 112 S.CL 
2649. 
I!. The traditional tone for legislative prayers can 
be found ax early as the constitutional conven-
tion in 1787. when Benjamin Franklin proposed 
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///. The constitutionality of Murray 
City'* "Reverence Period" 
Turning now to the specifics of this case, 
Snyder's amended complaint sought a declar-
atory judgment that Murray City's "conduct 
is in violation of . . . the establishment pro-
tection , or tlte United States Constitu-
tion." We do not perceive this request as 
seeking a declaration that Murray City's 
practice of beginning its council meetings 
with a prayer is unconstitutional as a whole. 
Rather, Snyder's request merely seeks a dec-
laration that Murray City's particular denial 
of his individual request to participate in the 
city's "reverence period" at the opening of its 
meeting is unconstitutional 
[5] Snyder's claim must fail as a matter 
of law because his proposed prayer falls well 
outside the genre of legislative prayers that 
the Supreme Court approved in Marsh and 
the record is devoid of evidence indicating an 
intent to promote or disparage any religion. 
Not only does Snyder's prayer explicitly at-
tack the genre itself, it also disparages those 
who believe that legislative prayer is appro-
priate. See Opening Prayer, supra note 3 
(denouncing politicians who believe in the use 
of legislative prayer as "self-righteous," "hy-
pocritical,^  "selfish," "mis-guided, weak and 
that the convention begin each morning with 
"prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven, and 
its blessings on our deliberations...." I Max 
Farrand. Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787 452 (1911). quoted in Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
787 n. 6.103 S.Ct. 1330. 
The same tone also is evident in the prayers of 
Nebraska's legislative chaplain that the Supreme 
Court found unobjectionable in Marsh. See 
Joint Appendix at 92-108. Marsh v. Chambers. 
463 VS. 783. 103 S.Ct. 3330. 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 
(1983) (No. 82-23). For example, in 197S. the 
Rev. Robert E. Palmer offered the following 
prayer "For lies that continue to bind us togeth-
er, even when the going is rough, for common 
purposes we continue to recognize as larger than 
we are. even when the business at hand taxes our 
patience and our constituents: for the privilege 
of sharing in the inspirations—as well as the 
frustrations—of events which make headlines . . . 
we now ask Your help. O Lord our Cod." Id. at 
93-94. Similarly, in 1979 during the Easter 
season, the chaplain offered the following prayer 
'Today as we are about to celebrate the great 
Holy Days of Christians and Jews. Holy Week 
and Passover, let us be reminded again through 
the faith and beliefs of ciur religions of the princi-
ple* and direct ive% v«hich should guide us. 
stupid," and calling the belief in the use of 
legislative prayer "blasphemous," "evil," and 
Mcheapen[ing]"). Most importantly, Snyder's 
prayer aggressively proselytizes for his par-
ticular religious views and strongly dispar-
ages other religious views. See id (asking 
for divine assistance to "guide" civic leaders 
to "the wisdom of separating church and 
state" and to "never again perform demean-
ing religious ceremonies as part of official 
government functions").12 Snyder's prayer 
clearly draws on the tenets of his belief— 
which is an aspect of many different religious 
faiths—that prayer should only be conducted 
in private. Because Snyder's prayer seeks 
to convert his audience to his belief in the 
sacrilegious nature of governmental prayer, 
his prayer is itself proselytizing. As a result, 
Murray City was well within its rights under 
Marsh to deny permission for Snyder to 
recite his proposed prayer. A deliberative 
body has a right to take steps to avoid the 
kind of government prayer that would run 
afoul of Marsh and the Establishment 
Clause. 
Having concluded that Murray City did 
not violate the Establishment Clause in re-
fusing Snyder's prayer, we next address the 
point raised by the dissent to the original 
May these Holy Days. then, enable us to act as 
true followers of the beliefs which we have and 
may it find expression in every act and law that 
is passed." Id. at 108. 
Finally, a prayer ofTered in 1975 implored. "O 
Lord, our Cod. if ever we needed Thy wisdom 
and Thy guidance, it is now—as our Legislature 
begins a new session, standing upon the thresh-
old of a new year, fraught with so manv dangci 
ous opportunities." id. at 92. 
12. In lact. virtually every supplication in Sny-
der's "Opening Prayer" variously calls on the 
citizens and leaders of Utah to convert from their 
adherence to public governmental prayer. In 
addition to the second paragraph quoted above, 
the third paragraph asks for divine assistance to 
"lead" Utah's politicians away from the practice 
of governmental prayer the fourth paragraph 
asks that Utah's politicians be "educatefd]" and 
come to "understand" that prayer should be pri-
vate and not used for the purpose of impressing 
others: the fifth paragraph asks that divine pow-
er "leach" the people of Utah that government 
should not participate in religion, and the sixth 
paragraph asks that divine power "deliver us 
from the evil of forced religious worship." See 
Opening Prayer, %'iipra notr 1 
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panel decision in this case, to the effect that 
there is sufficient evidence in the record 
below to raise a dispute of fact as to whether 
Murray City relied on an impermissible mo-
tive in its denial of Snyder's prayer. See 
Snyder III, 124 F.3d at 1357-68 (Briscoe, J., 
dissenting). The record includes circumstan-
tial evidence to suggest that City Attorney 
Hall's letter of June 1, 1994, in which he 
outlined Murray City's standards for legisla-
tive prayers, was drafted specifically to ex-
clude the kind of prayer that Snyder had 
proposed. See id. (pointing out that City 
Attorney Hall was aware of and influenced 
by newspaper accounts of Snyder's dealings 
with the city council in Salt Lake City). 
However, this evidence only establishes that 
Hall was concerned with the political nature 
of the proposed prayer and with the fact that 
it was not consistent with the genre of legis-
lative invocational prayer for which the open-
ing portion of the legislation session had 
been reserved. 
This evidence only tends to establish that 
Murray City acted with a "permissible" mo-
tive in excluding Snyder's proposed prayer. 
Snyder's proselytizing and disparaging pray-
er falls well outside the scope of invocational 
legislative prayers found to be constitutional 
in Marsh, and thus there was nothing im-
proper about excluding it from the time 
properly set aside for legislative prayer. It 
was therefore permissible to exclude Sny-
der's prayer from the city's "reverence peri-
od." In drafting guidelines for council pray-
ers that excluded Snyder's prayer, the record 
demonstrates that Hall was attempting to 
exclude the prayer because of its proselytiz-
ing and disparaging nature. 
Finally, Snyder attempts to incorporate 
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment into his argument in this appeal Be-
cause these contentions fall outside the limi-
tation of our order for rehearing—confined 
as it was to the Establishment Clause issues 
in this case—we will not address them. 
I. Like the majority. I do not read Snyder's 
amended complaint as directed to Murray City's 
practice of beginning its council meetings with 
prayer. With the majority. ! understand thai 
Snvder is only challenging the city's denial of his 
Conclusion 
Under the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment, the municipal council of 
Murray City has the power to open its meet-
ings with the kind of legislative prayer that 
our nation over the course of more than 200 
years has come to see as "tolerable.* See 
AfarsA,463U.S.at792,103S.Ct3330. Fur-
thermore, in the exercise of that power, Mur-
ray City has the discretion to prevent a 
proposed prayer that would be intolerable to 
that tradition. Snyder's prayer both prosely-
tizes for his own particular brand of religion 
and disparages other contrary religious 
views. As such, it falls outside the genre of 
invocational legislative prayer authorized by 
Marsh, and Murray City did not violate the 
Establishment Clause in rejecting it Thus, 
the district court correctly granted summary 
judgment against Snyder's Establishment 
Clause claim. 
We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal 
of plaintiffs establishment claim. The re-
mainder of the original panel opinion remains 
in effect as originally issued in Snyder III, 
124 F.3d at 1352-53, 1354-55. We RE-
MAND for further proceedings consistent 
with the disposition in Snyder III. See id. at 
1355. 
LUCERO, Circuit Judge, concurring in 
the judgment 
I concur in the judgment that Mr. Snyder 
is not entitled to the relief he seeks on his 
Establishment Clause claim.1 I arrive at this 
conclusion using a different analysis from 
that employed by the majority. I write sepa-
rately to state my disagreement with what I 
believe to be the majorit/s impermissible 
extension of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783, 103 S.Ct 3330, 77 L.Ed2d 1019 (1983). 
Marsh holds squarely that "legislative pray-
er" delivered by an established chaplaincy 
system is not per se unconstitutional But 
the Marsh Court did not consider the consti-
tutionality of the prayer format utilized by 
Murray City, wherein prayers are routinely 
individual request to ofTer his prayer at the pre-
meeting "reverence period." Were I to read his 
amended complaint more hroadlv. I would be 
obliged to endorse a result at odd.s with that 
reached by the majority. 
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offered, at the City Council's invitation, by 
members of the public acting as representa-
tives of discrete religious groups. Contrary 
to the view of the majority, I believe the 
city's choice of format proscribes regulation 
of the content of the prayers offered. 
However, contrary to the dissent, I do not 
believe that the city's elimination of its con-
tent regulations can salvage the constitution-
ality of its chosen prayer format Although I 
agree with the dissent that Murray City's 
practice of excluding certain prayers for their 
content violates the Establishment Clause, 
Snyder is not entitled to give his prayer at a 
reverence period that is itself a violation of 
the Establishment Clause.2 The remedy he 
wants is no remedy at all. 
I 
^ pi3jni<y evidenced by (lie case before us, 
government officials operating an open pray-
er format are inevitably drawn into regulat-
ing the content of the prayers offered.1 The 
majority believes such regulation to be sanc-
tioned by Marsh. I respectfully disagree. 
Purporting to interpret and apply Marsh to 
this case, the majority avers that a govern-
mental body can constitutionally bar a partic-
ular legislative prayer when "'the prayer 
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize 
or advance any one, or to disparage any 
other, faith or belief.'" Maj. Op. at 1233-34 
(quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95,103 S.Ct 
3330). I believe it misguided, however, to 
read this single passage from Marsh as 
standing for the far-reaching proposition that 
a governmental body can, in all circum-
stances, allow certain legislative prayers 
while censoring and barring others because 
they "proselytize* or "disparage* another 
faith or religious belief. Read properly, in 
2. Given the summary judgment posture of ihu» 
case, I am obliged lo regard Snyder's proposed 
contribution lo the reverence period as a genuine 
expression of his sincerely held religious beliefs. 
&v Master v. \ta\nard. 937 F.2d 1521. 1523-25 
(IOth Cir.IWt); Appellant's App. at 259 (Dep. of 
Torn Smder) ("0: And does this opening prayer 
represent sincerely held religious beliefs on your 
pan? . . . A: Yes. it does."). As a result. I 
accept, for purpoM.** of analysis, the majority's 
assumption thai Snyder's language comprises a 
praver 
the factual and historical context that an 
chors the case. Marsh does not vest a gov 
ernmental body with such powers. 
Marsh states that u[t]he question present-
ed is whether the Nebraska Legislature's 
practice of opening each legislative day with 
a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State 
violates the Establishment Clause." 463 
US. at 784, 103 S.Ct 3330; see also id. at 
786, 103 S.CL 3330 ("We granted certiorari 
limited to the challenge to the practice of 
opening sessions with prayers by a State-
employed clergyman.-) (citing 459 VS. 966, 
103 S.Ct 292, 74 L.Ed.2d 276 (Nov. 1,1982)). 
Although Marsh may perhaps be read to 
extend to circumstances in which chaplains 
are not paid and in which there is no single 
officiating clergyman, see id at 794 n. 18,103 
S.Ct 3330, the opinion's historical treatment 
of legislative prayer shows that Marsh in-
volves, and should be limited to, established 
chaplaincies—chaplaincies that are so struc-
tured that they become an arm or an office of 
the legislature.4 
Congressional chaplains, like the chaplain 
at issue in Marsh* are not members of the 
public invited on some representative or 
wholly open basis to give legislative prayers. 
They are officers of the state, who hold offi-
cial government positions. Referring to the 
origins of legislative prayer, the Marsh 
Court noted that* 
The tradition [of legislative prayer] in 
many of the colonies was, of course, linked 
to an established church, but the Continen-
tal Congress, beginning in 1774, adopted 
the traditional procedure of opening its 
sessions with a prayer offered by a paid 
chaplain. Although prayers were not of-
fered during the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the First Congress, as one of its early 
items of business, adopted the policy of 
J. Asked to confirm that "Mi. Snyder's proposed 
prayer was rejected because of the content and 
for no other reason." Mr. H. Craig Hall, the 
Murray City Attorney, responded: "I think that is 
an accurate statement," Appellee's App. at 88-
llf'l 
4, 01 *iMir\c, uluatlu r <n mil ,i irupluifuy w J 
.salaried position may be an indicium of whether 
its occupant is an official government agent. 
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selecting a chaplain to open each session 
with a prayer. 
Id. at 787-88, 103 S.Ct 3330 (footnotes and 
citations omitted). Marsh underscores the 
fact that congressional chaplains are official 
governmental functionaries when, in discuss-
ing the history of the position, it states: 
[0]n April 7, 1789, the Senate appointed a 
committee "to take under consideration the 
manner of electing Chaplains." On April 
9,1789, a similar committee was appointed 
by the House of Representatives. On 
April 25, 1789, the Senate elected its first 
chaplain; the House followed suit on May 
1, 1789. A statute providing for the pay-
ment of these chaplains was enacted into 
law. 
Id at 788,103 S.Ct 3330 (footnote and cita-
tions omitted). Noting that Nebraska's cha-
plaincy practice I s consistent with the man-
ner in which the First Congress viewed its 
chaplains," Marsh further states that M[r]e-
ports contemporaneous with the elections [of 
congressional chaplains] reported only the 
chaplains' names and not their religions or 
church affiliations.'* Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794 
n. 16, 103 S.Ct 3330. This again serves to 
make the point that the nature of the chapla-
incy with which Marsh deals does not involve 
people acting as members, leaders, or 
spokespersons of particular religions. Rath-
er, they are people who are first and fore-
most acting as officers of the various legisla-
tive bodies they serve. 
It is this fact that explains Marsh's cau-
tionary language—on which the majority ul-
timately rests—that legislative prayer not be 
"exploited to proselytize or advance any one, 
5. Admittedly, the line between an established 
chaplaincy and an open prayer system is not a 
bright one. But. as the Supreme Court has fre-
quently noted, that is a feature inevitably com* 
mon to much Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. See. e./*.. Lvtich v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 
668. 678-79. 104 S.Ct. 13S5. 79 L.Ed.2d 604 
(1984) ("The Establishment Clause like the Due 
Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed provi-
sion in a legal code capable of ready applica-
tion.. .. The line between permissible relation-
ships and those barred by the Clause can be no 
more straight and unwavering than due process 
can be defined in a single stroke or phrase or 
test. The Clause civets a 'blurred, indistinct, and 
variable barrier depending on all the circum-
stances of a particular relationship.'") (quoting 
or to disparage any other, faith or belief." 
Id. at 794-95, 103 S.O. 3330. Plainly, es-
tablished legislative chaplaincies may
 n o t 
proselytize, or disparage a particular belief; 
consistent with the dictates of the Establish-
ment Clause. Such chaplains speak for the 
legislature, and may not therefore champion 
particular religious beliefs while disparaging 
others. But, by the same token, the govern-
ment has the authority to tell its representa-
tives what they can and cannot do in their 
official capacities. See Rosenberger v. Rec-* 
tor & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
833, 115 S.Ct 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) 
("[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may 
make content-based choices.^. Prohibiting 
official chaplaincies from proselytizing on be-
half of one religion, or disparaging another, 
is not only within the powers of the govern-
ment, but serves a crucial Establishment 
Clause purpose because it ensures that the 
government does not, through its officers, 
espouse one particular religious view to the 
detriment of others. 
However, when the person giving a legisla-
tive prayer does not speak from an estab-
lished chaplaincy position, then Marsh, 
standing for the proposition that the govern-
ment may censor prayers of proselytization, 
is inapplicable.5 What is applicable is the 
Supreme Court's traditional Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, specifically its prohibi-
tion on "excessive entanglement." See Lem-
on v. Kurtzman* 403 US. 602, 614, 91 S.Ct 
2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). The process of 
policing the prayers offeree! in an attempt to 
exclude proselytization or disparagement will 
inevitably -call[ ] for official and continuing 
Lemon v. Kitrtzman. 403 U.S. 602. 614. 91 S.Ct. 
2105. 29 LEdJd 745 (1971)). But there can be 
no doubt that ihe facts of this case place it 
squarely outside Marsh. Murray City's practice 
sought "to invite a diverse community" to speak 
at prayer sessions. Appellee's App. at 10. and 
these invitations were sent to "associations" of a 
"religious nature." id. at 71-72. There is no 
suggestion in the record that such a diverse com* 
munity of religious bodies, offering prayers be-
fore council meetings, spoke as government func-
tionaries. Indeed, the City Attorney confirms 
that, in many cases, he has no idea what the 
invited parties will say—precisely because he 
does not know what religious beliefs such parties 
even hold. SeeUL at 183. 
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surveillance leading to an impermissible de- tent before the 
gree of entanglement" Walz v. Tax 
Omm% 397 U.S. 664, 675, 90 S.Ct 1409, 25 
L.Ed.2d 697 (1970); see also Widmar v. Vin-
cetxU 454 U.S. 263,272 n. 11,102 S.Ct 269,70 
L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) (public university that 
offers its facilities for student group meet-
ings Mrisk[s] greater 'entanglement'" by at-
tempting to enforce exclusion of groups prac-
ticing religious worship and speech, in part 
because of "continuing need to monitor group 
meetings to ensure compliance with the 
rulew); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620,91 S.Ct 2105 
(statute's requirement that government ex-
amine school records to determine how much 
of total school expenditure is attributable to 
secular education and how much to religious 
activity, "is fraught with the sort of entangle-
ment that the Constitution forbids"). Pray-
ers wfll either have to be submitted for ap-
proval in advance, as was the case for Mr. 
Snyder, see Appellee's App. at 199 ("Until 
your proposed prayer satisfies these guide-
lines, an invitation to participate in our open-
ing ceremonies will not be forthcoming"), 
then assessed by some government body us-
ing pre-established government criteria that 
purport to distinguish proselytizing from 
non-proselytizing behavior, or else assessed 
on the spot—the gavel ready—for such con-
1239 
ainen is spoken i And tin 
process will have to be repeated time after 
time. 
I cannot accept that the Constitution al-
lows the government to subject private citi-
zens—as opposed to official chaplaincies—to 
such liturgical supervision. "It is a corner-
stone principle of our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence that It is no part of the busi-
ness of government to compose official pray-
ers for any group of the American people to 
recite as a part of a religious program car-
ried on by government'n Lee v. Weisman* 
505 US. 577, 588, 112 S.Ct 2649, 120 
L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) (quoting Engel r. Vital* 
370 U.S. 421, 425, 82 S.Ct 1261, 8 L.EA2d 
601 (1962)).1 
II 
However, the dissent's suggested alterna-
tive to the majority's proposal that the City 
Council regulate the content of public prayer 
offered during a pre-meeting reverence peri-
od—namely that the City permit all prayers, 
Snyder's included—is also unconstitutional 
As Snyder's "prayer" starkly demonstrates, 
without content-based restrictions, the "rev-
erence period" established by Murray City 
6. A final alternative—that the government only 
extend invitations to those religious groups that 
it adjudges likely to abide by an implicit bar 
against proselytizing, a practice which may have 
occurred here, sec Appellee's App. at 155—is 
obviously no less entangling. Such practice also 
raises the specter of religious groups molding 
public statements of their creeds in ways de-
signed to elicit governmental approval, thus of-
fending one of the core historical purposes of the 
Establishment Clause See infra note 13, 
7. The foregoing analysis accepts the majority's 
implicit assumption that Murray City rejected 
Snyder's prayer because it proselytized and dis-
paraged other religions. Like the dissent, how-
ever. I believe the record raises serious questions 
as to whether this was in fact the City's grounds 
for refusing the prayer. 
Mr. Hall, the City Attorney who made the 
decision to reject Snyder's prayer, claims that he 
did so pursuant to a long-standing, albeit implicit 
and never before invoked, practice of refusing 
prayers or invocations that expressed political 
views, or attacked or mocked city policies and 
practices. St* Appellee's App. at 195. There is 
scant suggestion in the record that Hall refused 
the prayer because n disparaged other faiths 
Rather. Hall s claimed focus was on what he 
perceived as disparagement of the City Council 
and its practice of allowing pre-meeting prayers. 
Nonetheless, Snyder still validates his Estab-
lishment Clause claims. Even if one assumes 
Hall did not develop the stated criteria as a 
pretext for religious viewpoint discrimination 
(which assumption I make only for the purposes 
of the present discussion), the mere application 
of the criteria violates the Establishment Clause 
for at least two reasons. First, such application 
discriminates against religions that encompass 
stated tenets Hall deems inappropriately "politi-
cal." If we assume, as we must, that Snyder's 
prayer is premised on his religious views, then 
Hall's objection to Snyder's "politics" inevitably 
amounts to discrimination against his religion as 
well. Second, development and application of 
the criteria necessitate a governmental determi-
nation of whether religious views are inappro-
priately political. That kind of determination 
requires an excessively entangling interaction 
between the machinery of government and reli-
gious practice. See infra section III; cf. Wid-
mar. 454 U.S. at 272 n. 11. 102 S.Ct. 269 (given 
breadth and indeterminacy of uhat speech is 
"religious." state actor risks excessive entangle-
ment by Irving to identify and exclude such 
speech from public facilities). 
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will be used to disparage the religious beliefs 
of others. The resulting juxtaposition of ag-
gressive proselytization with the exercise of 
legislative power violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
Invocation of Marsh cannot protect such 
prayer. Once the government steps outside 
the historically determined confines of 
Marsh, it cannot regulate the content of the 
prayers it sponsors. The resulting unregu-
lated government prayer sessions come to 
pose, as this case clearly illustrates, an unac-
ceptable and inevitable risk of the advance-
ment of certain faiths at the expense of oth-
ers. A prayer session in which Snyder is 
offered—and takes—the opportunity to deni-
grate the faith of others is historically and 
philosophically far-removed from what 
Marsh sanctions as the 'tolerable acknowl-
edgment of beliefs widely held among the 
people of this country." Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
792,103 S.Ct 3330. As the majority correct-
ly observes, Marsh speaks only to legislative 
prayer of a specific "religious genre." M*g. 
Op. at 1232-33. Marsh's reliance on the 
ecumenism of the Nebraska prayers is not to 
be ignored—just as it is not to be read to 
repudiate the Court's entire jurisprudence of 
excessive entanglement To be constitution-
al, legislative prayer must be "part of the 
fabric of our society," Marsk 463 U.S. at 
792,103 S.Ct 3330, or, as the majority aptly 
puts it, "a kind of ecumenical activity that 
seeks to bind peoples of varying faiths to-
gether in a common purpose," Maj. Op. at 
1234. If the offerings at a legislative prayer 
session depart from this historical norm, 
which—as Mr. Snyder's prayer shows—they 
assuredly will once Murray City frees the 
public forum it has created from content-
based restrictions, then they can gain no 
protection from Marsh. 
S. In Lemon, the Court describes the following 
test: "First, the statute must have a secular legis-
lative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not 
foster an excessive government entanglement 
with religion." Union, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 91 
S.Ct. 21 OS (internal quotation and citations omit-
ted). 
9. The situation would be constitutionally differ-
ent were the "reverence period" not so signifi-
Outside the purview of Marsk and subject 
to the usual canons of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, government-sponsored open 
prayer sessions marked by uncontrolled 
proselytizing are unconstitutional True, the 
purpose of an open and unrestricted prayer 
session may, by analogy to Marsh, pass mus-
ter under the first step of the three-part 
Lemon test, 403 VS. at 612, 91 S.Ct 2105.* 
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 VS. 668,680-81, 
104 S.Ct 1355, 79 L.EdJZd 604 (1984) (city's 
display of creche has "legitimate secular pur-
poses" of celebrating, and depicting origins 
of, national holiday). A legislative body's 
intention in maintaining an open prayer ses-
sion may be simply to Msolemniz[e] public 
occasions, express[ ] confidence in the future, 
and encouragfe] the recognition of what is 
worthy of appreciation in society." Lynch, 
465 VS. at 693,104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J.,* 
concurring). 
But the effects of such prayer are very 
different from the situation considered in 
Marsk precisely because once members of 
the public are invited to pray, the govern-
ment must relinquish its power to exclude 
those prayers that proselytize or disparage. 
The remedy Snyder would have us endorse 
for himself and others would require the 
government to invite proselytizers to initiate 
its meetings—which it cannot do without vio-
lating both the second and third steps of 
Lemon, which proscribe, respectively, "a 
principal or primary effect" of advancing or 
inhibiting religion, and "fosterling] an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion." 
Lemon. 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct 2105 
(citations omitted). A principal effect of 
open prayer, as practiced by Snyder and 
others, will be the symbolic association of 
government power with religious—and ari-
tireligious—intolerance and bigotry.1 And 
the "divisive political potential" of such pray-
candy characterized by religious activity. Set 
Board of EJtic. v. JLfogrM*. 496 U.S. 226. 248. 
110 S.Ct. 2356. 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990) ("BIT a 
Stale refused to let religious groups use facilities 
open to others, then it would demonstrate not 
neutrality but hostility toward religion."). De-
spite Murray City's countless legal pleadings that 
the reverence period was open to all-comers, 
religious and non-religious alike, and for pur-
poses similarly religious and non-religious, the 
record is all but completely devoid of any sup-
port for such a conclusion. This may explain 
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er, which the case law identifies as a signifi- . This stands in stark contrast to Mank 
cant component of "excessive entanglement," The ecumenism of Marxh 's legislative prayer 
see Lemon. 403 U.S. at 622-23,91 S.Ct 2105, does not advance religion beyond the Su-
is self-evident "[A] prayer which uses ideas preme Court's general recognition that "[wje 
or images identified with a particular religion are a religious people whose institutions pre-
may foster a different sort of sectarian rival- suppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clau-
ry than an invocation or benediction in terms son, 343 U.S. 306,313,72 S.Ct 679,96 L.EA 
more neutral," Weisman, 505 US. at 588, 954 (1952). The same is true of other "offi-
112 S.Ct 2649, and that is even more the cial references to the value and invocation of 
case when a prayer aggressively proselytizes Divine guidance." Lynch, 465 US. at 675, 
and disparages the convictions of others 104 S.Ct 1355." But what is true of the 
present ' prayers in Marsk the creche in LyncK and 
why both ihe district court, see Appellant's App. 
at 597, and the majority today, see Maj. Op. at 
1228, appear to assume that invitations were 
only extended to religious groups and for the 
purpose of prayer. From the facts in the record, 
only one legal conclusion can follow: the "rever-
ence period" is primarily characterized by reli-
gious activity. There is simply no way that the 
content of these sessions is sufficiently secular 
for them not to advance religion unconstitution-
ally. Compare Widmar. 454 U.S. at 269. 272-75 
& n. 12. 102 S.Ct 269 (where state-provided 
forum is "generally" and "equally" open for use 
by religious and t ~n-reIigious groups, allowing 
religious groups does not have primary effect of 
advancing religion) with County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU. 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 * n. 50. 109 S.Cu 
3086. 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (Op. of Blackmun, 
J.) (display of privately-sponsored creche on 
"Grand Staircase" of county courthouse violates 
Establishment Clause because "[t]he Grand 
Staircase does not appear to be the kind of 
location in which all were free to place their 
displays"). 
The City Attorneys letter of June I. 1994. to 
Snyder, stales that "the Council has established 
the policy that all council meetings will start 
with prayer." Appellee's App. at 195. and defen-
dants* answer to Snyder's amended complaint 
concedes this point, see id. at 5 & Appellant's 
App. at 82. I cannot agree with the City Attor-
ney's unlikely semantics, whereby prayer does 
not denote inherently religious activity. (Nor. 
one might add. could the Supreme Court of 
Utah. See Society of Separation is ts v. Whitehead, 
870 P.2d 916. 931-32 (Uuh 1993)). Hall ap-
pears to concede the religious character of the 
proceedings when he confirms that the invited 
groups were "associations" of a "religious na-
ture." Appellee's App. at 71-72. Asked to con-
firm that prayers were "religious exercise." Hall 
replies. "Not necessarily." id. at 53, but his only 
substantiation of that qualification is as follows: 
"We had some Navajos that came and left a 
btessing and I don't know if it was a religious 
exercise or not." Id. The City Attorney's lack of 
familiarity with Native American culture simply 
cannot be enough to render the prayer sessions 
primarily non-religious in nature. The defen-
dants' answer to Snyder's amended complaint 
further supportN this view by arguing that Sny-
t.lt;i\ pinpoint contribution lo the reverence pe-
riod was justifiably refused because "it was not a 
sincere and earnest entreaty directed to a divini-
ty." and consequently fell outside the definition 
of "prayer." Appellant's App. at 83. 
Murray City points to two items in the record 
in support of its claim on this point Neither, in 
light of the overwhelming evidence to the con-
trary, can carry any weight whatsoever. .The 
first is a form letter sent to invited groups, which 
refers to Murray City's effort "to encourage com-
munity and religious leaders, representative of 
the diverse culture of the Salt Lake Valley, to 
participate in this meaningful segment of our 
meetings." Appellee's App. at 201. This vague 
language in a form letter does nothing to obviate 
the conspicuous failure, save for the erroneous 
reference to the Navajo blessing, to point to a 
specific non-religious association to whom an 
invitation was extended. The second item is 
Hall's claim that the list of invited parties in-
cludes "some nondenominational groups." See 
id. at 69-70. As "nondenominational" does not 
mean "secular." I am unsure why Murray City 
should believe this renders the proceedings open 
to all. believers and nonbelievers alike. Indeed. 
Hall emphasizes how the prayer session differed 
from the Council's period for comments by indi-
vidual members of the public, to which Snyder 
would have been welcome. See id. at 56-57. In 
short, a few evasive and ambiguous statements 
cannot support the implausible conclusion that 
"prayer" has nothing to do with religion. Thus 
this case conspicuously lacks the "important in-
dex of secular effect" that is provided by the 
"provision of benefits to [a] broad spectrum of 
groups." Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274, 102 S.Ct. 
26*1 
10. It is for this reason that numerous forms of 
everyday "ceremonial deism" pass constitutional 
muster. (This phrase is used in County of Alle-
gheny. 492 U.S. at 595 n. 46. 109 S.Ct. 3086 (Op. 
of Blackmun. J.), and was coined by Walter 
Rostow in 1962. See Steven B. Epstein. Rethink 
iitf* the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 
Colum.LRev.2083. 2091-92 (1996)). An incom-
plcle list of such practices would obviously in-
clude the poxl-1954 Pledge of Allegiance ("under 
God"); the national nuitto as inscribed on our 
national currency ("In God We Trust"); the in-
vocation to the Deity prior to judicial proceed-
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the Sunday closing laws in McGowan v. Ma-
ryland. 366 UJS. 420, 81 S.CL 1101, 6 
L.Ed.2d 393 (1961), namely that their "rea-
son or effect merely happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some or all 
religions," id at 442, 81 S.CL 1101, is as-
suredly not the case for an open prayer 
session, sponsored by a legislative body, in 
which proselytization and disparagement 
must of necessity be allowed. When the 
government invites a cross-section of reli-
gious parties—proselytizers included—to ap-
pear before its meetings, the resulting dis-
paragement of other faiths can hardly be 
regarded as mere happenstance.11 Conse-
quently, I cannot agree that this case pres-
ents grounds for a remand. Snyder has 
shown an Establishment Clause violation in 
the city's exclusion of his prayer, but his 
requested remedy would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause just as surely. 
Ill 
The majority assumes that in approving 
the chaplaincy format before it in Marsh* the 
Court somehow sanctioned a different format 
which permits a city council routinely to initi-
ate its meetings with an open prayer session 
at which members of the public are invited to 
pray. I disagree with that view, just as I 
would with the proposition that by favorably 
referring to our customary practice of open-
ing court with the familiar intonement, "God 
save the United States and this Honorable 
Court," Marsh somehow would permit us to 
ings ("God save the United Stales and this Hon* 
orable Court**); the swearing-in of government 
officials and witnesses in court proceedings ("so 
help me Cod"); public holidays on Christian 
Holy Days; references to the Almighty in inaugu-
ral addresses; and Thanksgiving Day proclama-
tions. 
11. Or. to put it in terms of Justice O'Connor's 
"endorsement" analysis, see Wallace v. Jaflree. 
472 U.S. 38. 76. 105 S.Ct. 2479. 86 L.Ed.2d 29 
(1985) (O'Connor. J., concurring). Snyder's pray* 
er. if given at an open prayer session before a 
City Council meeting, would strike an "objective 
observer" as government endorsement of the dis-
paragement of faith. 
12. According to Mr. Hall, the City Attorney, "(ills 
impossible when you have only 24. 25 Council 
meetings to offer c\cr\budy the opportunity to 
pray." Appellee's App. at 159. 
require the Clerk of the Court to organize a 
reverence period at the opening of court 
assuring that representatives of a broad 
spectrum of religious denominations are in* 
eluded in a prospective list of supplicants 
invited to seek the blessings of Providence on 
the proceedings of the day. The very orga-
nization of such prayer sessions—in the case 
at bar, the organization and selection of those 
delivering prayer is a duty of the Secretary 
to the City Council, see Appellee's App. at 
36—comes perilously close to the establish* 
ment of religion. 
Certainly, the mere administration of an 
open prayer session by the government may 
result in a level of entanglement far beyond 
that sanctioned by historical practice in 
Marsh. That is so, even when, as a result of 
the free choice of the invited public, a legisla-
tive prayer session is not marked by prosely-
tization or disparagement In running a 
prayer session open to the public, the gov-
ernment will need to identify which members 
of the public appropriately represent the di-
verse religious life of the community. That 
will require a government determination of 
what creeds and philosophies are to count as 
religious. Given the inevitable limits on the 
time available for legislative prayer, the gov-
ernment may also have to resolve which are 
sufficiently representative to earn its favor, 
and in what order.12 Finally, as in this case, 
the government will have to distinguish be-
tween prayer and political statement11 
13. There is also a grave risk that religious groups 
will seek to earn the government's favor with the 
intention of obtaining an invitation, or of in-
creasing the frequency of their invitations, or of 
being invited to speak before especially signifi-
cant and visible legislative sessions. In seeking 
governmental favor, religious groups may be-
come subject to an implicit form of government 
regulation—a danger that underlies much Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. See Weismaiu 
505 V.S. at 609. 112 S.Ct. 2649 ("We have be-
lieved that religious freedom cannot thrive in the 
absence of a vibrant religious community and 
that such a community cannot prosper when it is 
bound to the secular.") (Blackmun. J., concur-
ring). We note in this case that the City Attor-
ney, when asked whether the city inquires as to 
the content of a prayer prior to its delivery, 
responded: "As far as I know we've never asked. 
There has been no need to ask. Everybody has 
been MI positive and met the unwritten guide-
l i n e s . . . " Appellee's App. at 155. The Altor-
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None of the administrative machinery nee- BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
essary to such tasks is endorsed by MarsL \ respectfully dissent Underlying the 
There, because our social and political histo- majority's opinion is the implicit assumption 
ry has already made the necessary determi-
 th$l foe reverence portion of City Commis-
nations, there is less need for day-to-day
 s i o n meetings is a nonpublic fonim in which 
governmental administration of a legislative ^ speakers, though not paid by or other-
prayer -system.- Because this case is so ^ directly connected to the City, speak on 
readily resolved on the two grounds identi- behalf of the City. Based upon this assump-
fied above, I need not conclusively determine ^ ^ the majority concludes the City has the 
whether Murray City's administration of its ^ght to control or regulate who speaks on 
prayer system unconstitutionally entangles its behalf and what message is^conveyed. 
government and matters of religion. But Because I disagree with the majority's un-
legislative bodies should appreciate that an derlying assumption, I also disagree with its 
open prayer system has the potential, in its conclusion that the City properly rejected 
mere administration, to violate the Establish- Snyder's request to speak based upon the 
ment Clause. content of his proposed prayer. 
I. 
Under the foregoing analysis, government 
would have to seek the sanctuary of Marsh 
should it wish to maintain legislative prayer. 
It may appear ironic that the Establishment 
Clause should endorse official chaplaincies, 
while proscribing a practice of inviting pray-
er volunteers who represent many and varied 
religious faiths. But though this effect may 
appear establishmentarian, a closer inspec-
tion proves otherwise. In fact, the strength 
and diversity of religious life is doubly bene-
fitted by a legislative retreat to Marsh* 
First, Marsh requires that official chapla-
incy systems do not proselytize for one reli-
gion or disparage others. Though official 
chaplains speak with the authority of govern-
ment to an unparalleled extent, Marsh en-
sures that their pronouncements are broadly 
ecumenical—no more religious, indeed, than 
the "fabric of our society" at large. Marsh, 
463 UJS. at 792,103 S.Ct 3330. Second, as 
Madison recognized, M[r]eligion flourishes in 
greater purity, without than with the aid of 
Gov[ernmenti" James Madison, Memorial 
and Remonstrance against Religious Assess-
ments (1785), in The Complete Madison 309 
(S. Padover ed.1953). As this case shows, 
when bound to the secular, religion is no 
longer free to "flourish according to the zeal 
of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma." 
ZoracK 343 U.S. at 313,72 S.Ct 679, 
In Rosenberget v. Rector & Visitors of 
Univ. of V<L, 515 US. 819, 115 S.Ct 2510, 
132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995), the Court empha-
sized the importance of context in determin-
ing the extent to which the government can 
control speech. M[W]hen the State is the 
speaker," the Court noted, "it may make 
content-based choices." Id at 833,115 S.Ct 
2510. More specifically, it may "regulate the 
content of what is or is not expressed when it 
is the speaker or when it enlists private 
entities to convey its own message." Id. In 
contrast, when the State simply facilitates "a 
diversity of views from private speakers,*1 it 
may not discriminate based on the viewpoint 
of a particular private speaker. Id at 834, 
115 S.Ct 2510 
It is therefore critical, in deciding Snyder's 
appeal, to first determine the context in 
which the dispute arose. More specifically, it 
is necessary to decide whether Snyder was 
denied the opportunity to speak on behalf of 
the City or whether he was denied the oppor-
tunity to speak on his own behalf. As is 
apparent from the discussion in Rosenberger. 
the determination of this context will have a 
dramatic effect on how the appeal is analyzed 
and ultimately decided. 
In rejecting Snyder's Establishment 
Clause claim, the majority implicitly assumes 
persons who speak during the reverence pe-
riod do so on behalf of the City. Armed with 
ney\ i ippn imi t HIM* lot celebration is-—to my mind - C I I I M 1 for grave constitutional com cm 
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this assumption, the majority concludes, 
based upon its interpretation of Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 VS. 783, 103 S.Ct 3330, 77 
L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983) (deciding constitutionali-
ty of opening legislative sessions with a pray-
er by a chaplain appointed and paid by 
state), that the City has the right to control 
the content of messages conveyed during the 
reverence period, and the City did not violate 
the Establishment Clause by rejecting Sny-
der's tendered prayer because, in the majori-
ty's opinion, the prayer falls outside the 
bounds of constitutionally permissible legisla-
tive prayer. For reasons that follow, I can-
not accept the majority's assumption. 
As I indicated in my dissenting opinion 
from the original panel opinion, I believe "a 
reasonable observer aware of the City's prac-
tice of inviting persons representing a broad 
range of religious and nonreligious view-
points to give invocations would not regard 
Snyder's prayer as representing the City's 
endorsement of his particular beliefs." Sny-
der v. Murray City Corp., 124 FAi 1349, 
1357 (10th Cir.1997) (dissenting opinion). In 
other words, I do not believe any of the 
speakers offering prayers during the rever-
ence period could reasonably be perceived as 
speaking on behalf of the City. See generally 
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Lib* 
erties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 595, 109 S.Ct 
3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (endorsement 
test depends on observer's reasonable per-
ception of particular government policy)* 
To illustrate the point more thoroughly, I 
believe it is helpful to review the type of 
forum with which we are dealing.1 See gen-
erally Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 
515 UJS. 753, 761, 115 S.Ct 2440, 132 
L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (applying forum analysis 
to decide Establishment Clause issue). 
"[TJhe Supreme Court has recognized three 
distinct categories of government property: 
(1) traditional public fora; (2) designated 
public fora; and (3) nonpublic fora." Sum-
mum v. Callaghan, 130 FJid 906, 914 (10th 
Cir.1997) (citing Perry Educ Ass'n v. Perry 
Local Educators9 Ass'n, 460 VS. 37, 45-46, 
I. Although the scope of our en banc review is 
purportedly limited to Snyder's Establishment 
Clause claim, the inescapable fact is that this 
case lies at the intersection of the Establishment. 
Free Speech, and Free Exercise Clauses of the 
103 S.Ct 948, 74 L.Ed^d 794 (1983)). Un-
doubtedly, the reverence period at issue here 
does not fall within the category of tradition-
al public fora for it is not at all similar to 
areas such as "streets and parks[,] which 
'have immemorially been held in trust for the 
use of the public, and, time out of mind, have 
been used for purposes of assembly, commu-
nicating thoughts between citizens, and dis-
cussing public questions/" Perry, 460 UJS. 
at 45,103 S.Ct 948 (quoting Hague v. C./.O., 
307 UJS. 496,515,59 S.CL 954,83 L.EA 1423 
(1939)). Instead, the reverence period is ei-
ther a designated public forum or a nonpublic 
forum. 
"A designated public forum is property the 
government has opened for expressive activi-
ty, treating the property as if it were a 
traditional public forum." Summum* 130 
F.3d at 914. Such a forum "may be created 
for a limited purpose such as use by certain 
groups . . . or for the discussion of certain 
subjects." Perry, 460 VS. at 45 n. 7, 103 
S.Ct 948. In contrast, a. nonpublic forum is 
"[pjublic property which is not by tradition 
or designation a forum for public communica-
tion." Id. at 46, 103 S.CU 948. "Implicit in 
the concept of the nonpublic forum is the 
right [of the government] to make distinc-
tions in access on the basis of subject matter 
and speaker identity." Id at 49, 103 S.Ct 
948. 
"The government does not create a public 
forum by inaction or by permitting limited 
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a 
nontraditional forum for public discourse." 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed 
Fund, 473 VS. 788, 802, 105 S.Ct 3439, 87 
L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). To determine whether 
the government has intentionally created a 
designated public forum, we look to "the 
policy and practice of the government," as 
well as "the nature of the property and its 
compatibility with expressive activity." / £ 
Since 1982, the City in this case has incor-
porated a reverence period as part of the 
opening ceremonies of its City Council meet-
First Amendment. Thus, although the concept! 
of public fora arc typically associated with casef 
involving free speech claims, they arc useful in 
deciding the outcome of this ca.se. 
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ings. Speakers during the reverence period 
are not public officials. Rather, the City has 
"made efforts to assure that a broad cross-
section of the community would be repre-
sented" during the reverence period. Appel-
lant's App. at 162. To effectuate this goal, 
Jewel Chandler, the secretary to the City 
Council, regularly acomp3e[s] lists of various 
denominations and other groups" who she 
thinks "would be potentially willing to come 
to the City Council meetings based on invita-
tion to give a thought, prayer, whatever." 
Appellee's App. at 36-37. Chandler sends 
invitations to these groups, which read in 
part 
It has long been a custom of the Murray 
City Municipal Council to include an invo-
cation or inspirational message as part of 
the opening ceremonies in Council meet-
ings. 
Several years ago the Murray City 
Council undertook a vigorous effort to en-
courage community and religious leaders, 
representative of the diverse culture of the 
Salt Lake Valley, to participate in this 
meaningful segment of our meetings. 
We would, therefore, invite you to be a 
part of this program by consenting to offer 
an invocation, appropriate message or in-
spirational thought at one of our meetings. 
Id at 201. According to the City, partici-
pants in the reverence period "have included 
representatives from Zen Buddhists, Native 
Americans, a cross section of Judeo-Chris-
tian congregations, Quakers, and others." 
Appellant's App. at 163. The invitations con-
tain no restrictions on the messages that 
speakers can give. Further, at no time (save 
for this case) has the City ever asked a 
particular speaker about content of a mes-
sage or conveyed any guidelines to a particu-
lar speaker. In fact, City Attorney Hall 
testified: 
I don't have a clue . . . what the Murray 
Baptist Church is going to say just as I did 
not have a clue as to what the Zen Bud-
dhists were going to say. I don't know 
what the religious beliefs are. I don't 
know the particular tenants of their reli-
gious beliefs, I dont hnvr a rliu what 
"iey*re going to say. 
Appellee's App. at 183. Hall also testified: 
If a person wants to talk in the Buddhist 
faith about exhortation and blessings, 
that's fine. If the Navagos want to come in 
and do what they do. If the Catholics and 
Buddhists and Baptists and Seventh Day 
Adventists come in and don't mock city 
practices and policies and procedures dur-
ing that period of time, we're not going to 
determine what their expression of 
thought or their statements are going to 
be. 
Id* at 157. Finally, prior to Snyder's request 
to speak, the City had not developed any 
guidelines concerning the content of mes-
sages that could be given during the rever-
ence period. 
Taken together, I believe these uncontro-
verted facts demonstrate an intent on the 
part of the City to designate the reverence 
period as a public forum open to members of 
the community for the purpose of conveying 
religious and/or inspirational messages. In 
reaching this conclusion, I find significant (1) 
the City's goal of having a broad cross-sec-
tion of the community speak during the rev-
erence period, and (2) the lack of restrictions 
placed on reverence period speakers. To 
me, both of these factors indicate the City's 
Intent hi treat the reverence period as a 
setting open to all community members, re-
gardless of religious viewpoint I also find 
significant the fact that the reverence period 
occurs within the broader framework of the 
City Commission meetings, which themselves 
are designated public forums given the fact 
that citizens are encouraged to attend and 
voice their opinions. See Grossbaum v. In* 
dianapolis-Marion County Bldg. AUOL% 100 
FJd 1287,1296 (7th Cir.1996) ("Legally cre-
ated public fora are fora such as school 
board meetings*), cert denied — U.S. , 
117 S.O. 1822, 137 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1997); 
compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 VS. 263, 
267 n. 5,102 S.Ct 269,70 L.E<L2d 440 (1981) 
(in considering whether university meeting 
facilities were a public forum, the Court em-
phasized the campus possessed many charac-
teristics of a traditional public forum), with 
Conuliu.% 473 U.S. at 805,105 S.Ct. 3439 (in 
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concluding the combined Federal Campaign 
charity drive was a nonpublic forum, the 
Court emphasized the federal workplace, 
where the drive took place, was a nonpublic 
forum). With regard to this latter point, a 
finding that the reverence period is a desig-
nated public forum is not inconsistent with 
the "normal uses" of the overall setting (Le^ 
the City Commission meetings). 
The conclusion that the reverence period is 
a designated public forum for private reli-
gious/inspirational expression demonstrates 
that the City's ability to control the content 
of messages conveyed during the reverence 
period is much more limited than suggested 
by the majority. "For the State to enforce a 
content-based exclusion" when dealing with 
access to any type of public forum, "it must 
show that its regulation is necessary to serve 
a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.9* Perry, 
460 US. at 45, 103 S.Ct 948. Although 
"compliance with the Establishment Clause 
is a state interest sufficiently compelling to 
justify content-based restrictions on speech,** 
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761-62, 115 S.CL 2440, 
no such interest was present here. Specifi-
cally, because Snyder could not have reason-
ably been perceived as speaking on behalf of 
the City, there was no necessity for the City 
to edit his prayer or deny him the opportuni-
ty to speak based on the content of his 
proposed prayer.2 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 
763, 115 S.CL 2440 (state could not justify 
content-based restrictions because there was 
no potential Establishment Clause violation); 
2. Even if the reverence period is considered a 
nonpublic forum. I do not believe the speakers 
were speaking on behalf of the City. Rather, for 
many of the reasons already outlined, I believe 
the City chose to allow private citizens access to 
the forum to speak on the subject matter of 
religion and spirituality. See Lamb's Chapel v. 
Center Moriclies Union Free School DisL. SOS 
U.S. 384. 113 S.CL 2141. 124 L.£d.2d 352 (1993) 
(school district chose to allow private citizens 
access to nonpublic forum for wide variety of 
social, civic, and recreational purposes); see also 
Summum. 130 F.3d at 914-19 (discussing non-
public forums which have been opened for limit-
ed access to public). Thus, the only way the City 
could have properly rejected Snyder is if its 
decision was "reasonable in light of the purpose 
served by the forum and [was] viewpoint neu-
tral/9 Cornelius. 473 U.S. at 806. 10S S.Ct. 3439 
(discussing restrictions on access to nonpublic 
forum); stt uiso Ctus±batun v. Indianapolis-Mar* 
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union 
Free School Dist, 508 US. 384, 395, 113 
S.CL 2141, 124 L.EcL2d 352 (1993) (same); 
Widmar, 454 US. at 276, 102 S.Ct 269 
(same). 
Ultimately, I believe the City overstepped 
its bounds and violated the Establishment 
Clause by rejecting Snyder's request to 
speak based on its distaste for the content of 
his tendered prayer. M[T]he [Establishment 
Clause's] guarantee of neutrality is respect-
ed, not offended, when tide government, fol-
lowing neutral criteria and evenhanded poli-
cies, extends benefits to recipients whose 
ideologies and viewpoints,, including religious 
ones, are broad and diverse." Rosenberger, 
515 US. at 839,115 S.Ct 2510. Here, how-
ever, M[t]he neutrality commanded of the 
State by the separate Clauses of the First 
Amendment was compromised by the [City's] 
course of action.9* Id at 845,115 S.Ct 2510. 
In particular, the City's action evinced a 
hostility toward Snyder's religious view-
points, and thereby Mundermine[d] the very 
neutrality the Establishment Clause re-
quires." Id Stated in different terms, the 
City's action clearly had the effect of disap-
proving of Snyder's religious viewpoints.1 
See County of Allegheny, 492 US. at 592-93, 
109 S.Ct 3086. 
In the end, the City cannot have it both 
ways: it cannot purport to open the rever-
ence period to a broad cross-section of the 
community without restrictions, while at the 
ion Bldg. Auth.. 63 FJd 581. 587 (7th Cir.1995). 
I do not believe the denial of access to the forum 
would have been reasonable if it was based on 
concern about a potential Establishment Clause 
violation, nor do I believe the City Attorney's 
stated reasons for the denial were reasonable. 
Rather. I believe the uncontroverted evidence 
indicates Snyder was denied access solely to 
suppress the point of view he espoused in his 
tendered prayer. Cornelius. 473 U.S. at 806.105 
S.CL 3439. 
3. In my dissenting opinion from the original 
panel decision. I outlined in greater detail why I 
believed the City's actions violated the test set 
forth in Union v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. 612-
13. 91 S.Ct. 2105. 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). 124 
F.3d at 1358-60. I continue to stand by my 
earlier analysis, but find it unnecessary to incor-
porate all of it into this opinion. 
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same time limiting a particular speaker's ac-
cess to the reverence period because of its 
distaste for the speaker's proposed message. 
Thus, I believe it must either allow Snyder 
the opportunity to give his tendered prayer 
or cease its currently-formatted reverence 
period altogether. 
Even assuming, arguendo, I were to accept 
the majority's assumption that the reverence 
period is a nonpublic forum in which the 
speakers offer prayers and messages on be-
half of the City, I could not fully join the 
majority opinion. In particular, I believe the 
majority has adopted an improper analytical 
framework that requires it to do precisely 
what the Supreme Court in Marsh was 
loathe to do: sit as a board of censors on an 
individual prayer. Further, I am not con-
vinced the majority's framework is useful for 
determining whether the City acted with im-
proper motives. 
Only a minor portion of Marsh touches on 
the propriety of selecting government-sanc-
tioned speakers for invocational prayer ses-
sions. In particular, the appellant chal-
lenged the fact that the Nebraska legislature, 
in carrying out its practice of invocational 
prayer, had selected a chaplain of only one 
denomination over a period of approximately 
sixteen years. The Court rejected this chal-
lenge, stating: 
We, no more than members of the Con-
gresses of this century, can perceive any 
suggestion that choosing a clergyman of 
one denomination advances the beliefs of a 
particular church. To the contrary, the 
evidence indicates that [the chaplain] was 
reappointed because his performance and 
personal qualities were acceptable to the 
body appointing him. [He] was not the 
only clergyman heard by the Legislature; 
guest chaplains have officiated at the re-
quest of various legislators and as substi-
tutes during [his] absences. Absent proof 
that the chaplain's reappointment stemmed 
from an impermissible motive, we conclude 
that his long tenure does not in itself con-
flict with the Establishment Clause. 
tAY cmr CORP. 1247 
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463 VS. at 793-94,103 S.Ct 3330. Although 
the quoted language does not provide us with 
a precise framework to follow in determining 
the constitutional propriety of a particular 
selection (or rejection) decision, it neverthe-
less provides us with two important princi-
ples. First, it expressly indicates we should 
focus on evidence pertaining to the legislative 
body's reasons for selecting or rejecting a 
particular speaker. Second, in analyzing 
such evidence, the ultimate question is 
whether or not the selection or rejection 
"stemmed from an impermissible motive." 
463 U.S. at 793,103 S.Ct 3330. 
In establishing its framework for review-
ing Snyder's claim, the majority acknowl-
edges the second principle, but effectively 
ignores the first The majority begins by 
acknowledging that, in accordance with 
Marsh, a selection decision cannot stem from 
an impermissible motive. Based upon this 
principle, the majority then concludes 'there 
is no Impermissible motive9 when a legisla-
tive body or its agent chooses to reject a 
government-sanctioned speaker because the 
tendered prayer falls outside the long-accept-
ed genre of legislative prayer." From this 
conclusion, the majority makes the insup-
portable leap in logic that the issue of motive 
can be decided solely by focusing on the 
content of the proposed prayer. Ultimately, 
because the majority believes Snyder's pro-
posed prayer falls outside the boundaries of 
acceptable legislative prayer, it concludes the 
City acted with permissible motives in reject 
ing the prayer. 
The majority's analytical framework runs 
counter to Marsh. Marsh provides prayer 
content is simply not an issue for the federal 
judiciary unless a claim is made that an 
entire practice of legislative prayer has been 
"exploited to proselytize or advance any one, 
or to disparage any other, faith or belief." 
Id. at 794-95,103 S.Ct 3330. No such claim 
has been made here. Thus, by adopting the 
framework outlined above, the majority ig-
nores the Supreme Court's directive and ef-
fectively opens the door to future judicial 
review of legislative prayers4 outside the 
narrow confines outlined in Marsh. 
4. I u rM tbfc term "legislative prayer*** to refer to prayei* jiwri on behalf of a legislative body. 
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Additionally, the majority's analytical 
framework simply does not do what it pur-
ports to do, L c ferret out evidence of mo-
tive. The fact a reviewing court concludes a 
tendered prayer is or is not "constitutionally 
acceptable" says nothing about the motiva-
tions of the legislative body that actually 
rejected the prayer. Indeed, it is entirely 
conceivable that what turns out to be a 
"constitutionally unacceptable" prayer could 
have been rejected by a legislative body 
based solely on its distaste for the proposed 
speaker's religious beliefs. On the flip side, 
if a legislative body rejects a proposed pray-
er solely because of concern for complying 
with MarsK the majority would neverthe-
less apparently infer impermissible motives 
if it concludes the prayer is "constitutionally 
acceptable." Both of these examples dem-
onstrate the raajorit/s framework requires 
absolute perfection on the part of those leg-
islative bodies that attempt to conform their 
own prayers to the dictates of Monk* For 
these reasons, I believe the content of a 
tendered prayer is, at best, but one piece of 
evidence pertaining to the issue of motive. 
III. 
I would reverse the district court's grant 
of summary judgment and remand Mr. Sny-
der's Establishment Clause claim for further 
proceedings. 
SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, joins in the 
foregoing dissent 
5. t again emphasize that my criticisms are con-
fined to those situations involving prayer by gov* 
ernmcnt speakers. Where, as here, we are deal* 
ing with private expression, absolute perfection 
is required because a private party's free speech 
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CURRY COUNTY BOARD OF COMMIS-
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Meeting attendee brought § 1983 action 
against county board of commissioners and 
its members alleging that they violated his 
First Amendment free speech rights by vot-
ing to ban him from all future commission 
meetings and subsequently deciding to pro-
hibit him from participating in or speaking 
before commission meetings. The United 
States District Court for the District of New 
Mexico, Wiley Daniel, J., denied board's and 
members* motion to dismiss, and they ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, McKay, Cir-
cuit Judge, held that commissioners9 actions 
were administrative, and they thus were not 
legislatively immune from attendee's claims. 
Affirmed. 
1. Federal Courts e»554.l 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to ad-
dress whether claims arc; barred by absolute 
legislative immunity where district court's 
denial of immunity turns on an issue of law. 
28U&CJL5 1291. 
rights are affected by the government's decision. 
See. e*.. Pimtte. 515 U.S. at 763. 115 S.CL 2440 
(rejection of private expression cannot be based 
on government's incorrect conclusion concern-
ing potential Establishment Clause problem). 
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The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no 
religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror 
on account of religious belief or the absence thereof. There shall be no union of 
Church and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. No property qualification shall be required of any person to vote, or 
hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
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"No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the 
press." 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT ' 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
TOM SNYDER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation and 
H. CRAIG HALL, City Attorney 
for Murray City Corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 990907806 
Plaintiff claims that Murray Cityfs denial of his offer to 
pray before the City Council meeting interferes with his exercise 
of religion under the free exercise guaranteed by Article I, 
Section 4, of the Utah Constitution. He further argues that Murray 
City violated the establishment clause and that he has been 
deprived of the liberty interests without due process. He further 
claims a violation of his free speech right. The defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss the free speech claim under Article I, Section 
15/ of the Utah Constitution is granted based on the five year 
statute of limitations. 
Article I, Section 4, provides that: 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The 
State shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no 
religious test shall be required as qualification for any 
office of public trust or for any vote at any election; 
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nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror 
on account of religious belief or the absence* thereof. 
There shall be no union of Church and State nor shall any 
church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction, or for the support of any 
ecclesiastical establishment. No property qualification 
shall be required of any person to vote, or hold office, 
except as provided in this Constitution. 
Plaintiff argues that the defendant did not remain neutral and 
therefore violated plaintiff's right to free exercise. The City 
argues that it does not have an affirmative duty to provide Snyder 
with a forum in which to exercise his religion. Furthermore, the 
City contends that it did offer Snyder the opportunity to speak 
during the public comment period of the meeting. Finally, the City 
claims that Snyder did not have a deeply held religious belief in 
the practice he seeks to exercise. 
Snyder admits that his purpose in volunteering to offer prayer 
before the Murray City Council meeting was to illustrate to the 
Murray City Council the error in their prayer policy and to get 
them to abandon said policy. To this end, the Snyder "prayer" is 
really a protest and since Snyder chose to style his political 
commentary as a "prayer," it makes a mockery of prayer for the 
purpose of embarrassing the listeners, it contains no sincere 
application to any form of deity, and as pointed out by the 
defendant in their briefs, it is critical of the policy of Murray 
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City and criticizes politicians in general and any coincidental 
bumping together of church and state. 
The free exercise clause bars any law prohibiting the free 
exercise of religion. This is for the purpose of preventing 
government from outlawing or seriously burdening a person's pursuit 
of religion. The City relies primarily on the conclusions of the 
United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals 
in determining that it did not violate Utah's free exercise clause. 
In response, Snyder argues that reliance upon federal decisions is 
improper because the Utah Constitution provides individuals with 
greater protection than federal law. This is true, and in support 
thereof Snyder cites Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 
claiming that the City did not remain neutral and therefore his 
free exercise rights were violated (870 P.2d 916 (1993)). 
• While the Society of Separationists is instructive, the issues 
are distinguishable from the present case. First, Society of 
Separationists contains a direct challenge to Salt Lake Cityfs 
policy allowing prayer at the beginning of City Council meetings. 
Snyder does not challenge the policy of allowing prayer, but 
challenges instead the accessibility of the opportunity to give a 
prayer to all individuals. Second, Society of Separationists 
focuses on that portion of Article I, Section 4, which provides 
that "no public money or property shall be appropriated for or 
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applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction or for 
the support of any ecclesiastical establishment." 
To be valid, a free exercise claim must involve a "religious 
belief." Snyder provides this Court with an Affidavit stating that 
the convictions and beliefs expressed in his prayer are sincere and 
religious. He also provides an Affidavit from a philosophy 
professor at the University of Utah stating that his "statement" is 
a "prayer." The federal court in the Snyder case found that 
Snyder's speech was political and not religious. This Court 
differs with both Affidavits recognizing that Snyder's statement is 
clearly non-religious, while it may be sincere. 
The City argues that it did not have an affirmative duty to 
provide Snyder with a forum in which to exercise his "religion" and 
that it has a right to run a Council meeting subject to rules of 
order and stability, and that it is completely reasonable to 
require Snyder to speak during the public comment portion of the 
meeting. Murray City's policy and practice has been to have an 
opening ceremony with a purpose of promoting civility, lofty 
thoughts, attention to agenda items and to clear out the clutter of 
the day. Snyder's statement is contrary to said purpose. 
As argued by Snyder, the Utah Supreme Court in Society of 
Separationists states that the Utah Constitution provides greater 
protection than federal law. Society of Separationists gives an 
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expansive definition of "religious worship/ exercise or 
instruction," but Snyderfs statement still falls without that 
definition. However, under Society of Separationists, whether or 
not the "prayer" is inherently religious may not be dispositive 
because a non-religious statement should be given the same rights 
to expression as a religious statement. 
Snyder argues that the City violates the establishment clause 
by disallowing the presentation of Snyder's beliefs while allowing 
other religious beliefs and ideas to be presented. Snyder argues 
that the City improperly prefers religion over non-religion in 
violation of Article I, Section 4. Furthermore, Snyder claims the 
City did not have any policy or practice regarding who can perform 
an opening prayer, a claim which appears to be valid. 
The City argues that permitting Snyder's "prayer" would have 
violated the Society of Separationists, since under that case 
opening ceremonies cannot be used for proselytizing. In Society of 
Separationists the court stated that prayer is "a portable, yet 
inherently religious, exercise. It need not occur within a group 
of celebrants to take on religious character, although it may arise 
there. One person praying, silently or aloud, alone in a crowd, 
among nonbelievers or believers, is still participating in a 
religious exercise. We think to hold otherwise would demean prayer 
and those who practice it." Snyder's "prayer" fails to meet this 
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definition of religious exercise and to include it as a prayer or 
as an exercise of religion would demean those who do pray and who 
practice religion. 
Again, Society of Separationists is distinguishable from the 
instant case. As stated above, it contains a direct challenge to 
Salt Lake City's policy allowing prayer at the beginning of City 
Council meetings, which is not a challenge that Snyder makes. He 
challenges accessibility. Society of Separationists focuses on 
that portion of Article I, Section 4, regarding the expenditure of 
public money in support of an ecclesiastical establishment and that 
appears to not be at issue in the instant case. In the Society of 
Separationists action the Salt Lake City Council1 s opening ceremony 
policy had been adopted, but was not formalized as an ordinance or 
resolution, however, the policy was formalized as a resolution soon 
thereafter. The Society of Separationists court specifically noted 
that it did not believe that the informal status of the policy at 
the time the lawsuit filed was "outcome determinative." The Murray 
City policy was less formal if anything than the City Council's 
policy, and it is uncertain whether Murray City intended to 
formalize that policy or not. 
Although the Utah Constitution provides greater protection 
than federal law, the federal court's interpretation is of 
interest. Judge Greene of the United States District Court 
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concluded that Snyder's prayer did not violate the federal 
establishment clause and was "properly excluded from the reverence 
portion of the meeting, however, because it disparages the faith 
and beliefs of others, and contains political commentary concerning 
the City's practices and it proselytizes and advances plaintiff's 
belief concerning church and state." Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 
902 F.Supp. 1444, 1452 (1995). The United States Court of Appeals 
held that the "establishment clause does not give any individual 
the right to establish his religion by guaranteeing an opportunity 
to pray during public meetings and certainly does not require 
Murray City to permit all comers to speak during the reverence 
portion of its City Council meetings." Snyder v. Murray City 
Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1353 (1997). 
In order to avoid a religious clause challenge, it appears 
that Murray City must engage in an opening ceremony based upon the 
concept of government neutrality. Whether or not the Utah Supreme 
Court in Society of Separationists envisioned that governmental 
neutrality would encompass a "prayer" such as Snyder's "prayer" is 
unclear. Under its discussion of neutrality, Society of 
Separationists indicates that absolute neutrality may mean that the 
City cannot discriminate based on an individual's belief system. 
This notion of neutrality is applied by the court in the context of 
concluding that all groups who want to use City facilities must 
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have equal access. However, equal use of City facilities may not 
amount to an equal opportunity to provide disparaging remarks 
during the opening portion of the City Council meeting. The City 
emphasizes this point, claiming that Society of Separationists 
endorsed "generic" statements made at the opening ceremony and did 
not encourage proselytizing. Snyder, on the other hand, claims 
that if only generic statements are allowed, the concept of prayer 
becomes essentially void. This Court agrees with Mr. Snyder on 
this premise. 
Society of Separationists stands for the proposition that the 
concept of government neutrality also includes equal access to all. 
The Court specifically found that the Salt Lake City Council had 
not favored one religion or religion in general, and the Salt Lake 
City Council made efforts to assure a broad cross-section of the 
community was represented. These efforts were in compliance with 
the City Council's resolution which provides in part that the 
opening ceremony will (1) provide a moment during which Council 
members and the audience can reflect on the importance of the 
business before the Council; (2) recognize cultural diversity; and 
(3) foster sensitivity for and recognize the uniqueness of all 
segments of our community. At the time Snyder brought his suit no 
such formal policy existed in Murray City. 
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Snyder contends that the City created a protected interest 
when it scheduled the opening ceremony as a public forum for 
religious expression and that the City deprived Snyder of interests 
guaranteed by specific constitutional provisions. It is difficult 
to discern whether Snyder presents a procedural due process or a 
substantive due process claim# and any analysis of the due process 
right is dependent upon the free exercise and establishment clause 
claims discussed above. 
Mr. Snyder's statement is not a prayer. His statement was 
clearly non-religious. The statement further is proselytizing, in 
that its purpose is to encourage others to criticize Murray City's 
policy. Society of Separationists requires non-religious claims be 
given equal time with religious claims in ceremonies such as the 
ones in question. However, the nature of Snyder's statement was 
clearly not contemplated by the Murray City Council in establishing 
its policy, and Mr. Snyder was offered the opportunity to speak 
during the later portion of the meeting more appropriate for 
political statements. 
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Snyder's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Murray City 
Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Dated this / day of February, 2001. 
hi 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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